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regulating misconduct by the insurers than with
Quackenbush's need to raise $4 million for a "media buy"
that touted his supposed efforts for consumers (see MAJOR
PROJECTS). At this writing, it is unclear whether these settle-
ments are valid; further, the Commissioner's emergency regu-
lations were disapproved by OAL and were never pursued by
DOI after Quackenbush's resignation (see MAJOR
PROJECTS). The Attorney General's lawsuit is stayed while
the state Controller's Office continues to audit the books of
114 title and 477 escrow companies in California (see agency
report on DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS for related
discussion).
People v. Old Republic Title Co., No. 993507 (San Fran-
cisco Superior Court), is similar litigation filed in May 1998
by the San Francisco City Attorney and the San Francisco Dis-
trict Attorney. The suit charges Old Republic with unfair busi-
ness practices and invokes the False Claims Act, a 1986 law
intended to identify and punish companies who defraud the
government. The city claims that Old Republic defrauded con-
sumers of $30 million by failing to return unclaimed escrow
accounts to homeowners or to the state; instead, the city al-
leges that Old Republic treated these funds as profit and placed
them in its own accounts. The suit also alleges that the com-
pany falsified documents and charged illegal fees for services
it did not provide. After a preliminary scuffle over the city's
standing to bring a False Claims Act case (which ended in June
2000 when San Francisco Superior Court Judge Stuart Pollak
ruled in the city's favor), Judge Pollak issued a "tentative deci-
sion" on April 16, 2001 finding that the escrow firm's practice
of retaining interest earned on investments made with escrow
funds is illegal. According to Judge Pollak, Insurance Code
section 12413.5 "does not permit escrow companies to retain
the net interest on instruments required to be purchased with
the proceeds of below-market rate loans extended in exchange
for depositing escrow funds in demand accounts at the bank
making the loan." The judge noted that although state regula-
tions do not specifically prohibit the escrow company's prac-
tice, neither do they affirmatively permit it. At this writing,
Judge Pollak has yet to finalize his ruling; assess damages,
civil penalties, and potentially punitive damages; and decide
whether Old Republic also kept money from unclaimed es-
crow accounts that should have escheated to the state.
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he California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) was
created in 1911 to regulate privately-owned utilities
and ensure reasonable rates and service for the public.
Today, under the Public Utilities Act of 1951, Public Utilities
Code section 201 et seq., the PUC regulates more than 1,200
privately-owned and operated gas, electric, telephone, water,
sewer, steam, and pipeline utilities, as well as 3,300 truck,
bus, railroad, light rail, ferry, and other transportation com-
panies in California. The Commission grants operating au-
thority, regulates service standards, and monitors utility op-
erations for safety.
The agency is directed by a commission consisting of
five full-time members appointed by the Governor and sub-
ject to Senate confirmation. The Commission is authorized
directly by the California Constitution, which provides it with
a mandate to balance the public interest-that is, the need for
reliable, safe utility services at reasonable rates-with the
constitutional right of a utility to compensation for its "pru-
dent costs" and a fair rate of return on its "used and useful"
investment.
The Commission has quasi-legislative authority to adopt
regulations, some of which are codified in Chapter 1, Title 20
of the California Code of Regulations (CCR). The Commis-
sion also has quasi-judicial authority to take testimony, sub-
poena witnesses and records, and issue decisions and orders.
The PUC's Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) Division supports the Commission's decisionmaking
process and holds both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
hearings where evidence-taking and findings of fact are
needed. In general, PUC ALJs preside over hearings and for-
ward "proposed decisions" to the Commission, which makes
all final decisions. At one time, PUC decisions were review-
able solely by the California Supreme Court on a discretion-
ary basis; now, Public Utilities Code section 1756 permits
courts of appeal to entertain challenges to most PUC deci-
sions. Judicial review is still discretionary and most petitions
for review are not entertained; thus, the PUC's decisions are
effectively final in most cases.
The PUC allows ratepayers, utilities, and consumer and
industry organizations to participate in its proceedings. Non-
utility entities may be given "party" status and, where they
contribute to a beneficial outcome for the general public be-
yond their own economic stake, may receive "intervenor com-
pensation." Such compensation has facilitated participation
in many Commission proceedings over the past twenty years
by numerous consumer and minority-representation groups,
including San Francisco-based TURN (The Utility Reform
Network), San Diego-based UCAN (Utility Consumers' Ac-
tion Network), and the Greenlining Institute, an amalgam of
civil rights and community organizations in San Francisco.
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PUC staff-which include economists, engineers, ALJs,
accountants, attorneys, administrative and clerical support
staff, and safety and transportation specialists-are organized
into twelve major divisions and offices, including industry-
specific divisions addressing energy, telecommunications, rail
safety and carriers, and water. The Commission's Consumer
Affairs Branch attempts to resolve consumer complaints re-
garding utility service, safety, and billing problems; its vari-
ous branches provide consumers with information, analysis,
conflict resolution, and advocacy services to help them make
intelligent decisions about utility purchases. The Strategic
Planning Division analyzes emerging policy issues and
changes in the regulatory environment caused by economic,
financial, institutional, and technological trends, and helps
the Commission plan future policy.
In addition, the PUC includes two special offices impor-
tant to public access and representation. The San Francisco-
based Public Advisor's Office and the Commission's outreach
offices in Los Angeles and San Diego provide procedural in-
formation and advice to individuals and groups who want to
participate in formal PUC proceedings. Most importantly,
under Public Utilities Code section 309.5, an Office of Rate-
payer Advocates (ORA) independently represents the inter-
ests of all public utility customers and subscribers in Com-
mission proceedings in order to
obtain "the lowest possible rate for Starting in the summer of
service consistent with reliable experiment with electrici
and safe service levels." On March unprecedented and dis
21, 2001, after a long delay dur- including volatile and exc
ing which the directorship of the supply of electricity forcing
Office remained vacant, Governor and PUC impotence to do
Davis appointed Regina Ann
Birdsell to direct ORA.
The five PUC commissioners each hold office for stag-
gered six-year terms. The precise Commission line-up at any
given point in time has been much complicated by Governor
Davis' delay in filling these appointed positions. As of No-
vember 1999, the Commission consisted of three Wilson ap-
pointees (PUC President Richard Bilas and Commissioners
Henry Duque and Josiah Neeper) and Davis appointees Carl
Wood and Joel Hyatt, both of whom had been appointed on
June 9, 1999 after Governor Davis left their slots empty for six
months (and filled them with temporary appointees Tal Finney
and Loretta Lynch from June 4-9, 1999). [17:1 CRLR 170]
Hyatt's term was to end on December 31,2000, but he resigned
in January 2000. At that time, Governor Davis permanently
appointed Loretta Lynch to the vacancy and designated her as
the President of the Commission; her term expires at the end of
2004. Lynch is a Yale Law graduate and former partner in the
firm of Keker & Van Nest. Previously, she was director of
Governor Davis' Office of Planning and Research.
Meanwhile, Wilson appointee Josiah Neeper continued
to hold the fifth seat, even after his term expired at the end of
1999. Because of Governor Davis' failure to replace him,
Neeper remained as a holdover (and was the deciding third
vote on many key issues) during all of 2000, at which time
the position became vacant by operation of law. On January
1, 2001, Governor Davis appointed his chief of staff, John
Stevens, as a temporary member to fill the vacant swing slot.
Stevens served for 18 days; the Governor then replaced him
with Geoffrey Brown as a permanent appointee. Brown gradu-
ated from the University of San Francisco Law School in 1970
and became a public defender in 1971. In 1978, he took over
as the head of the San Francisco Public Defender's Office
and served there until his appointment to the PUC on January
18, 2001. His term expires at the end of 2006.
Thus, at this writing, the Commission consists of Davis
appointees Lynch (President), Wood, and Brown, and Wilson
appointees Bilas and Duque (whose tenure is in jeopardy;
see LITIGATION).
MAJOR PROJECTS
The Crash of California's Electricity
Industry Restructuring Experiment
Starting in the summer of 2000, California's vaunted
experiment with electricity deregulation resulted in unprec-
edented and disastrous market failure-including volatile and
excessive prices, insufficient supply of electricity forcing
blackouts across the state, and
000, California's vaunted PUC impotence to do anything
deregulation resulted in about either. Most California
strous market failure- ratepayers have suffered 50% rate
ssive prices, insufficient increases; San Diego residentslackouts across the state, saw their bills double for several
nything about either. months during 2000. The state's
three investor-owned utilities-
which spent millions lobbying the
legislature for its 1996 approval of the experiment, raked in
billions due to the required sale of their power-generating
facilities and artificially high rates during the first two years
of the program, and then diverted much of that revenue to
their parent companies-purport to stand at the brink of fi-
nancial ruin, while out-of-state power generators have posted
obscene profits. The poor credit rating of all three utilities
has forced the state to purchase electricity for its citizens to
the tune of $5.1 billion at this writing- most of which will be
borne by current and future ratepayers, none of whom voted
for deregulation.
* Deregulation Overview. California's deregulation ef-
fort formally began with the Commission's December 1995
decision to "unbundle" and deregulate the state's $23 billion
electricity industry. Under the new regime, the PUC main-
tains regulation of the power distribution grid (i.e., the rights
of way and wiring which bring power into homes and busi-
nesses), but generation is subjected to competition. Utilities
that previously generated and transmitted electricity were
required to divest themselves of their power generation fa-
cilities, and must now purchase power from generators in a
competitive environment and transmit it to their customers.







The Commission's decision required approval by the state
legislature and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). In 1996, the California legislature confirmed most
of the PUC's initiative by enacting AB 1890 (Brulte) (Chap-
ter 854, Statutes of 1996). Effective March 1, 1998, AB 1890
created three new entities to administer the deregulation
scheme:
* The Independent System Operator (ISO), a private non-
profit organization, assumed control of the power grid that
transmits electricity statewide between the respective utili-
ties controlling local delivery. The stated purpose of the ISO
is to ensure efficient use and reliable operation of the state's
electricity transmission system. As enacted in AB 1890, the
ISO was controlled by a 26-member governing board ap-
pointed by the Electricity Oversight Board (see below). Un-
der Public Utilities Code section 337 (as added by AB 1890),
the ISO's governing board "shall be composed of California
residents and shall include, but not be limited to, representa-
tives of investor-owned utility transmission owners, publicly
owned utility transmission owners, nonutility electricity sell-
ers, public buyers and sellers, private buyers and sellers, in-
dustrial end-useis, commercial end-users, residential end-us-
ers, agricultural end-users, public interest groups, and
nonmarket participant representatives. A simple majority of
the board shall consist of persons who are themselves unaf-
filiated with electric generation, transmission or distribution
corporations."
* The Power Exchange (PX), also a private nonprofit or-
ganization, was established to function like a stock exchange,
enabling sellers and buyers to bargain for the best price for
electricity. As enacted in AB 1890, the stated purpose of the
PX is to provide an open, efficient, competitive public auc-
tion to meet customers' electricity loads. Under Public Utili-
ties Code section 338, the PX's governing board "shall be
composed of California residents and shall include, but not
be limited to, representatives of investor-owned electric dis-
tribution companies, publicly owned electric distribution com-
panies, nonutility generators, public buyers and sellers, pri-
vate buyers and sellers, industrial end-users, commercial end-
users, residential end-users, agricultural end-users, public
interest groups, and nonmarket participant representatives."
- The Electricity Oversight Board (EOB), a five-mem-
ber board, was established to oversee the ISO and the PX and
to "appoint governing boards [for both entities] that are
broadly representative of California electricity users and pro-
viders" and to "serve as an appeal board for majority deci-
sions of the [ISO] governing board." As enacted in AB 1890,
EOB's five members included three voting members (all of
whom must be California residents and electricity ratepayers)
appointed by the Governor, and one non-voting member each
appointed by the Senate Rules Committee and the Assembly
Speaker.
As noted above, FERC also had to approve the deregula-
tion scheme. Inasmuch as the ISO and the PX are non-public
entities engaged in the interstate transmission and wholesale
power markets, their operations are subject to FERC juris-
diction under the Federal Power Act. When it approved the
ISO and the PX tariffs, FERC rejected those portions of the
ISO and PX bylaws requiring California residency and EOB
appointment of governing board members. In doing this,
FERC exercised jurisdiction over not only the interstate op-
erations of the ISO and the PX, but also over the framework
of the institutions themselves. FERC found that the EOB's
role (and thus the state's role) in regulating the ISO and the
PX conflicted with FERC's own jurisdiction and undermined
the independence of the ISO and the PX governing boards.
FERC further found the residency requirement established in
AB 1890 to be inconsistent with FERC's policy to provide
"broad-based, non-discriminatory, open-access transmission
service" and that it "discourages participation in the ISO by
out-of-state entities by denying them meaningful representa-
tion." In FERC's view, the ISO should not be controlled by
the State of California, but rather should be a regional orga-
nization in which other states may participate-a concept that
California has resisted. FERC did recognize a limited over-
sight function for the EOB on strictly California matters. As
such, the authority of the EOB over the governing boards of
the ISO and PX was limited in SB 96 (Peace) (Chapter 510,
Statutes of 1999). [17:1 CRLR 179-80]
AB 1890 authorized "direct access"-direct transactions
can occur between power generators and end use customers
without effective interference from the utility carrying the
electricity. AB 1890 also outlined a general plan to accom-
plish the "unbundling," or separation, of the three distinct
functions of electricity service: (1) generation, (2) transmis-
sion, and (3) distribution (including the unbundling of the
maintenance of electricity lines, metering, and billing). Thus,
under the new scheme, the traditional local utility - now called
a "utility distribution company" (UDC)-continues to trans-
mit electricity to end users, but power generation and some
aspects of distribution (such as metering and billing) have
been removed from direct private utility control and placed
under a competitive format managed by the ISO or the PUC.
AB 1890 also permitted utilities to charge ratepayers a
"competition transition cost" (CTC) to compensate them for
"stranded costs" or "sunk investments" in imprudent power
generation facilities; the CTC appears as a special itemized
cost on energy bills. Further, the utilities were allowed to
freeze the price of electricity for residential and small busi-
ness users at high 1996 levels (about 50% above the national
average) until 2002 or whenever the utilities sell their power
generation assets. The new law also required the utilities to
give consumers a 10% reduction in electricity rates from those
in effect on June 10, 1996. This rate reduction was effective
January 1,1998 and continues until the earlier of March 31,
2002, or such earlier time as each utility fully recovers its
transition costs (the "transition period"). However, the rate
reduction was accompanied by the issuance of "rate reduc-
tion bonds" by the utilities to finance the reduction, and con-
sumers are required to pay the borrowed money back in an-
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other specially designated charge on the monthly bill called
"trust transfer amount" (TTA). The latter charge was greater
than the rate cut (due to interest accumulation). In other words,
the rate reduction bonds were secured by a surcharge on
ratepayers that substantially offsets the facial reduction. Fi-
nally, the bill promised ratepayers an "anticipated result" of
"no less than a 20% reduction" in post-transition electricity
rates. As events have unfolded, these mandated savings will
not occur.
As described in prior issues, the PUC's implementation of
the new scheme has been fraught with problems. [17:1 CRLR
170-75; 16:2 CRLR 140-44; 16:1 CRLR 158-62] Prior to the
summer of 2000, consumer advocates complained about the
PUC's creation of a new and complicated set of terms of art
and multi-step proceedings, the separation of rate regulation
into "transition period" and "post-transition period" phases,
and complex decisionmaking in separate and fragmented hear-
ings not amenable to comprehensive coverage by underfinanced
consumer groups. But these complaints have been vastly over-
shadowed by the emergence of four
fundamental flaws in the system: The system of buying ar
(1) the underlying nature of power PX/1SO is extraordinaril
and the extraordinary cost of mar- numerous "markets" to
ket failure; (2) possible natural or electricity.
manipulated scarcity as an unad-
dressed defect; (3) the involvement
of the self-interested parties in public "oversight"; and (4) the
use of a "market clearing price" at the end of a bidding period
that hikes up all previous bids to that level and gives all bid-
ders an incentive to "game" that number.
* The Mechanics of Power Purchases Through the PX/
ISO. The system of buying and selling power through the
PX/ISO is extraordinarily complex and consists of numerous
"markets" for the purchase and sale of electricity. In the so-
called "day-ahead market," a day
in advance, market buyers request By May 2000, regional w
the amount of electricity they an- By a 2000, reia,
ticipate needing for each hour of SDG&E passing throul
the following day; sellers of power shocked ratepayers who
state the amount of energy they tripling by the end of Jun
can produce and the prices they re-
quire for each hour. On the basis
of hourly supply and demand bids and orders, the PX sets the
"market clearing price"-the price to be paid by all buyers to
all sellers for energy purchased during each hour-at the high-
est amount bid for that hour (even if some sellers are willing
to sell for less). In another market called the "forward mar-
ket," some market participants can utilize longer-term con-
tracts to lock in prices. The ISO directs the flow of electricity
throughout the state and tracks real-time supply and demand.
When supply purchased through the PX is less than the an-
ticipated demand, the ISO purchases additional electricity to
balance the load and meet specified "reserve" levels (the buffer
capacity needed at all times to keep the electric system stable
and operating). These "real-time" purchases are not subject
to the "day-ahead" prices; ISO must pay what the market
demands (subject to possible price caps set by FERC).
When the ISO anticipates that the state's purchased elec-
tricity and its reserves will not meet forecasted demand, the
ISO begins to issue a series of alerts, warnings, and then staged
emergencies. If reserves fall below 7%, the ISO declares a
"Stage 1 Alert" and asks all customers to reduce energy con-
sumption. If reserves fall below 5%, the ISO declares a "Stage
2 Alert" and power is cut off to commercial and industrial us-
ers who are on interruptible contracts (who receive discounted
rates in exchange for shutting down in times of high demand).
If reserves fall below 1.5%, the ISO declares a "Stage 3 Alert"
and orders rolling blackouts for one to two hours in the af-
fected area(s) to keep the entire system from crashing.
* A Chronology of California's Energy Crisis. As noted
above, the "transition" period ends when a utility disposes of
all of its power generation assets. San Diego Gas & Electric
Company (SDG&E) became the first major utility to do so in
July 1999. With the PUC's decision in D. 99-05-051, the rate
freeze ended, and SDG&E's rates
selling power through the immediately spiked 10%. [17:1
complex and consists of CRLR 173]
he purchase and sale of By May 2000, regional
wholesale prices had started a gen-
eral and steep climb, particularly
in San Diego, with SDG&E pass-
ing through higher energy costs to shocked ratepayers who saw
their bills doubling or tripling by the end of June 2000 (despite
the fact that overall area power use was down). Residential
and small business ratepayers revolted, holding rallies to burn
their utility bills in downtown San Diego.
On June 8, 2000, the PUC issued a controversial deci-
sion (D. 00-06-034) which ultimately proved critical in the
unfolding energy crisis. Capping a yearlong evidentiary hear-
ing involving all the UDCs, con-
sumer groups, power producers,
cslare pic ad sted aih and other parties, the Commis-
ihry inegcoss wth sion released a 3-2 decision re-
higheir energy ostg tor quiring all three UDCs to con-
00w. ttinue to buy electricity only
through the PX or other "quali-
fied exchange" subject to PUC
approval; only in the post-transition period (when a UDC has
sold off its generation assets and its rate freeze has ended)
may a UDC purchase more broadly, including through long-
term contracts. The Commission also rejected PG&E's pro-
posal to cap rates to insulate customers from high prices dur-
ing times of high demand. The PUC stated: "We are confi-
dent that the market will evolve to develop various services
and options that will further enhance competition, while damp-
ening price volatility" (see "Post-Transition Period
Ratemaking Applications" below for detailed discussion of
this decision).
On June 14, 2000, a heat wave in northern California
spiked energy consumption, which led to blackouts affecting










100,000 Bay Area ratepayers. The lack of supply during peak
hours pushed real-time power rates to the maximum permit-
ted-$750 per megawatt-hour (mwh). However, Pacific Gas
& Electric Company (PG&E) was not able to pass on these
prices to ratepayers, as its rates were still frozen.
On June 29,2000, the ISO's governing board (with FERC
authorization) reduced the wholesale power price cap from
$750/mwh to $500/mwh; the board deadlocked 12-12 on
whether to further reduce the cap to $250/mwh. The power
generators warned that lower caps would backfire on con-
sumers because they would discourage power companies from
investing in new facilities; further, generators would simply
sell power to other western-state customers with higher caps-
thus leading to low supply and blackouts in California. On
July 6, the ISO board again refused to lower the cap.
On July 6,2000, the Utility Consumers'Action Network
(UCAN), a San Diego-based ratepayer advocacy organiza-
tion, filed a petition asking the PUC to freeze SDG&E's rates
at 1999 levels.
In late July 2000, FERC announced that it would con-
duct an inquiry into national pricing and energy market is-
sues.
On August 1, 2000, as prices hit the $500 cap for ten
consecutive hours, the ISO finally lowered the cap to $250/
mwh. However, the cap was only applied during energy emer-
gencies and its level -even as reduced-remained almost four
times the historical and normal competitive price. As such,
the cap did not ameliorate excessive bidding or costs.
Also on August 1, 2000, as the ISO governing board was
debating the cap, the ISO declared a statewide Stage 2 Alert
because of sizzling temperatures and soaring demand; ISO
officials noted that the state narrowly missed Stage 3 only
because interruptible customers shut down for the third day
in a row and because of unprecedented conservation efforts
by ratepayers in the San Diego area.
On August 2, 2000, the Commission released its first
major report to the Governor concerning the state's skyrock-
eting electricity costs. The report,
coauthored by PUC President Wholesale prices for el
Loretta Lynch and EOB Chair have increased on averag
Michael Kahn, found that "whole- in 1999, resulting in over
sale prices for electrical power in for electricity. During the
California have increased on av- of California power sper
erage 270% over the same period 300% more than they pai
in 1999, resulting in over $1 bil- 1999."
lion in excess payments for elec-
tricity. During the week of June
14, purchasers of California power spent $1.2 billion on elec-
tricity, 300% more than they paid during the same period in
1999....Had the 1999 price cap of $250/mwh been in place in
2000, electricity purchasers would have saved $110 million
on June 14 alone."
The report made the following points: (a) the state's de-
regulation scheme has eliminated the PUC's authority to cap
rates; only FERC is authorized to established maximum prices;
(b) the ISO and PX "have no duty to protect the public or con-
sider the retail customer," are not accountable to California
consumers, and are controlled by boards "whose members can
have serious conflicts of interest"; (c) because the construction
of new powerplants requires considerable lead time and should
not be relied upon to increase supply in the short term, base
energy demand must be reduced through conservation; (d) re-
newable energy sources and transmission upgrades should be
stimulated; and (e) FERC must impose a wholesale price cap
to blunt price volatility. The report did not endorse the pass-
through of high energy prices to Commission-regulated utili-
ties, noting in a pungent line: "Short term price relief...cannot
resolve market gaming or fundamental wholesale pricing prob-
lems controlled by federal regulators."
The report repeatedly noted that "the data we need to
assess wholesale market pricing and supply scheduling be-
havior is in the hands of two private, autonomous entities:
the California Independent System Operator and the Power
Exchange. Despite the Electricity Oversight Board's legisla-
tive mandate to oversee these institutions, we have been un-
able to obtain this data....We recommend that the California
Attorney General immediately subpoena relevant records and
data to determine the pricing and offering behavior of market
participants; the actions of the ISO and its board members;
and the actions of generators in supplying California's en-
ergy needs." The report specifically said that "California
should not wait for national findings [stemming from FERC's
inquiry] before it investigates California market practices."
The report also recommended the creation of a Califor-
nia Energy Council, modeled after the National Security
Council, to "unify State action to resolve energy problems
and to perform integrated energy planning." Other recom-
mendations included vigorous advocacy to FERC of whole-
sale power price caps; energy conservation; investment in
renewable energy sources that could be ready for the summer
of 2001; improved monitoring of powerplant maintenance
schedules and withdrawal of capacity (which creates artifi-
cial shortages for radical price in-
rical power in California creases); and the elimination of
70%, over the same period conflicts of interest in the ISO and70%iovinexthess amens PX governing boards. Other more
pillion in excess payments
ek of June 14, purchasers immediate recommendations in-
1.2 billion on electricity, cluded the imposition of transi-
luring the same period in tional price caps in San Diego;
allowing "hedging" and "bilateral
contracts" by utilities (the use of
long-term contracts and one-on-
one contracts between a UDC and an electricity producer to
lock in prices); revising building standards to reduce energy
use; streamlining state powerplant siting procedures; invest-
ment in targeted transmission upgrades for new supply; and
reforming the PX's pricing protocols to reduce excess profit.
On August 3, 2000, the PUC denied UCAN's request for
a rate freeze in San Diego (D. 00-08-021), opining that a freeze
might conflict with federal law. Although the Commission








took other actions it said would assist San Diegans (including
a requirement that SDG&E accelerate rebates owed to
ratepayers for previous overpayments), local leaders vowed to
take their case to the legislature. On the same day, President
Clinton ordered federal facilities in California to lower elec-
tricity use and vowed to make federal energy available to Cali-
fornia; Governor Davis called for state and federal investiga-
tions into price manipulation by wholesale power producers.
Statewide Stage 2 Alerts were declared for four straight
days from August 15 through 18, 2000. In late August, the
Joint Legislative Audit Committee ordered the Bureau of State
Audits to commence an investigation into the structure and
market surveillance activities of the ISO and the PX, to de-
termine whether the operation of
and relationship between the two On September 27, 2000
entities have contributed to rising Commission to authorize
electricity costs. increases to pay for $4 bil
On August 21, 2000, eigh- the summer of 2000. Con.
teen days after it refused to freeze that the utilities knew the
SDG&E's rates, the PUC adopted advocated deregulation
a "bill stabilization plan" for be allowed to hold con.
SDG&E ratepayers due to the ris- volatility of the market.
ing furor in San Diego and re-_I
peated requests by Governor
Davis (see "SDG&E Bill Stabilization Decision and Investi-
gation" below for details on this decision). That plan was
quickly superseded by the August 30, 2000 passage and Sep-
tember 6, 2000 approval of AB 265 (Davis), urgency legisla-
tion that caps SDG&E's rates at 6.5 cents per kilowatt-hour
(kwh); it also appears to allow the utility to subsequently col-
lect from ratepayers the growing deficit between that charge
and the amount it pays to generators for electricity (see 2000
LEGISLATION). Called a "sham" and "window-dressing"
by San Diego officials, the bill did nothing to address the
underlying causes of the energy crisis, and in fact may re-
quire future SDG&E ratepayers to pay the exorbitant rates
charged by the producers.
On September 7, 2000, the PUC issued orders imple-
menting AB 265 (Davis), and ordered an investigation into
the "prudence" of SDG&E's energy procurement decisions
from June 2000 forward.
Simultaneously, PG&E-with its rates still frozen-an-
nounced it had lost $2 billion during the summer of 2000 and
wanted similar assurance that it could pass on the difference
between its costs and its rates to its ratepayers. PG&E esti-
mated that its losses could reach $15 billion if prices remain
at summer 2000 levels. A week later, PG&E notified the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission of its intent to sell its
remaining hydroelectric plants by the spring of 2001-at
which point it would divest itself of its generation assets and
its rate freeze would be lifted, exposing northern California
ratepayers to the kind of rates suffered by San Diegans. Sev-
eral days later, a PG&E official announced that the utility
might petition for a lifting of the freeze even before it sells its
hydroelectric facilities.
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On September 21, 2000, the PUC authorized SDG&E to
enter into long-term contracts to purchase electric energy. The
amount of the long-term contracts into which SDG&E may
enter is limited; the utility is permitted to purchase about one-
half of its peak load via long-term contracts. The contracts
can be up to five years in length and must expire by Decem-
ber 31,2005. SDG&E was not compelled to disclose the terms
of those contracts publicly.
On September 27,2000, PG&E and Southern California
Edison (SCE) asked the Commission to authorize retroactive
pass-through rate increases to pay for $4 billion in power
purchases over the summer of 2000. Consumer groups
howled, noting that the utilities knew there would be risks
when they advocated deregulation
G&E and SCE asked the in 1996 and should not now be al-
roactive pass-through rate lowed to hold consumers account-
n in power purchases over able for the volatility of the mar-
ner groups howled, noting ket. Nevertheless, on October 4,
would be risks when they 2000, PG&E filed for a rate in-
1996 and should not now crease of two cents/kwh, or $20/
ners accountable for the mwh, while the average price of
wholesale power had escalated to
$102/mwh. On October 17, the
PUC temporarily denied the utili-
ties' requests for an urgency ruling, but announced its intent
to begin a fact-finding proceeding concerning the utilities'
financial status. In announcing the Commission's decision,
PUC President Loretta Lynch stated that "in my view, the
basic assumptions underlying AB 1890 are ripe for reconsid-
eration. This legislation, enacted by the previous administra-
tion, was based on assumptions about how the California en-
ergy markets would work in a restructured environment. Those
assumptions have not proven accurate. We should evaluate
the reality of California's energy markets and act to coordi-
nate energy policy based on today's facts, not theories, to
serve the overall public interest of California's businesses,
families, and the California economy."
On October 19, 2000, The Utility Reform Network
(TURN), a San Francisco-based ratepayer organization, re-
leased a report in which it contended that PG&E and SCE
received $4.5 billion in windfall profits from the sale of their
powerplants, and argued that those sums-rather than a rate
increase-should be made available to offset the claimed $4
billion in losses due to high energy prices during the summer
of 2000.
On November 1, FERC issued a ruling on its investiga-
tion into potential market manipulation by power generators.
Although it found that electricity prices charged to Califor-
nia during the summer of 2000 were "unjust and unreason-
able," the Commission found no evidence of market manipu-
lation and said it lacks legal authority to order refunds of fed-
erally-sanctioned wholesale rates in the absence of such evi-
dence. FERC instead suggested that California build new
power generating facilities, relax its air pollution guidelines
to allow facilities to generate more power during peak hours,








and permit its utilities to enter into long-term power contracts
for price stability.
On November 29,2000, consumer attorney Mike Aguirre
filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court on behalf of a
single ratepayer against 16 power generators (Hendricks v.
Dynegy Power Marketing Inc., No. GIC758565). During the
same week, similar suits were filed by three San Diego County
water districts. These suits allege violation of federal anti-
trust law prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade (section
1 of the Sherman Act). State legislators subsequently joined
these suits. Initial removal to federal court and motions to
dismiss based on federal preemption were denied.
During November and December 2000, Governor Davis
and other California officials urged FERC to impose whole-
sale price caps. In mid-November, the ISO declared Stage 2
Alerts on three successive days, blaming low supply and soar-
ing prices on powerplant shutdowns for maintenance-both
scheduled and unscheduled.
On December 7,2000, the ISO declared California's first
ever Stage 3 Alert, but was able to avert statewide rolling
blackouts because the Stage 3 declaration permitted it to call
back some power that was being exported out of state. Once
again, powerplants that could have generated about one-third
of California's needed electricity sat idle because they were
undergoing maintenance, shut down because of operational
problems, or had reached their air pollution limits for the year.
Also in December 2000, the ISO executive director in-
explicably petitioned FERC to lift its high $250/mwh ceiling
on energy prices, contending that anticipated scarcity demands
high incentives to develop production. More inexplicably,
FERC in fact lifted the ceiling on December 8. By December
11, the wholesale price of electricity had jumped to between
$600-$800/mwh in northern Cali-
fornia; on December 12, the PX
price of electricity was $1,182/ By December11, the who
mwh during hours of peak de- jumped to between $6
mand, as the ISO declared the California; on December
state's 30th Stage 2 Alert in 2000. was $1,182/mwh during h
On December 14, Clinton admin- ISO declared the state's
istration Energy Secretary Bill
Richardson helped the state avoid
imminent rolling blackouts by ordering twelve generating
plants to sell power to PG&E and SCE (some were refusing
on grounds that previous bills remained unpaid).
On December 15,2000, FERC issued a new order again
denying California's requests for mandatory wholesale price
caps and refunds to ratepayers. Instead, the Commission im-
posed a temporary wholesale "soft" price cap of $150/mwh
(meaning that wholesale bids above that figure must be spe-
cially justified); authorized UDCs to enter into long-term
contracts with generators for electricity; authorized UDCs to
use power they generate or control through contracts to serve
their customers (rather than requiring them to direct it to the
PX); and called for a restructuring of the ISO governing board
to ensure its independence from generators. California offi-
cials and consumer groups were outraged. Governor Davis
accused FERC of ensuring "unconscionable profits for the
pirate generators and power brokers who are gouging Cali-
fornia consumers and businesses." He ordered the legislature
into special session commencing January 3 to pass legisla-
tion restructuring the ISO board, authorizing the state to in-
spect private powerplants to assure the coordination of main-
tenance and operating schedules, and providing low-interest
financing for new power generation facilities.
On December 18, 2000, two class action lawsuits were
filed in Los Angeles alleging that Southern California Gas
and SDG&E conspired to manipulate natural gas prices in
southern California. The suits allege a conspiracy with El Paso
Natural Gas Corporation of Houston, which owns the only
major natural gas pipeline into southern California. Natural
gas prices at the California end of the pipeline were three to
six times the price in Texas, reaching $55 per million BTU in
early December 2000; by contrast, natural gas cost $3 per
million BTU in December 1999.
By December 21, 2000, the average price of wholesale
electric power in California reached an extraordinary $377/
mwh. Historical prices and energy costs vary from $60-$90/
mwh. By December 31,2000, PG&E announced that its debt
to generators totaled $4.8 billion and again demanded pass-
through rate increases; both PG&E and SCE threatened to
file for bankruptcy if rate increases were not granted.
On December 27,2000, the PUC announced its hiring of
KPMG to audit SCE and the Barrington-Wellesley Group to
audit PG&E, to determine the validity of the utilities' claims
of "extreme financial distress" cited to justify their requested
rate increases.
In late 2000, SCE and PG&E filed federal court actions
seeking to compel the PUC to
grant them rate increases to pay
sale price of electricity had for the higher energy costs im-
0-$800/mwh in northern posed upon them. PG&E's law-
, the PX price of electricity suit, filed in the Northern District
urs of peak demand, as the of California, was transferred to
th Stage 2 Alert in 2000. the Central District of California
where U.S. District Judge Ron
Lew is presiding over SCE's case.
The January 2001 average price of energy stood at $314/mwh.
On January 4, 2001, the PUC reversed previous ground
and announced approval of an emergency rate hike for SCE
and PG&E customers; rates increased 9% for residential cus-
tomers and about 15% for large commercial and industrial
users. PG&E complained that the rate increase was not nearly
enough, having applied for an immediate increase of 20%
and a 40% increase by the end of 2001. Combined, PG&E
and SCE claimed that they had run up $11 billion in losses
since June 2000, complained that the rate increase was insuf-
ficient, and vowed to pursue their federal court lawsuits.
On January 12,200 1, FERC approved PG&E's petition
to restructure its relationship with its holding company and
subsidiaries to shield the latter from any indebtedness incurred







by the utility. Consumer advocates decried the move, con-
tending that substantial revenues were transferred from the
utility to the holding company-revenues that should be avail-
able to cover PG&E's indebtedness.
On January 11, 16, and 17,2001, the ISO declared Stage
3 Alerts. The January 17 alert resulted in rolling blackouts
across California and a declaration of a state of emergency
by Governor Davis. In a January 17 press conference, the
Governor announced that four power generators -Duke En-
ergy, Southern Company, Reliant
Energy, and Dynegy-were "pre- On January 11, 16, and 17
pared to pull down the utilities into 3 Alerts. The January
bankruptcy tomorrow at 12:01 blackouts across Californ
p.m. They have agreed, if legisla- of emergency by Govern
tion passes tomorrow, they will
not do that, [and] they will pro-
vide us the power necessary to keep the lights on." Because
the utilities continued to claim that they were on the verge of
bankruptcy, Davis ordered the Department of Water Resources
(DWR) to use funds already budgeted to it to purchase elec-
tricity for the state, and further ordered the legislature to ap-
propriate general fund monies to pay for power.
On January 18, 2001, as the ISO declared another Stage
3 Alert, the legislature passed and the Governor signed two
bills consistent with FERC's December 15 decision. ABX1 5
(Keeley) converts ISO's 26-member "stakeholder" govern-
ing board to a five-member board of directors appointed by
the Governor; prohibits any member of the independent gov-
erning board from being affiliated with any actual or poten-
tial participant in any market administered by the ISO; pro-
hibits the ISO from entering into a multistate entity or a re-
gional organization unless that entry is approved by the board;
and requires the ISO to publish on the Internet a list of Cali-
fornia powerplants that are out of service due to either a
planned or unplanned outage on a daily basis. ABX 1 6 (Dutra)
prohibits the sale of any public utility-owned powerplant un-
til January 1, 2006, requires the
PUC to ensure that generation as- On January 19,2001, as pC
sets remain dedicated to service ratepayers in northern
for the benefit of California fourthconsecutive dayor
ratepayers, and clarifies that pub- passed and the Govern
lic utility-owned generation assets which appropriated $400
remain regulated by the PUC un-
til the Commission authorizes to or tprhe er
their disposal under Section 851
of the Public Utilities Code (see
2001 SPECIAL SESSION LEGISLATION).
Also on January 18,2001, the City of San Francisco filed
suit against 13 major power producers, contending that they
unlawfully colluded to manipulate the wholesale market. City
Attorney Louise Renne filed the action (People v. Dynegy
Power Marketing Inc., No. SCV318189), which is similar to
the class actions filed in San Diego County in November 2000.
On January 19, 2001, as power outages affected 675,000





consecutive day on Stage 3 Alert, the legislature passed and
the Governor signed SBX1 7 (Burton), which appropriated
$400 million from the general fund to DWR to purchase en-
ergy for the use of utility customers for twelve days. The leg-
islation directed the PUC to implement emergency regula-
tions to facilitate utility collection and remittance of customer
payments to DWR for its purchases (see 2001 SPECIAL SES-
SION LEGISLATION). The Commission's decision imple-
menting SBX 1 7 was issued on January 31,2001. It allocated
revenues collected by utilities to
01, the ISO declared Stage DWR in proportion to the energy
alert resulted in rolling delivered by DWR.
nd a declaration of a state Starting on January 19,2001,
Davis. the State of California began buy-
ing power with this initial $400
million-which covered only
twelve days of purchases. Governor Davis began negotiations
with executives of the top four power generators-Duke,
Southern, Reliant, and Dynegy-for long-term contracts. The
Governor announced that the contracts would be let via an
auction, in which he expected up to 50 sealed bids in the 5-
5.5 cents/kwh range. By January 24, the state had received
39 bids with a "weighted average" price of 6.9 cents/kwh.
On January 24, 2001, Governor Davis named five new
members to the ISO board, which had been reconstituted by
ABXl 5 (Keeley) (see above). All board members must be
"independent from any market participant."
Also on January 24, 2001, SDG&E petitioned the PUC
for an additional 17% rate increase. Under AB 265 (Davis)
(see above), the utility is under a rate freeze until December
31, 2002, but is entitled to any overage from power purchases
accrued to that point, which it warned could reach $1.45 bil-
lion by then. SDG&E complained that its debt is hampering
its ability to buy power and borrow money.
On January 26, 2001, Governor Davis outlined a "nine-
point plan" under which the state would establish its own power
authority and purchase "stock
r outages affected 675,000 ownership" in the utilities, thus
fornia during the state's infusing the utilities with cash that
would enable them to pay off their
signed SBX1 7 (Burton), soaring debts. The Governor pro-
lion from the general fund posed to finance the purchase by
gy for the use of utility selling bonds, and expressed "hope
and expectation" that current elec-
tricity rates would not have to be
increased beyond the 9-15% in-
creases authorized by the PUC on January 4 (see above). The
Governor's proposal mirrored ABX 118 (Hertzberg), introduced
on January 25, which would allow the state to sell $12 billion
in bonds to help PG&E and SCE cover their summer 2000
debt. Consumer advocates blasted the plan as a bailout of the
utilities which sought deregulation.
By January 30, 2001, the $400 million authorized in
SBXI 7 (Burton) had run out. Governor Davis ordered DWR
to continue purchasing electricity from its own budget.









On January 30, 2001, the PUC ordered PG&E to file a
plan for cost-based rates for remaining utility-generated power
(not yet sold to generators), authorized $314 million in en-
ergy efficiency funding, and scheduled hearings starting in
March 2001 on PG&E's requested rate increase.
On January 31, 2001, the results of the PUC-ordered
audits of SCE and PG&E were released. KPMG's audit of
SCE concluded that the utility overstated its debt in purchas-
ing electricity by at least $1.5 billion, and that it had trans-
ferred $4.8 billion to its parent company since 1996 deregu-
lation. SCE earned $2 billion from the generating facilities it
had not yet sold. The PUC-ordered audit of PG&E by the
Barrington-Wellesley Group revealed that during nine months
of 2000, the utility turned over nearly one-third of its cash
flow to its parent, PG&E Corporation, including $632 mil-
lion in dividends. In total, the two utilities received more than
$10 billion above their costs during the first two years of de-
regulation. These funds were transferred to parent compa-
nies and then to stockholders, bondholders, or other subsid-
iaries. The holding companies have sought and obtained re-
structuring permission from FERC to immunize these funds
from liability should they be ordered to pay power genera-
tors. The audits did confirm that the utilities, as presently fi-
nanced, do not have sufficient reserves to pay current and
imminent bills from power generators at the rates extant.
On February 1,2001, the legislature passed and the Gov-
ernor signed ABX1 1 (Keeley), which significantly expands
DWR's role in purchasing power for the state. ABXI 1 au-
thorizes DWR to enter into long-term contracts to purchase
power and sell it at cost to retail customers of PG&E, SCE,
and SDG&E and to municipal utilities; appropriates $500
million to DWR with which to buy power; requires revenues
collected from end-use customers to be deposited into a new
"Electric Power Fund" in the State Treasury; and authorizes
DWR to sell bonds to finance its power purchases. ABXI 1
also somewhat limits PUC authority by providing that resi-
dential customer rates may not be increased for usage up to
130% of baseline quantities.
On February 2, 2001, the Sacramento Bee published a
detailed accounting of the extensive lobbying and campaign
contribution activity of the state's major utilities, mostly
through their parent companies. While claiming financial ruin,
SCE and PG&E and its affiliates expended over $2 million
on lobbying and campaign contributions to the state legisla-
ture during the last half of 2000. Federally, five major power
generators-Mirant, Reliant, Dynegy, Duke, and Williams,
together with Enron Incorporated (which is not a generator
to California, but created a commodities market role for it-
self as a middleman in the state)-provided substantial funds
for congressional candidates and for the Bush administration.
All of those companies posted unprecedented profits during
the third and fourth quarters of 2000 due to their sales of
power to California; Enron executives played a major role in
fashioning the Bush administration's 2001 energy policy
through Vice-President Dick Cheney.
On February 5, 2001, as California entered its 22nd
straight day on Stage 3 Alert, Governor Davis invoked his
emergency powers and seized the existing PG&E and SCE
energy contracts held by the California Power Exchange. The
PX presented the Governor with a bill for $1 billion, its valu-
ation of the contracts taken. These contracts, which the PX
was preparing to auction off because neither utility had paid
the PX for power they had purchased, provide for energy de-
livery at relatively low rates (6-13 cents/kwh). The state is
obligated to pay the "reasonable value" of the contracts us-
ing public money.
On February 6, the PUC announced that it may under-
take an investigation into whether power utilities have vio-
lated Commission rules governing their diversification into
"unregulated businesses." All three utilities formed parent
holding companies since 1986 (PG&E formed PG&E Cor-
poration, SCE formed Edison International, and SDG&E
formed Sempra Energy). The two PUC-ordered audits of SCE
and PG&E found that almost all of the income of the parents
was traceable to utility profit. (Note that utilities are design-
edly confined to cost recovery plus a "fair rate of return" on
"used and useful capital" committed to utility purposes.) The
utilities and their parent companies contend that these funds
are unavailable to them to pay for power- all of which must
be borne by ratepayers.
On February 9, 2001, Duke Energy gave the Orange
County Register an internal letter dated July 31, 2000 from
Duke president James Donnell offering to sell California 2,000
megawatts at five cents/kwh for five years. The offer was not
accepted. Also on February 9, the Governor announced spe-
cial incentives to bring new powerplants on line.
On February 12, 2001, California's 28th consecutive day
on Stage 3 Alert, U.S. District Judge Ronald Lew rejected
SCE/PG&E's motions for injunctive relief requiring the PUC
to increase their rates. Judge Lew said that it would be "wholly
inappropriate" for a federal court to intrude on PUC
ratesetting. In light of the PUC's plans to hold hearings in
March 2001 on SCE/PG&E's requests for rate increases, the
court declined to grant the PUC's motion to dismiss the ac-
tions and promised the utilities an early trial date once they
had exhausted their administrative remedies before the Com-
mission.
On February 16,2001, Governor Davis unveiled his over-
all "rescue plan," which would include state purchase of the
transmission grids owned by the state's three investor-owned
utilities (which would help the utilities pay off the massive
deficits owed to generators). The price would range from $3-
$9 billion, and would be repaid from future rates. The Gover-
nor also sought a significant contribution by the utilities' par-
ent companies to their utility subsidiaries to satisfy their credi-
tors, cheap power from the utilities' remaining power gen-
eration facilities, and dismissal of all pending litigation. The
Governor expressed hope that the deal could be negotiated
with the utilities in the coming weeks and without further
rate hikes. Also on February 16, the Los Angeles Times re-
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vealed that public power agencies-including the Los Ange-
les Department of Water and Power-had joined in charging
excessive rates for the sale of their own excess power.
On February 20, 2001, as the Governor's closed-door
negotiations with the utilities for the sale of their transmis-
sion facilities continued, the state Senate approved SBX 1 6
(Burton), which would create a state public power authority
that could generate and sell electricity, and would authorize
it to sell $5 billion in general obligation revenue bonds to
finance such plant investment or conservation incentives (see
2001 SPECIAL SESSION LEGISLATION).
On February 22,200 1, the Commission ruled that PG&E
and SCE are not responsible for paying the unanticipated cost
of DWR-purchased power. That power was purchased in the
short run from the state's general fund. But the Governor
pledged a multibillion dollar bond issuance to repay that with-
drawal in full. Accordingly, the decision implies future
ratepayers will be assessed the cost of bond repayment, with
interest over many years. Politically, this option was consid-
ered most palatable because it places the cost on future
ratepayers.
Also on February 22, 2001, the state announced its need
for another $500 million from surplus public funds for an-
other ten days of energy purchases, bringing the total to $2.6
billion in direct public money for purchases to that date. This
sum does not include the billions of dollars the generators
claim they are owed from utilities.
On March 5, 2001, the Governor announced long-term
energy contracts with 20 suppliers. At the time, the details of
the contracts were not disclosed. However, a subsequent suit
by the media to compel disclosure under the California Pub-
lic Records Act revealed that the contracts include terms of
ten to twenty years, require payment at levels double to triple
historical prices, and include-in some cases-additional
escalation clauses based on the price of natural gas (which
may rise precipitously given evolving federal deregulation).
On March 16, 2001, FERC announced that it would order
$69 million in refunds for overcharges by power generators in
January 2001, and a possible $55 million for February. These
overcharges were based on prices
in excess of $430/mwh during On March 21, 2001, the IS
Stage 3 emergencies. Commenta- FERC on the cause of
tors scoffed at the trivial nature of concluding that pow
the ordered refunds, noting that manipulated prices thro
relatively little power was sold dur- withholding" to generate
ing Stage 3 emergencies, and that withhoading" t rt
the $430 ceiling is about six times prices, particularly thro
the normal price for power and
amounts to about 10% of the over-
charge for the same period sought by California's ISO.
On March 21,2001, the ISO filed a 100-page report with
FERC on the cause of generator price increases, concluding
that power generators artificially manipulated prices through
"physical and economic withholding" to generate scarcity and
artificially high prices, particularly through deferral to the
real-time market clearing price. Based on the typical operat-
ing costs of powerplant owners, the report said the state ap-
pears to have been overcharged $6.87 billion since May 2000.
The ISO again called for regional price caps, concluding that
current prices are 400% over what is needed to create incen-
tives for new plant construction.
On March 22, 2001, the Bureau of State Audits (BSA)
released Energy Deregulation: The Benefits of Competition
Were Undermined by Structural Flaws in the Market, Unsuc-
cessful Oversight, and Uncontrollable Competitive Forces,
its report on energy deregulation that had been requested by
the Joint Legislative Audit Committee in August 2000 (see
above). The study concluded that a "complex combination of
factors" has resulted in the failure of deregulation. That "com-
plex combination" includes (1) the terms of the legislation
mandating deregulation; (2) its implementation by the PUC-
particularly the Commission's requirement that investor-
owned utilities sell all the power they generated themselves
into "sequential short-term markets" or "spot markets" oper-
ated by the PX and ISO, and its initial refusal to let the utili-
ties enter into long-term contracts when prices were low; (3)
the utilities' failure to immediately secure long-term contracts
when the PUC finally authorized them to do so; and (4) "mis-
judgments" on the part of FERC and the PUC as to the effec-
tiveness of their corrective actions. The report also noted some
factors contributing to the crisis that are "outside the scope of
any regulator or agency"-such as unusual weather patterns
(a drought limiting the availability of hydroelectric power)
and steep increases in natural gas prices.
BSA made four major recommendations: (1) "eliminate
the opportunity for strategic bidding" by stopping real-time
bidding and executing forward (long-term) contracts with
generators, halting "ancillary services" spot market bidding
and buying these forecasted advance reserve purchases
through sealed bids, and considering contracting for genera-
tion capacity; (2) avoid using a single statewide wholesale
price cap as a check on abuse, because that then becomes the
"targeted bid price"; instead, BSA recommended that caps be
imposed where "markets are found to be noncompetitive and
supply is being withheld... ."; (3)
give the ISO authority to sched-
led a 100-page report with ule powerplant maintenance, re-
nerator price increases, moving that power from the gen-
generators artificially mvthat-owerfrmegen-
"physical and economic erators-who were allegedly ma-
arcity and artificially high nipulating outages to limit supply
and escalate the real-time bid
market clearing price; and (4)
limit the amount of market data
published on Web sites-here,
BSA found that the posting of bid and price data immediately
after the fact, combined with readily available ISO data and
PX pricing models, facilitated the "gaming" of prices to arti-
ficially high levels; instead, BSA recommended that bidding
and winning bid data should be delayed a full year before
public release in any form.








The report's recommendations were not followed. Some
were mooted by other events -including the use of long-term
contracts not by utilities but by the state through DWR, and
the bankruptcy of the PX entity and collapse of that market
mechanism following FERC's December 15, 2000 order. At
this writing, wholesale price caps remain the primary check
on abuse, ancillary services remain subject to spot bidding,
and information about post hoc bid amounts continues to be
available.
By March 26,2001, the Governor's staff, legislators, and
PUC officials admitted that a rate increase would be neces-
sary to bail out the utilities.
On March 27, 2001, the PUC unanimously approved the
biggest electricity rate increase in California history -a hike
of just under 50% (three cents/
kwh)-for ratepayers of PG&E On March 27,2001, the PU
and SCE to yield $2.4 billion in ad- biggest electricity rate in
ditional revenue for the utilities. In bie st cit r i
so ruling, the Commission ratepayers of PG&E and
nonadopted the proposed decision atpa of for and
of a PUC AU, who stated: "Since additional revenue forth
April 1998, ratepayers have paid
billions of dollars in excess of market costs to support recov-
ery of utility transition costs. Ratepayers did not cause the util-
ity liquidity problems, have not benefitted from electric restruc-
turing, and should not bear the cost recovery risks imposed by
AB 1890." Consumer groups were outraged, arguing that a
rate increase will do nothing to resolve the flaws that caused
the crisis. The Commission also ordered PG&E and SCE to
begin paying debts owed to "qualified facilities" (usually small
renewable cogenerators) to assure continued power from that
source. The Commission also announced "incentive programs"
involving the expenditure of $138 million through the end of
2004; these programs will provide incentives for energy con-
servation, renewable fuel generation, and waste heat recovery
for efficiency gain pursuant to the instruction of AB 970
(Ducheny) (see 2000 LEGISLATION). The funds will come
from "electric distribution revenues" (that is, they will be added
to utility bills and paid by ratepayers).
On March 28, 2001, FERC's governing board indicated
it would not award substantial refunds to California arising
from allegedly excessive and unreasonable wholesale energy
prices paid to the out-of-state gen-
erators. Of the $6.87 billion in On Aprl6,2001, PG&E--c
overcharges claimed by the ISO shocked public official
and utilities, FERC indicated that bankruptcy.
only $3 billion is eligible for con-
sideration. Of that amount, only
$124 million is being closely examined by FERC for refund.
Also on March 28, 2001, the PUC's Office of Ratepayer
Advocates accused SDG&E of padding electricity bills by
$170 million in recent months. The utility obtained below-
market prices in a long-term contract with Louisville Gas &
Electric, and-instead of passing on those reductions-
charged ratepayers at market levels and pocketed the differ-
lair
sb
ence for its stockholders. Consumer critics charged that if
costs are above established market level, the utility expects
ratepayers to pay; if below, it proposes to keep the differ-
ence. ORA is seeking refunds for SDG&E ratepayers. The
charges were made amidst disclosure of a new compensation
package of $7 million per year for Stephen Baum, who chairs
the board of SDG&E's parent (Sempra Energy).
On April 3, 2001, the Commission finally ordered an in-
vestigation of transactions between PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E
and their respective holding companies. Consumer advocates
argued that substantial sums were extracted from utility rev-
enues and assets (including the high prices paid for generat-
ing plants sold by the utilities) and transferred to holding com-
panies and their other subsidiaries. At the same time, many
of these holding company assets
have interests in generation and
inanimously approved the have profited from the high prices.
ase in California history- The Commission announced that
E to yield $2.4 billion in its inquiry is appropriate given theilities, rate increases just announced.On April 5, 2001, in the
Commission's proceeding to in-
vestigate the reasonableness and prudence of SDG&E's pro-
curement practices required by AB 265 (Davis) (see above),
the PUC's Office of Ratepayer Advocates charged that
SDG&E failed to enter into long-term contracts when able to
do so during the previous year, costing ratepayers $98 mil-
lion. ORA noted that PG&E and SCE aggressively hedged in
the PX's forward market during 2000; SDG&E had the same
opportunity but failed to implement any risk management pro-
gram or take advantage of the forward market. Instead, it
overly relied on the short-term "spot market" which hit ex-
traordinarily high levels in late 2000.
Also on April 5, 2001, Governor Davis made a televised
speech in which he reported progress in solving the state's
energy crisis. He stated that twelve new powerplants have
been licensed during his administration (whereas no new
powerplants were built during the twelve years prior to his
term). He ticked off the steps taken by the state-its purchase
of power because the utilities can't; its entry into long-term
contracts with generators; its progress in negotiating state pur-
chase of utility transmission lines; its incentive programs to
conserve energy; and its ongoing
ming debts of $8.9 billion- investigation into possible market
iy declaring Chapter 11 manipulation by the generators.
He also acknowledged that rate in-
creases are necessary to "keep our
lights on and our economy
strong," but suggested that the PUC revised its rate increase
proposal to "reward those who conserve and motivate the
biggest users to cut back."
On April 6, 2001, PG&E-claiming debts of $8.9 bil-
lion- shocked public officials by declaring Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy. The filing threw the state's negotiations with the utili-
ties for their transmission facilities into chaos. U.S. Bank-







ruptcy Judge Dennis Montali of San Francisco received the
complicated case. Consumer advocates sought and were re-
fused permission to represent ratepayers in the bankruptcy
proceedings, which normally focus on the rights of creditors.
On April 9, 2001, Governor Davis and SCE agreed in
principle on the state's purchase of the utility's 32,000 miles
of transmission lines for $2.76 billion. As part of the deal,
Edison's parent agreed to refund back to the utility some $420
million in profit from its plant sales to the power generators
to help pay some of the debt owed to those generators. The
deal was opposed vigorously by the Foundation for Taxpayer
and Consumer Rights (FTCR) as a "massive, unadulterated,
ratepayer-funded bailout of Edison."
On April 18, 2001, energy experts testified before an
Assembly committee that El Paso Natural Gas sold capacity
on the only natural gas pipeline into southern California to its
own affiliate in a scheme to profit from monopoly power.
Paul R. Carpenter of the Brattle Group from Cambridge,
Massachusetts contended that El Paso took advantage of lax
federal regulation to add $750 million in extra revenues from
SCE customers alone. The Brattle Group report concluded
that El Paso sold one-third of its pipeline capacity to Dynegy
(one of the five power generators)-an amount well in ex-
cess of Dynegy's need or ability to sell to other marketers.
Dynegy then raised the price to those then forced to seek its
captured portion of the pipeline, inflating prices. Then El Paso
awarded another capacity contract to a sister company. The
resulting manipulation, combined with the removal of fed-
eral regulatory oversight, drove California natural gas prices
to levels twelve times the price in Texas.
On April 21, 2001, the San Diego County Board of Su-
pervisors announced plans for state legislation to authorize a
municipal utility district to generate and sell electricity. Los
Angeles, Sacramento, and San Francisco currently have such
districts. Sempra Energy expressed public support for the
concept, but its behind-the-scenes opposition eventually
scuttled the whole proposal.
By April 24, 2001, the state had spent $5.1 billion-an
average of $54 million per day - for electricity purchases from
January to April, all in addition to current amounts allegedly
owed energy producers by utilities.
On April 25, 2001, FERC voted 2-1 to issue a "price
mitigation order" purportedly limiting prices that may be
charged by power generators; however, the effect of the or-
der fell far short of the regional price caps California sought.
The plan includes the following three elements: (1) sellers
with participating generator agreements must offer all avail-
able power in real time; (2) the ISO should establish a single
market clearing price for the real-time auction; and (3) "price
mitigation" (ceilings) will apply during a Stage 1 emergency
(when contingency reserves fall below 7%). That ceiling is
marginal cost for natural gas-generated power, plus $2/mwh
for administrative overhead. If a generator has higher costs,
it may bill and justify at the higher figure. Further, the plan is
contingent upon the ISO and the state's investor-owned utili-
ties submitting a regional transmission organization (RTO)
proposal to FERC by June 1 -something California has thus
far been unwilling to do.
Most consumer advocates dismissed FERC's order as too
limited to correct the market imbalance. They argue that the
only limitation on high prices is a new FERC $150/mwh
"breakpoint" where refunds may be claimed if rates are charged
without cost justification above that level. However, that level
is over four times the cost of energy production -and double
the historical cost of utility power in California. Price controls
below this level are imposed only during power emergencies.
Hence, last-minute bidding at the real-time auction could still
yield bid prices up to four times cost and those prices could be
collected through utility assessment-so long as a 7% reserve
remains in place. The marginal cost limitation would be im-
posed less than 5% of the time and would not address the over-
all problem. At this writing, the likely failure of this April 25
order will probably compel FERC to reconsider, expand, and
tighten its order before the end of summer 2001.
* Consumer Critique. According to consumer advocates
(including TURN in northern California, FTCR in Los Ange-
les, and UCAN in San Diego), deregulation as implemented
is seriously flawed and is based on a misunderstanding of
utility economics. The advocates argue that decisions by the
legislature, FERC, and the PUC have exacerbated those flaws
and threaten those relying on electricity for business and do-
mestic purposes with ruinous rates. Those decisions have re-
sulted in substantial subsidies to existing utilities to divest
themselves of uneconomic powerplants, price spike problems
as unregulated electricity generators take advantage of scar-
city to exact excessive prices and profits, failure to adequately
provide for external benefits (renewable energy stimulation),
and failure to expand generation capacity.
Consumer advocates point to a 1996 decision by FERC
as critical to the current conundrum. From 1992-95, the Cali-
fornia Energy Commission recommended the development
and stimulation of substantial alternative energy supply
sources. This policy decision was driven by several years of
study of future energy supplies, and by the long-run advan-
tage of developing renewable energy sources for future con-
sumers in the millennia to come. It would have produced 1,400
megawatts of power for a capacity cushion, which conserva-
tionists and consumer advocates argued was prudent. How-
ever, the utilities appealed to FERC, arguing that some of the
costs of this alternative generation would be higher than the
cheapest available power (generally hydro- and gas-powered
generators). They contended that utilities had a right to the
lowest-price sources; indeed, they argued that a failure to
pursue the lowest price could be "imprudent" under regula-
tory law standards and subject them to liability for the differ-
ence. In addition to the cost argument, the utilities also con-
tended that supply was adequate without the 1,400 megawatts
of additional capacity. SCE CEO John Bryson wrote in 1994
that it would not need new power sources until "at least 2005."
Regrettably, FERC sided with the utilities.
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To this day, the utilities contend that their projections were
accurate, that demand has not increased inordinately, and that
the "scarcity" problem leading to high prices in the bidding
process is the result of price manipulation by the five major
private generator companies. However, consumers and envi-
ronmentalists point out that such manipulation would be much
more difficult if substantial capacity beyond the 11% now com-
ing from "green power" were available to defeat that alleged
manipulated scarcity by the five major generators.
Apart from the 1996 lost opportunity for renewable en-
ergy stimulation and scarcity insurance, the higher prices were
exacerbated by the high concentration of energy assets in the
hands of five major energy providers-Mirant, Dynegy, Re-
liant, Duke, and Williams. Those producers are all advised
by a group of firm interchanging "advisers" who predict de-
mand and "game" offers of sup-
ply and bid prices. The producers Apart from the 1996 los
are able to learn what their com- energy stimulation and s
petitors are doing through instan- prices were exacerbated
taneously arranged Web site com- energy assets in the h
munication arranged by the ISO. providers--Mirant, Dyneg
Critically, most energy is bid on a
"spot market" basis, where pro-
ducers bid a day ahead, an hour ahead, and then on a "real-
time" basis as demand dictates. Power is purchased at what-
ever price necessary to secure it, and revenue requirements
are adjusted accordingly post hoc.
Exacerbating the setting's bonafide market dynamic are
three flaws. First, as described above, market participants are
able to bid "a day ahead" for a given supply and price, and
then if demand rises so that energy is needed the following
day, renege on that offer, pay a penalty, and instead sell that
power on a "real-time" basis at a "market clearing price" many
times cost or previous levels. That artificial and high "market
clearing price" applies to all "real-time bidders," even those
who bid lower prices during the same time increment (either
one hour or, more recently, ten-minute intervals). Accordingly,
all energy producers gain when any one of them is left alone
at the last minute in real time to bid at an excessive price of
ten to fifty or more times normal market level. All suppliers
have an incentive to restrict supply, stimulate scarcity, and
achieve extremely high real-time market clearing prices. Ac-
cordingly, even without direct unlawful collusion, the sys-
tem is rigged to inhibit genuine price competition.
The second flaw is the development by all energy pro-
ducers of experts called "schedule coordinators" (SCs). These
are the persons who communicate with the ISO to offer sup-
ply and to bid a day ahead, an hour ahead, and real-time.
They all have almost instantaneous information on bids and
prices after they are set, hour by hour. They all work to pro-
vide maximum advantage for their companies, using the same
data and sources. They do so in a context of a strong "non-
zero sum" game-where all can benefit together simply by
not signing long-term contracts, withholding capacity in the
day-ahead market, and withholding some capacity in the real-
time market and relying on a high market clearing price to
increase profit margins more than increases in volume (mar-
ket share) would achieve.
The third flaw is the segmentation of the market into many
separate submarkets each subject to its own separate rules
and auctions. Hence, power may be "RMR" power which is
a base amount, or "ancillary services" power (either spinning
or non-spinning) which generators are paid to have at the ready
in case called upon, or it may be in one of five other catego-
ries. That segmentation makes gaming of the system more
likely since fewer competitors are presented in each of these
separate auction markets than would be the case if they were
consolidated.
The excessive prices beginning in late 1999 raised elec-
tricity spending more than threefold their pre-2000 or cost-
based levels, produced a serious
pportunity for renewable public budget squeeze, produced
,city insurance, the higher substantial rate increases by all
the high concentration of three utilities compelled to pass
ds of five major energy energy costs onto consumers, and
teliant, Duke, and Williams. will require a $12 billion public
bond issuance to repay the gen-
eral fund. Nevertheless, all such
charges have not been collected by utilities from ratepayers.
In addition to over $9 billion owed the general fund and higher
ongoing rates, utilities purportedly owe additional billions of
dollars to energy producers, forcing one utility into bankruptcy
and leading the other two to seek massive rate increases.
In addition, the utilities have allegedly profited by (1)
pocketing substantial sums from the sale of assets (which in-
dicated some anticipation of excessive prices), (2) holding
company involvement in natural gas and other generation
assets achieving substantial (unattributed) profits, and (3)
profiting from the rate freeze. Rates were frozen at a level
substantially above fair rate-of-return levels in order to give
the utilities an incentive to approve deregulation. The plan
built in substantial profit that utilities would keep where and
if efficiencies resulted from market forces as advertised. And
that efficiency gain would theoretically allow the promised
20% reduction in rates following transition to competition.
However, instead of efficiency gain and a 20% reduction,
consumers have been assessed increases above the freeze lev-
els of 60%, with substantial additional liability pending, and
a $12 billion public bond needed to repay the general fund.
This bond will be repaid by ratepayers who will bear not only
the cost of the general fund repayment, but added interest
over the twenty-year term of the bond. In addition, such a
large bond issuance reduces general fund revenues because
paid interest is deductible from otherwise received general
fund revenues, and serves to limit other public bond financ-
ing opportunity.
Consumer advocates note that the utilities supported de-
regulation in a gamble that the freeze would provide room
for substantial additional profit given those gains. They would
keep that gain should they win the gamble. Having lost it,







they should not now receive compensation for their failure.
Consumer representatives argue that those sums diverted to
holding company parents from generator sales should be
tapped, as well as other utility assets, for proper utility stock-
holder assessment.
* Performance-Based Ratemaking. As to PG&E, SCE,
and SDG&E-the remaining monopoly utilities that deliver
electricity to businesses and homes, the PUC has altered tra-
ditional "fair rate of return" maximum rate regulation at the
same time it has devolved power generation and some trans-
mission to less regulation (as discussed above). As to the re-
maining monopoly structure (actual distribution), fair rate-
of-return ratemaking has yielded to "performance-based
ratemaking" (PBR). Under PBR, utilities' rates are set ac-
cording to an average market price for electricity. If a UDC is
able to purchase electricity for less than the benchmark price,
the savings are split between the ratepayers and the utility's
stockholders. The theory behind PBR is to give the utility an
incentive to improve efficiency by allowing it to share in sav-
ings, to provide a reward similar to that extant in the free
market for improved performance. However, the calculations
made under this more nebulous standard lack the reference
point of fair rate-of-return analysis which monitors exces-
sive profit.
Prior to the crisis described in the chronology above, the
PUC engaged in proceedings to set rates under the PBR
mechanism for SDG&E [17:1 CRLR 172], SCE, and PG&E.
However, the Commission indicated in 2001 that PBR issues
have been rendered substantially moot by the extraordinary
events described above. PBR ratemaking is essentially a fine-
tuning device to provide incentives to regulated utilities to
improve performance as a market would reward. Given the
enormous pass-through charges developing from generator
charges at ten to twenty times historical levels, such refine-
ments have become substantially moot for the time being.
* Annual Transition Cost Proceedings. During the pe-
riod of transition (while utilities dispose of uneconomic gen-
erating facilities to achieve stability), the PUC continues to
regulate rates through annual transition period rate adjust-
ments. These adjustments involve cost recovery to utilities
subject to competition-caused loss. Part of that loss is calcu-
lated through the CTC (discussed above). That loss also in-
cludes restructuring implementation costs-the costs that
occur when a utility gives up its generating plants and associ-
ated assets. [17:1 CRLR 172]
All three utilities filed their first ATCP applications in
September 1998 (A. 98-09-003 for PG&E, A. 98-09-008 for
SCE, and A. 98-09-009 for SDG&E). On February 17, 2000,
the PUC issued a final 5-0 decision (D. 00-02-048) largely
reflecting settlements between the parties to the proceedings;
consumers were represented through the PUC's Office of
Ratepayer Advocates.
The major issue in dispute in these proceedings was the
amount properly allowed to SDG&E and SCE as "employee
transition" costs -that is, how much should the utility be al-
lowed as an expense for the cost of reconfiguring its employ-
ees to match the deregulated structure (where many of its
previous functions are taken over by "competitive" firms).
PG&E employee transition cost issues with the ORA were
resolved by agreement. Most of these calculations involved
the allocation of pension and disability benefits as employ-
ees are laid off or transferred to other entities under the tran-
sition to competition.
All three utilities were ordered to revise their handling
of asset depreciation prospectively. They were ordered to es-
timate the market value for each asset (above book value),
record authorized depreciation for each, and cease taking
depreciation as a part of transition costs. This issue is of par-
ticular importance in the case of SDG&E, which was taking
accelerated depreciation (in violation of PUC guidelines) as
a transition cost in order to write it off and assess ratepayers
for those expenses in the short term (see D. 00-02-048 at 62).
In addition, SDG&E was allowed to recover the "difference
between actual payments" for power and "corresponding rev-
enues from the PX, ISO, or other markets." This guarantees
the utility ratepayer assessment for all its power costs up front,
regardless of outside collection problems. SDG&E's "nuclear
material and supply inventory" was deemed fully eligible for
recovery through the Transition Cost Balancing Account
(TCBA). Hence, the utility will fully recover as costs these
fuel elements which may or may not qualify as "prudently"
purchased under normal maximum rate regulation doctrine.
SCE won approval of most of the transition costs it
sought, although training equipment, mechanical service shop
equipment and certain other costs which were included were
limited only to those costs truly "stranded" (made superflu-
ous) by transition to competition.
PG&E was ordered to subtract $2.47 million in share-
holder savings disallowed by the Commission in related D.
99-06-089. Otherwise, almost all of the utility's accounting
methods and TCBA entries were approved. This approval
included the Diablo Canyon audit costs and other housekeep-
ing matters.
As to all three utilities, the decision tightens accounting
requirements, imposing monthly entries and monthly deter-
minations of transition cost recovery. Importantly, PG&E was
ordered to enter into its TCBA the plant additions and depre-
ciation accruals consistent with Commission D. 99-10-046.
The Commission found that "as of January 1, 1998, it is rea-
sonable to assume that PG&E, Edison, and SDG&E were
aware that their generation plants were likely to sell above
net book value." Hence, it prospectively modified its rate ac-
counting procedures to require PG&E and Edison (which,
unlike SDG&E, had not yet entirely divested themselves of
all power-generating assets) to credit the TCBA based on
market value, now higher than book value. This change ap-
plies to non-nuclear assets only, and will benefit ratepayers
marginally.
The Commission disallowed carrying costs and interest
on various assets within the TCBA given the fact that a TCBA
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deficit to a utility already earns interest, and separately add-
ing interest as a "carrying charge" would duplicate already
granted interest assessments.
* Post-Transition Period Ratemaking Applications. In
January 1999, PG&E, SCE and SDG&E proposed methods
to mark the end of the transition period and to establish the
mechanism for future revenue adjustment proceedings (A.
99-01-016, A. 99-01-019, A. 99-01-034, and A. 99-02-029).
In Phase 1 of the ensuing proceeding (D. 99-10-057), the Com-
mission addressed the mechanics of ending the rate freeze
and other ratemaking matters (e.g., balancing account treat-
ment for energy procurement costs and ongoing CTC recov-
ery), and considered post-transition rate regulation in Phase
2 during 1999-2000. [17:1 CRLR 173; 16:2 CRLR 142-43]
In Phase 2, the PUC considered post-transition rate regu-
lation, including regulation of the utilities' procurement costs
and various cost allocation issues. The proceeding attempted
to address important post-transition issues, including the fol-
lowing:
- How will PBR operate for procurement spending by
the utilities? That is, if procurement costs-the cost of en-
ergy purchased from the PX-decrease, how much of that
reduction should be credited to the utility in the form of addi-
tional charges to ratepayers?
- In general, how will the PUC oversee utility purchases
for customers purchasing power after transition who still lack
a practical competitive alternative to the utility?
- Should the utilities be required to buy all their energy
from the PX after transition (the so-called "mandatory buy
requirement")?
- How does the PUC's jurisdiction interact with FERC
jurisdiction over the power generators and the increasingly
common interstate transmission of electricity?
- How should price volatility be handled? Should some
price cap limits be imposed, par-
ticularly for so-called "bundled" The Commission improv
customers (those without alterna- initiate electric restru
tive choice to utility-provided consumers from the marl
power as selected and arranged by in incomplete and ineffi
the utility)? system demand, and cor
- How should ongoing tran-
sition costs (which carry over af-
ter transition) be handled after the rate freeze is lifted?
- How should "restructuring implementation costs,"
"nuclear decommissioning costs," and "public purpose pro-
grams" (see below) be handled post-transition?
* How do the answers to these questions translate into
the ongoing Revenue Adjustment Proceedings, the distrib-
uted generation rulemaking proceeding (see below), and other
issues?
All evidence and briefing in the Phase 2 proceedings were
considered submitted for AU decision on November 5, 1999.
However, prior to that submission, several major parties to
the proceeding-including SDG&E, ORA, UCAN, the PX,
and other parties-proposed a partial settlement to the pro-
ceeding. As a result, the Commission reopened the proceed-
ing to enable public comment on the proposed settlement,
and extended the date for final submission to the ALJ to De-
cember 13, 1999.
On June 8, 2000, the Commission issued D. 00-06-034,
which included 68 findings of fact and 24 conclusions of law.
By a 3-2 vote (with Commissioners Lynch and Wood dissent-
ing), the PUC rejected the settlement arrived at by some of the
parties to the proceeding. In general, the Commission suspended
decisions on a proposed PBR procurement mechanism and other
matters governing post-transition ratemaking, finding that "the
new market structures are not sufficiently developed." Its most
important elements include the following:
* During the transition period, the three utilities may pro-
cure their energy only through the PX or through "any quali-
fied exchange, as authorize by future advice letter filings." A
"qualified exchange" may not be owned, all or in part, by a
California UDC or its affiliates. (Note that this prudent con-
flict of interest caveat was not applied to the underlying mar-
ket catalyst, the ISO, which was dominated by those with a
profit stake in market outcome.)
* After the end of the rate freeze period (during the post-
transition period, when all three UDCs have sold their gen-
eration assets), UDCs may buy more broadly, including
through bilateral contracts. However, the PUC opined that
the PX system needs all utilities participating in order to be-
come a comprehensive and effective market. This controver-
sial ruling would prove unfortunate, as the absence of bilat-
eral contracts facilitated the market clearing price excesses
described above.
- The PUC rejected a proposal by PG&E to impose a tem-
porary electricity price cap to insulate customers from high
prices during times of high demand. Instead, the Commission
improvidently found: "We did not initiate electric restructur-
ing in order to shield consumers
from the market .... [M]asking
ring in order to shield prices results in incomplete and in-
.[.M]asking prices results efficient market structure and sys-
nt market structure and tem demand, and compromises
aises system reliability".... system reliability...." Within three
months of this decision, this find-
ing would also prove embarrass-
ing to the Commission, as the chronology above indicates.
- The Commission also rejected proposals to allow UDCs
to offer new commodity products and services, other than
those already authorized by prior PUC decisions.
- The PUC agreed to permit utilities to continue to offer
"balanced payment plans" to residential consumers (a "bill-
smoothing" option allowing customers to spread large bills
over several months).
Most disturbing to consumer advocates was the
Commission's continued reliance on performance-based
ratemaking without reference to "used and useful" capital,
"fair rate of return" analysis, or "prudent cost" standards which
are all monitored and included in calculating required rev-







enue in traditional "fair rate of return" ratemaking. Consumer
advocates argued that one may add "incentive" measures to
such a proceeding, including those which replicate market-
place reward for enhanced efficiency, innovation, or public
benefit. But such an inclusion need not exclude the basic el-
ements necessary to monitor a monopoly utility for exces-
sive profits. Instead of supplementing a regulatory regime
which monitors variables relevant to excessive or fair profit
levels, the Commission made the following finding of fact:
"With properly-designed incentive regulation, once the bench-
mark is established, little regulatory oversight is required
because the interests of shareholders and ratepayers are prop-
erly aligned." PBR starts from the assumption that the initial
revenue posited is correct and is properly immutable, but for
the incentive factors chosen for PBR adjustment. Consumer
advocates disagree that a single benchmark (or starting posi-
tion) at an historical point of time will properly monitor dy-
namic costs, investment, productivity, and costs of capital
without reference to those concepts directly.
* SDG&E Bill Stabilization Decision and Investiga-
tion. As SDG&E was the first utility to sell its generating
facilities and San Diegans were thus the first California resi-
dents to "enjoy the benefits" of California's electricity de-
regulation experiment, it may be instructive to focus on the
PUC's treatment of SDG&E.
In 1999, the Commission was confronted with skyrock-
eting SDG&E post-transition rates. [17:1 CRLR 173] In July
1999, the PUC adopted a settlement applicable to SDG&E's
post-transition rates in D. 99-05-051. That decision capped
SDG&E rates at a level 12.5% above the previous frozen lev-
els for the monthly bills for July, August, and September 1999
[17:2 CRLR 172]; the decision also provided that SDG&E
would not propose a similar rate cap for the year 2000.
When San Diegans' rates soared to double and then triple
their historical level during the summer of 2000, UCAN pro-
posed a rate freeze at 1999 levels on July 6, 2000. On August
3,2000, the PUC issued D. 00-08-021, rejecting the proposed
rate freeze but acknowledging that the matter warranted fur-
ther study. Accordingly, the Commission also modified D.
99-05-051 and opened investigation I. 00-08-002. The Au-
gust 3 decision recognized that the wholesale markets "are
not workably competitive," and noted that PG&E and SCE
customers were benefitting from the continued rate freeze
(because those utilities remained in "transition" to competi-
tion) while SDG&E rates were rising quickly, with a jump of
more than 30% in 2000.
Responding to further requests from the Governor about
SDG&E rate increases, the Commission adopted a "bill sta-
bilization plan" on August 21, 2000 to extend through De-
cember 31, 2001. The plan was intended to set rates at no
more than $68 per month for those residential consumers who
use less than 500 kwh/month through January 2001, to in-
crease to $75 per month through the remainder of the year
(about a 10% increase). Commercial customers using less than
1,500 kwh/month were ceilinged at $220 per month through
January 2001, to rise to $240 for the remainder of 2001. The
plan also imposed some limited retroactive caps, prorated to
apply most to low-use customers and partly ameliorating the
July-December 2000 increases. It also provided for a
"levelized payment plan" on an "opt out" basis-so consum-
ers subject to high summer bills will average their costs un-
less they affirmatively choose not to. Commissioners Lynch
and Wood dissented from the decision.
Less than a month later, the PUC's August 21 decision
was superseded by AB 265 (Davis), urgency legislation cap-
ping electricity rates at 6.5 cents/kwh for residential, small
commercial, and street lighting customers of SDG&E through
December 31, 2002, retroactive to June 1, 2000 (see above
and 2000 LEGISLATION). AB 265 also directed the Com-
mission to establish a voluntary bill stabilization plan for larger
customers by allowing them to elect to have the energy com-
ponent of their bills set at 6.5 cents/kwh, subject to true-up
after a year. In December 2000, the Commission established
a voluntary program for larger customers in D. 00-12-033.
That rate produced an average bill of $72 per month for large
customers.
Following these decisions, on January 24,2001, SDG&E
petitioned the Commission for an immediate 17% increase in
rates, to $83.50 for the average residential user. (Note that
many users-particularly low-income persons and commer-
cial enterprises in inland areas subject to high desert heat-
have to use substantially more than 500 kwh/month. Their
bills would increase substantially to $300 per month for resi-
dential and $2,000 per month for commercial rates.) The re-
quested 17% hike was on top of the 30% increase from 1999
assessed during 2000 (see discussion above).
The new plan and SDG&E's petition were then influ-
enced by additional urgency legislation, SBXI 43 (Alpert)
and ABXI 43 (Correa), enacted in early 2001 and signed by
the Governor in April (see 2001 SPECIAL SESSION LEG-
ISLATION). The new laws essentially extend the ceiling of
6.5 cents/kwh on the energy component of SDG&E's elec-
tricity bills to large industrial customers through December
31, 2002, retroactive to June 1, 2000. They provide that the
PUC may extend the ceiling through December 2003. As dis-
cussed above, the PUC decided (D. 00-02-048) that all funds
charged SDG&E by power generators which are not paid for
from these ceilinged amounts must go into a "Transition Cost
Balancing Account" -to be assessed at the end of 2001 (or at
a further date as legislation subsequently provides). However,
SBX1 43 and ABX1 43 provide that no such later billing may
occur and that such arrearages may not be collected from
consumers. Given the utility's constitutional right to a fair
rate of return on investment, however, it is unclear how such
a prohibition can be enforced. UCAN Executive Director
Michael Shames commented that these assurances of "no later
assessment" were politically motivated-made with knowl-
edge that such funds would be assessed as constitutionally
required, and as provided for in the PUC order discussed
above.
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* PG&E and SCE Rate Increases and Rate Design.
On January 4, 2001, the PUC granted SCE and PG&E an
emergency one cent/kwh rate increase. The hike amounted to
about 9% of the supposedly frozen rates, already increased
once during 2000. Then on March 27,2001, the Commission
approved another increase for PG&E and SCE in D. 01-03-
082. The previous 9% temporary increase was made perma-
nent by the decision, and another 47% was added on top-
the largest increase in PUC energy regulation history. It will
cost the customers of the utilities approximately $2.5 billion
dollars annually.
The decision orders the utilities to enter the revenues from
the rate increases into balancing accounts subject to refund
if, at a later date, they fail to use the funds to pay for future
power purchases. And the decision reiterated that the utilities
must spend the previously-authorized one cent increase simi-
larly. The warning is important because the PUC-ordered
audits of both utilities found that those funds were not ap-
plied exclusively for power purchases. The Commission later
determined that DWR should receive a pro rata share of rates
collected by the utilities (including these increases), based
on its power purchases provided for utility use.
The decision also "expect[s] the utilities to join with the
State and take any and all actions necessary to assure that
California and its utility customers realize refunds for or re-
payment or disgorgement of
power seller overcharges." The The PUC noted: "The
PUC noted: "The utilities possess information and expertis
market information and expertise position to understand m
that place them in a unique posi- legal remedies. To date,
tion to understand market behav- to have been hesitant to
ior and to pursue legal remedies. generators and sellers m
To date, however, the utilities ap- have profited by, the utili
pear to have been hesitant to take
legal action against the generators
and sellers who are responsible for, and have profited by, the
utilities' financial distress." The PUC declared that it would
make the rate increase subject to refund in two circumstances:
(1) to the extent that generators and sellers make refunds for
overcollections, "those refunds should either be passed
through to ratepayers or applied to unrecovered power pur-
chase costs"; (2) to the extent that any administrative body or
court denies refunds of overcollections in a proceeding where
recovery has been hampered by a lack of cooperation from a
utility, the rate increases will also be subject to refund.
Although requested by the utilities to end the "rate freeze,"
the Commission concluded that the freeze of AB 1890 is still
in effect technically, notwithstanding the obvious mootness
of its application given subsequent increases and events.
The decision did not finally determine the "rate design"
(which customers will be charged how much to yield the rev-
enue the utility is due). It did increase the coverage of the
California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE) program, which
provides a small discount for low-income families (see be-
low).
On April 25,2001, the Commission announced hearings
scheduled to occur through May 2001 on its initial proposed
rate design. That design adds higher-percentage increases as
energy usage grows beyond average use levels for each cat-
egory of user. Although this criterion is intended to stimulate
conservation, it could work substantial inequities where resi-
dential users living in hot interior climates require more en-
ergy for basic comfort, or where commercial or industrial us-
ers unavoidably use substantial energy and have substantial
sunk cost investment in appliances and machinery requiring
electricity.
* Energy Efficiency and Demand Side Management.
When the PUC regulated power comprehensively, it was able
to impose cross-subsidies through its rate design to reward
customers for conservation, notwithstanding the lack of such
incentives in a market lacking the "internalization" of such
"external" or future costs-as is typical under current liabil-
ity regimes. With the imposition of competition, the Com-
mission needs to formulate new ways to stimulate energy
conservation, which provides long-term economic and social
benefit. In 1999, the PUC conducted two proceedings con-
cerning energy efficiency and demand side management pro-
grams (D. 99-08-021 and R. 98-07-037). D. 99-08-021 ad-
dresses standards for conservation which may apply in 2000
and 2001, including low-income weatherization programs.
Hearings on the policy and pro-
ilities possess market cedural issues were held duringplace them in a the last week of August and first
at betuue week of September 1999. [17:1
et behavior and to pursue CL
Cthe utilities appear 175] On September 27,
e legal action against the 1999, the utilities filed their com-
are responsible for, and pliance applications seeking ap-
;' financial distress." proval of proposed program year(PY) 2000 and 2001 energy effi-
ciency programs, budgets, perfor-
mance incentive mechanisms, and market assessment and
evaluation studies.
In December 1999, the PUC issued D. 99-12-053, which
authorized the utilities to implement their proposed PY 2000
energy efficiency programs and budgets on an interim basis,
subject to mid-year adjustment after further hearings. The de-
cision deferred a determination regarding the utilities' pro-
gram-specific performance award mechanisms to the final
decision. Evidentiary hearings concluded February 2, 2000
and the Commission issued a related decision later that month,
adopting D. 00-02-045 concerning the structure and operat-
ing procedures of the California Board for Energy Efficiency
(CBEE) and the Low-Income Governing Board (LIGB). In
this decision, the Commission disbanded the CBEE effective
March 31, 2000, while continuing the LIGB. The Commis-
sion also changed LIGB's name to the Low Income Over-
sight Board (LIOB).
* Low-Income Programs. The PUC maintains two pro-
grams to assist low-income ratepayers: the California Alter-
nate Rates for Energy (CARE) and Low-Income Energy Ef-









ficiency (LIEE) programs. CARE provides eligible low-in-
come households with a 15% discount on their electric and
gas bills. In theory, it currently applies to 2.7 million house-
holds, almost one in five. However, the utilities have imple-
mented it for only 1.6 million households. The LIEE pro-
vides funding to weatherize and install other energy-saving
devices to reduce the amount of energy required by eligible
low-income families. Only a small fraction of eligible fami-
lies receive this assistance. Funding for these programs comes
from a "public purpose" surcharge on utility bills, providing
$140 million per year for CARE and $60 million for LIEE.
In its March 27, 2001 rate decision markedly increasing
SCE and PG&E rates, the Commission reiterated its commit-
ment to the CARE program. It had exempted CARE-eligible
customers from its previous January 2001 9% rate increase,
and it similarly exempted them from the new increase. And it
actually expanded coverage for CARE from 150% of the pov-
erty line to 175%, raising eligibility for the benchmark fam-
ily of three from $21,500 annual income to $25,000.
Related to the CARE subsidy is the "baseline" level of
energy assumed in PUC rates. Use up to that baseline is often
excluded from rate increases as a way to both encourage con-
servation and to assure a minimum quantity of power to low-
use consumers.
"Baseline" calculation is an important part of the rate
design decisions of the Commission. Consumer advocates
argue that the baseline, which has not been raised in over ten
years, is well below the amount of electricity needed. On
March 2, 2001, the Commission announced proceedings to
review that level given the implications of high rate increases
during early 2001 on many consumers who were compelled
to use energy well above the baseline level for minimal com-
fort, particularly lower-income consumers who tend not to
live along the more temperate coastline of the state. The
baseline varies by area, generally from 300-1,300 kwh/month,
with rates increasing beyond specified levels. It is also in-
creased somewhat for families with electric heating.
In early 2001, the legislature enacted SBX 15 (Sher) and
ABX1 29 (Kehoe), both signed by the Governor on April 11,
2001 (see 2001 SPECIAL SESSION LEGISLATION). The
former provides a one-time supplement of $100 million for
CARE, and the latter provides a one-time appropriation of
$20 million for LIEE and another $50 million to replace inef-
ficient appliances. The Commission is expected to implement
the legislation during late 2001.
Distributed Generation Rulemaking
In rulemaking commenced in December 1998 (R. 98-
12-015), the PUC examined the potential for competition in
electricity distribution services, including distributed genera-
tion (electricity produced on or near a customer's premises)
and the roles and responsibilities of big electric distributors.
Distributed generation (also referred to as "distributed en-
ergy resources") refers to small, modular electric generation
and/or storage devices installed close to the customer's pre-
mises. The rulemaking, which was initiated to consider
whether the Commission should pursue further reforms in
the structure and regulatory framework governing electricity
distribution services, was initially undertaken as a collabora-
tive effort among the PUC, the California Energy Commis-
sion, and the Electricity Oversight Board. Its goal was to iden-
tify the range of issues on distributed generation and distri-
bution competition and their interrelationships, and to explore
options.
Over 61 parties submitted opening comments in March
1999, leading to the PUC's adoption of D. 99-10-065 on Oc-
tober 21,1999. [17:1 CRLR 174] That decision, which closed
R. 98-12-015, set forth the procedural roadmap that the Com-
mission will follow to address the issues of distributed gen-
eration, electric distribution competition, and the role of the
UDCs. The decision bifurcated the issues into two tracks. The
first track will address distributed generation issues, which is
being accomplished through a new rulemaking proceeding,
R. 99-10-025. The goal of R. 99-10-025 is to develop poli-
cies and rules regarding the deployment of distributed gen-
eration. The second track issues will address electric distri-
bution competition and the roles of the UDCs in a competi-
tive retail electric market. The second track issues are ad-
dressed in a PUC staff study and report.
The staff report was filed in June 2000, and covers the
benefits and disadvantages of distributed generation, end user
side-distributed generation (a plant generating some of its own
electricity also provides some to another plant), grid side ap-
plications of distributed generation (a plant with its own gen-
erating capacity for itself has excess power to contribute to
the grid), interconnection issues, sale of excess electric ca-
pacity, rate design issues, stranded costs, California Environ-
mental Quality Act issues, and local government impacts. In
addition, the report sets forth twelve additional issues inher-
ent in competition in these distributed services (from line
extensions to rights of way and metering procedures). Finally,
the report lists broader impacts to examine, including labor,
consumer education, natural gas infrastructure impacts, and
requests from the Solar Development Cooperative. The re-
port is intended to set the agenda for future proceedings.
Energy Affiliate Transaction Rules
On January 4,2001, the Commission announced its com-
mencement of a rulemaking proceeding (R. 01-01-001) to
review its energy affiliate rules adopted in December 1997
(D. 97-12-088, as amended in D. 98-08-035). These rules at-
tempt to establish standards of conduct governing relation-
ships between California's natural gas local distribution com-
panies and electric utilities and their affiliated, unregulated
entities providing energy and energy-related services. The
1997 proceeding set forth two objectives to guide the
Commission's formation of the appropriate rules: (1) to fos-
ter competition, and (2) to protect consumer interests. The
Commission was then concerned with the behavior of Com-
mission-regulated utilities, not their affiliates. One purpose
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of the rules was to ensure that utility entities competing to
provide energy services face uniform rules so that no advan-
tage or disadvantage accrues to any one utility.
This subject area is of great importance given the advan-
tage accruing to the incumbent utility in competition for re-
lated products and services. Thus, the Commission anticipated
the need for rules to promote a level playing field and to pre-
vent the utility with monopoly power advantage from lever-
aging that advantage to limit competition from otherwise su-
perior competitors to its affiliates. In addition, the Commis-
sion wished to avoid cross-subsidization and self-dealing, so
that a utility's customers would not subsidize the affiliate's
operation.
The PUC's current affiliate rules prohibit preferential
treatment. The same policies must apply to affiliates and non-
affiliates in the provision of utility services. Transactions be-
tween a utility and its affiliates are limited to tariffed prod-
ucts and services, or products and services made generally
available by the utility or affiliate to all market participants
through an open, competitive bidding process. The utility may
not condition the provision of any services provided by the
utility, any discounts, rebates, or waivers of terms and condi-
tions of any services on the taking of any goods or services
from its affiliates. There can be no assignment of customers
to an affiliate. There must be a separation between the utility
and its affiliates on issues of business development and cus-
tomer relations so that there is no soliciting of business, ac-
quisition of information, sharing
of proprietary information, pass- In January 1998, the Com
ing of customer information, or proceeding (R. 98-01-01
giving the appearance that either "benefits' of deregulat o
speaks on behalf of the other. If a
utility provides a discount, rebate,
or waiver of any charge to its affiliates, it must electronically
notice it.
In addition, a utility may not provide customer informa-
tion to affiliates exclusively, and without customer consent.
Any non-customer-specific non-public information the util-
ity makes available to its affiliates must be contemporane-
ously available to all other service providers. A utility may
only provide information on its affiliates to its customers with
a Commission-approved list of service providers. A utility
must maintain records of all transactions with its affiliates,
maintain a record of all contracts and bids related to its affili-
ates, and may not favor its affiliates in providing customers
with advice or assistance.
Under the current rules, a utility and its affiliates must
be separate corporate entities, keep separate books and
records, may not share plants, facilities, equipment or costs,
and may not make joint purchases of goods and services as-
sociated with traditional utility merchant function. A utility
may share with its affiliates certain joint corporate oversight,
governance, support systems, and personnel. A utility may
not trade upon, promote, or advertise its affiliates association




or advertise their affiliation with utilities. If a utility shares
its name or logo with an affiliate, that affiliate must disclose
in plain legible or audible language that the affiliate is not the
same company as the utility, is not regulated by the Commis-
sion, and that the customer does not have to buy the affiliate's
products to continue to receive services from the utility. In ad-
dition, a utility and its affiliates may not jointly employ the
same employees, including board of directors and corporate
officers, except in specified circumstances. Any movement of
employees between a utility and its affiliates must meet enu-
merated provisions, including the payment of a transfer fee.
New products and services must be offered through af-
filiates, unless they satisfy the affiliate rules and are approved
by the Commission. The affiliate rules specify the require-
ments to be met for approval of a new category of nontariffed
products or services.
The new proceeding will review each of these rules, and
consider additional rules. These proceedings have special
importance given the continued activity of California's three
major private utilities in the "competitive" sector, including
natural gas and other assets related to energy interests. At
this writing, the proceeding is expected to continue through
2001 and reach decision in mid-2002.
Competition in the Natural Gas Industry
In January 1998, the Commission initiated a rulemaking
proceeding (R. 98-01-011) to look into extending the "ben-
efits" of deregulation to the natu-
sioniniiatd arulrnaing ral gas industry. Related legisla-sion initiated a rulemaking tion- SB 1602 (Peace) (Chapter
o look into extending the 401, Statutes of 1998)-was en-
othe natural gas industry, acted in August 1998, effective
January 1,1999. The bill enacted
section 328 of the Public Utilities Code, which allows the
Commission to explore natural gas deregulation, but prohib-
its the Commission from "enacting" [sic] any gas restructur-
ing changes until after January 1,2000. [16:1 CRLR 168] On
October 8, 1998, the Commission responded to the Peace leg-
islation by issuing D. 98-10-028 to adjust its proposed
rulemaking schedule consistent with the legislation.
On July 8, 1999, the Commission issued D. 99-07-015
to begin a broad investigation (I. 99-07-003) into prospects
for natural gas deregulation. The investigation is intended to
identify the most promising options and to explore problems.
Consistent with the Peace bill, the Commission also is exam-
ining the costs and benefits of various options, and may rec-
ommend statutory changes to the legislature to facilitate
healthy competition. In D. 99-07-015, the PUC identified the
following options to be examined:
* Enhance consumer protections for "core customers"
(residential and small commercial customers that rely on the
utility for all their natural gas needs) to enable them to make
informed decisions regarding their options, protect themselves
from unscrupulous providers, and seek assistance if problems
arise.
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* Improve access to transmission and storage services,
and transmission, storage, and balancing rights trading. In
addition to companies using the utilities as a primary source
for transmission and storage services, the Commission will
consider creating a secondary market.
- Improve the "balancing service" whereby gas is added
to the pipeline system by the utility pipeline operator when
supplies are low and gas is drawn off the system when sup-
plies are high.
• Identify appropriate conditions for offering "hub ser-
vices," which include holding extra gas supply somewhere
in the system, or selling some of a utility's gas to a customer
for short-term use.
- Refine gas utility procurement practices and expand
competitive options for core customers.
- Improve the flow of information related to market trans-
actions. The Commission is looking at the information the
gas utilities currently provide to customers and competitors
to determine if it is sufficient or if more should be provided.
- Assure accountability for system safety and meter choice
by requiring utilities to be responsible for installation, opera-
tion, and maintenance of their system and the meters they
use, as well as provision of after-meter services. Standards
will be developed for manufacture and utility procurement of
alternative metering technologies.
* Consider billing options that allow competitors to bill
for their services through the utilities' bills.
" Separate costs and rates for all gas utility services.
" Review inconsistencies in programs administered by
PG&E and SoCal Gas to determine if they need to be consis-
tent.
The Commission is seeking to develop a structure that
preserves the utilities' traditional role of providing full ser-
vice to core customers while clearing obstacles to the com-
petitive offering of gas, transmission, storage, balancing, and
other services for all customers throughout the state. [17:1
CRLR 175-76]
Also on July 8, 1999, the PUC ordered an investigation into
one aspect of natural gas regulation relevant to the list of identi-
fied options. The investigation (I. 99-07-003) explored one of
the so-called "promising options" for deregulation-the
"balancing issue" described above-and led to D. 00-02-050
issued on February 17, 2000. The decision discusses PG&E's
practice of declaring an "operational flow order" (OFO) when it
believes "that pipeline inventory would be above or below a
tolerable range." In other words, if gas is in short supply, the
utility may charge more for it, thus discouraging demand peaks
at times of short supply (presumably replicating the market's
reaction to scarcity). The concept in theory is that if one imposes
higher prices (here, "penalties") as available supply is low, de-
mand is discouraged and sudden price spikes are avoided. Ex-
cessive supply, which also causes disposition problems for the
utility, similarly triggers an OFO and a penalty. PG&E gives at
least twelve hours of warning to customers before it issues an
OFO and raises prices for further increased use.
A major issue raised by the investigation but not yet ad-
dressed by it is the possibility of gratuitous "rigging" of short
supply by PG&E to justify self-enriching OFO assessments.
Indeed, since the implementation of a "Gas Accord" in 1997
(D. 97-08-055), PG&E has been permitted to establish a rela-
tively narrow "tolerance band" as a target free from penalty.
When projected supply falls above or below that narrow band,
the utility issues an OFO and collects additional revenue.
Evidence in the proceeding established that PG&E had called
OFOs about five times per month since 1997. Note that al-
though market forces will stimulate a higher price where de-
mand approaches projected supply, suppliers can be expected
to have reserve capacity. Large customers will favor a sup-
plier with the security of such a reserve and a sophisticated
market will produce such reserves. But a monopolist can es-
chew such reserves, and will have an incentive to so limit
them where it directly profits from short supply.
In its decision, the PUC partly sided with customers who
suffer increasing penalty assessments, noting that the utility
could provide basic information so supply variations could
be predicted more accurately by large users subject to pen-
alty assessment, allowing them to modify usage and avoid
penalties. The Commission, while moving toward competi-
tive principles, also encouraged customers and utilities to
"work together cooperatively" to share information (not the
presumption commonly underlying competitive behavior).
The final decision was largely driven by a proposed settle-
ment reached by the involved parties. It requires PG&E to
disclose additional operational information on its Web site
accessible to customers, thus facilitating their ability to pre-
dict and mitigate OFO assessments. Those unable to monitor
data and usage electronically may carry imbalances over a
longer period to allow more latitude to reconcile an "operat-
ing imbalance."
Regrettably, the decision does not require the addition of
storage assets by PG&E, which could remove the need for
such a tight range between supply and projected demand. In-
stead, it merely orders a "report describing the costs of add-
ing such assets." Tellingly, the decision reduces penalties
during a Stage 1 OFO from $1 per Dth to 25 cents per Dth,
and creates a Stage 2 penalty at the previous $1 level (which
is not assessed until limits are exceeded by more than 20%).
Consumer advocates expressed concern that the
Commission's investigation missed the major source of pos-
sible price excess: the federal permission to deregulate pipe-
line transmission into southern California. That "deregula-
tion" did not end government oversight in lieu of a competi-
tive market. Rather, it left a single pipeline carrier in some
areas able to effectively control prices and extract excess
profit. Southern California is served by a single major pipe-
line firm and, according to consumer advocates, other major
energy firms are capable of collusion and price manipulation
apart from the monopoly power of the pipeline. As 2001 be-
gan, natural gas prices rose in California to two, and then
five, and then ten times price levels at the pipeline source in
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Texas. According to consumer critics, the Commission's study
of "more competition" in the gas industry thus far misses the
overriding dangers and misunderstands the deep reliance of
industrial and consumer infrastructure on predictable and rea-
sonable prices in relation to cost. The prospective replication
of the electricity debacle in natu-
ral gas would magnify the impact
of the former given the reliance According to consumer cr
of most generators on natural gas of moe omeiin" iias te lo-cos enegy fel. misses the overriding dan
as the low-cost energy fuel. deep reliance of industrial
Implementation of AB 1149: on predictable and reason
Utility Line Undergrounding
In 1999, the legislature enacted AB 1149 (Aroner) (Chap-
ter 844, Statutes of 1999), which is intended to stimulate ad-
ditional undergrounding of unsightly and sometimes danger-
ous overhead lines, particularly in populated areas. [17:1
CRLR 180] The bill required the PUC to study and report to
the legislature by January 1, 2001 on improving the conver-
sion of existing overhead utility lines (both power and tele-
communications). The legislature directed the PUC to include
the following specific issues in its study: (1) the elimination
of barriers to establishing continuity of the existing under-
ground system and ways to eliminate uneven patches of over-
head facilities; (2) how to enhance public safety; (3) how to
improve reliability; and (4) how to provide more flexibility
and control to local governments. In addition to these enu-
merated issues, the PUC was ordered to look at both the broad
policy issues raised by its undergrounding program as well
as the details of program implementation, including the over-
all cost-effectiveness of the program and the current level of
funding.
On January 6, 2000, and in compliance with the legisla-
tion, the PUC issued an Order Instituting Rulemaking (OIR
00-01-005). The 12-page rulemaking order was accompanied
by a 19-page Undergrounding White Paper issued on No-
vember 19, 1999 by the Commission's Energy Division, which
sets forth relevant background information.
Prior to 1967, property owners desiring to replace an over-
head system with an underground system had to form an as-
sessment district to bear the costs. That year, the Commis-
sion adopted a policy of encouraging undergrounding, and
applied it uniformly to all utilities by prescribing tariff amend-
ments (D. 73078). New housing subdivisions (and those that
were already undergrounded) were required to provide un-
derground service for all new connections. Utilities (both elec-
tric and telephone) would bear the costs of installation ex-
cept for trenching, conduit, and backfilling. Utilities were
authorized to request exemptions from undergrounding re-
quirements where house lot sizes were very large or where
undergrounding was otherwise impractical. The Commission
recognized, however, that it was not generally practical to
put transmission facilities underground.
The Commission also established three programs that
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with underground service if specified conditions were met.
The Commission asked each utility to submit a budget for
the new programs, and adopted tariff rules that required com-
munications utilities to coordinate with electric utilities in
order to place their lines underground as well.
In 1969, the Commission
clarified its policy. In particular,
sthe Commission's study it required all service extensions
h as misndstnus fr to be placed underground, with
s and misunder tandsthe utilities bearing all costs except
d consumer infrastructure those of trenching and backfilling,
which remained the responsibil-
ity of developers (D. 76394). In
1970, the Commission confirmed that underground service
was mandatory in new subdivisions (D. 77187). In 1976, the
Commission extended its policy regarding undergrounding
to cover distribution lines of any voltage classification (D.
85497). A number of subsequent resolutions and decisions
ordered utilities to increase budgets for replacement of over-
head with underground facilities. In 198 1, Resolutions E- 1930
and E-1931 ordered such increases for PG&E and SCE in
order to "maintain construction activity at the historical
level..." (D. 82-01-18).
The Commission also changed the formula used to allo-
cate available funds among local governments. At first, funds
were allocated to local governments based on population. In
1982, the Commission recognized that some areas (where
most service was already underground) had relatively little
need for undergrounding, and approved a formula based on
the number of meters served by overhead lines. The Com-
mission also adopted a procedure for shifting funds away from
communities that were not using their allocation promptly.
Finally, the Commission allowed local governments to re-
quire utilities (for example, through franchise agreements) to
install the first 100 feet of utility-owned underground facili-
ties free (D. 82-01-18).
In 1990, the Commission reexamined the allocation is-
sue and struck a compromise between the two previous poli-
cies. Henceforth, allocations would be based on 1990 levels,
with increased funding allocated half-and-half on the basis
of total meters and overhead meters, respectively. To the ex-
tent that funds exceeded 150% of the previous year's alloca-
tions, however, those funds were allocated according to the
number of overhead meters.
The current undergrounding program consists of two
parts. The first (under Tariff Rules 15 and 16) requires devel-
opers to put utility services underground in new subdivisions.
Utilities, both electric and telephone, bear the costs of instal-
lation, except for trenching and backfilling expenses, which
are the responsibility of developers. The second part of the
program (under Tariff Rule 20) governs both when and where
a utility may remove overhead lines and replace them with
new underground service, and who shall bear the cost of the
conversion. Rule 20 dictates three levels-A, B, and C-of
ratepayer funding for undergrounding projects. Under Rule
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20C, any electric customer may convert to undergrounding
so long as it reimburses the utility for all costs (less the esti-
mated net salvage value and depreciation of the replaced over-
head facilities). Under Rule 20B, limited ratepayer funding
is available to pay the cost of cables, transformers, and other
electrical equipment, but the balance of the costs (including
conduits and structures) must be paid by the customer re-
questing the undergrounding. Under Rule 20A, utility
ratepayers bear most of the cost of the undergrounding con-
version, but only for projects that are "in the public interest."
Rule 20A funds are very limited, the demand for them is high,
and the potential for controversy over these funds is great.
In its OIR, the PUC concluded that the ratepayers' cur-
rent share of the cost of conversion appears to be between
$130 and $180 million annually. At this current rate of ex-
penditure, it could take many decades to underground the
entire state's distribution system. The Commission proposed
to evaluate the history, costs, and accomplishments of the
program; its potential future costs and projected benefits; a
desirable level of funding; cost containment; allocation to
high-priority projects; the rather momentous problem of its
relationship to electric restructuring and other Commission
programs; and the interaction with telecommunications is-
sues. The order stated that the PUC would address these is-
sues through a combination of workshops, testimony, hear-
ings, and briefs.
Staff's white paper cites the benefits of undergrounding,
including aesthetics and increases in property value. Increased
public and worker safety is another undergrounding benefit.
The potential reduction in fatalities and injuries due to contact
with overhead facilities, as well as reduction of power outages
caused by overhead incidents, are desirable goals. In addition,
undergrounding may reduce the danger of fire and other threats
to life and property. Other potential advantages include a re-
duction in utility and public costs due to less maintenance, and
a reduction in overall public exposure to electromagnetic fields.
However, these benefits must be subject to a cost-benefit analy-
sis. Perhaps the same benefits could be achieved at lower cost
than undergrounding. Underground lines may provide a higher
level of service reliability than overhead lines because of their
protection from aircraft, the elements, trees, or even fog, but if
there is a failure underground it may be harder to inspect, de-
tect, diagnose, and repair.
During 2000, the Commission held a workshop on Feb-
ruary 10 and eight public participation hearings throughout
the state. It deliberately confined its inquiry to non-contro-
versial matters, deferring to a "phase 2" the difficult ques-
tions such as third-party bidding to underground, incentive
mechanisms, unbundled payments via utility billing (that is,
the itemization of undergrounding costs on utility bills), and
handling telecommunications inclusion underground. Despite
this deferral to a "phase 2," the Commission failed to comply
with the January 1,2001 legislative deadline and did not even
conclude phase 1 by that date, noting that the energy crisis
occupied its attention as a higher priority.
On April 23, 2001, Commissioner Duque-the assigned
commissioner in this proceeding-issued a letter to the legis-
lature with recommendations for legislative action. He sug-
gested that the legislature provide funding for an
"undergrounding ombudsperson" to assist consumers stymied
by utilities and the PUC from achieving undergrounding goals;
create different funding mechanisms for Rule 20B and 20C
projects; fund an appeals process at the PUC for citizen com-
plaints; and increase underground funding (perhaps by adding
taxpayer funds). To the extent these recommendation draw upon
general fund resources, favorable legislative response is dubi-
ous given the state's budget situation. Commissioner Duque's
recommendations were not approved by the full Commission,
and the more germane PUC policy issues have been put off for
later phase 2 deliberations with no set deadline.
Telecommunications Utility Regulation
Telecommunications deregulation preceded California's
electricity deregulation by several decades. The seminal 1982
consent decree in United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982), divested AT&T of its existing national tele-
phone monopoly, spinning out the so-called "Baby Bells" to
substantial regulation by state public utilities commissions,
and introducing competitive choice in long distance service,
telephone equipment manufacture, inside wiring of homes,
and other aspects of telephone service then subject to AT&T
control. This divestiture created 22 local operating compa-
nies known as Bell operating companies (BOCs). These BOCs
were then grouped into seven unaffiliated regional BOCs
(RBOCs). Because of subsequent mergers-including the
takeover of Pacific Bell by SBC, only four RBOCs are now
in operation: SBC/Pacific Bell, Qwest, Verizon, and
BellSouth.
The newly competitive environment has created serious
problems in telecommunications, including (1) the unclear
division of jurisdiction between state commissions and the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC); (2) the perva-
sive local monopoly power held by cable providers in virtu-
ally every community, and more recently the concentration
of power nationally as Time Warner and AT&T now control
over three-fourths of national cable enterprises; (3)
government's failure to apply "cross-ownership" media re-
strictions to cable (thus allowing Time Warner and AT&T to
consolidate significant holdings in newspapers, magazines,
entertainment production, theaters, et al., and-together with
the enterprises of Rupert Murdoch-to dominate television
satellite transmission); (4) government's failure to regulate
maximum rates by cable providers, allowing them to achieve
monopoly power profit to cross-subsidize and undercut po-
tential competitors unfairly, and (5) Internet access prob-
lems-including the contention of the cable industry that the
single available provider of cable (and, for many, the single
high-speed Internet provider) can restrict Internet access to
its designated service provider. The recent U.S. Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in AT&T v. City of Portland (see
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-ITIGATION) essentially declares the Internet to be a part
of the national telecommunications system under FCC juris-
diction. Hence, that federal agency will determine available
competitive choice as to Internet access, costs, and competi-
tion. Regrettably, the FCC has to date indicated little concern
over anticompetitive abuses and dangers involving the cable
industry, the Internet marketplace, or telecommunications gen-
erally. The growing number of individual channels and mar-
ket choices have distracted policymakers and the public from
the growing concentration of "choke points"-cable and
Internet access decisionmakers who are consolidating verti-
cally into production and programming, and who exercise
concentrated economic power to an extent inconsistent with
a competitive free market governed by consumer sovereignty.
Many of these background issues lie beyond the direct
purview of the PUC, but they af-
fect the market position of tele- Internet access increa
communications licensees within telephone intermodal c
its jurisdiction. For example, subjecttosubstantialPUC
Internet access increasingly de- enjoys extraordinary unr
pends on cable/telephone
intermodal competition, with the
latter subject to substantial PUC jurisdiction while the former
enjoys extraordinary unregulated status. Reliance on such
intermodal competition may pose problems where each mode
has areas of cost or locational advantage (e.g., in many areas,
high-speed Internet access may be available only by telephone;
in other areas, it is available only via cable). Such a setting
stimulates below-cost competition
where both alternatives exist, and PacBell is undertaking it
extraction of excess profit where PUC permission to prov
choice is lacking. Where one California residents.
mode has no price impediments
and substantial monopoly power,
imbalances and distortions are magnified.
Within the telephone service market, the legal history of
regulation outside of California also imposes complications.
The 1982 AT&T final judgment precluded the BOCs from
providing interLATA services. "InterLATA" refers to service
that crosses different "local access and transit areas" (LATAs).
In common parlance, the regional Bell companies are not al-
lowed to provide "long distance" service themselves (except
to deliver the message locally). The court included this pro-
hibition to prevent the BOCs from using their local exchange
monopoly to bar competitive entry into the long distance field.
The BOCs may request permission to enter the long distance
market if they can show that they are no longer capable of
using monopoly power to stifle competition. Several BOCs
outside California have now been granted permission to do
so; Pacific Bell is currently in the process of applying for
permission (see below).
The federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104 (1996), was enacted to enhance competition in
telecommunications, including local markets (see LITIGA-
TION for further discussion of the 1996 Act). The law forces
incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to open their mar-
kets to competitors. At the same time, BOCs may potentially
enter into the regional and interstate markets now open to
competition under section 271 of the Act. However, that sec-
tion effectively requires BOCs to prove that they have opened
their respective local exchange markets, including the
interLATA calls within their own territorial jurisdictions. To
meet this requirement, the BOC must demonstrate that it has
complied with a 14-point "competitive checklist."
The Act explicitly removes or preempts any state or lo-
cal regulation which impinges on the open competition goal.
Because of preemption, state public utilities commissions are
now subject to FCC guidance in most telecommunications
regulation. State PUCs have acted as local agents of the FCC
when dealing with the local BOC under acknowledged FCC
jurisdiction. When a BOC at-
singly depends on cable/
ompetition, with the latter




tempts to enter the long distance
market, it does so by initially fil-
ing an application with the state
PUC, which processes it through
one of two tracks and holds hear-
ings to determine whether the
BOC has satisfied the "checklist" and can be passed on for
FCC approval.
* PacBell Reappliesfor Permission to Enter Long Dis-
tance Market. PacBell is undertaking its second attempt to
secure PUC permission to provide long distance service to Cali-
fornia residents. In order to obtain approval to provide in-re-
gion long distance service, PacBell
.econd attempt to secure must demonstrate that it provides
long distance service to non-discriminatory access to com-
petitive local exchange carriers
(CLECs) pursuant to a 14-point
checklist enumerated in section
271 (c)(2)(C) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and that
"the requested authorization is consistent with the public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity." In December 1998, the PUC
ruled that the utility had failed to comply with all of the check-
list requirements that must be met before entering the long dis-
tance market, and that PacBell must refile its application. The
FCC has stated that the most probative evidence of non-dis-
criminatory access is actual performance data, including third-
party testing. Accordingly, in D. 98-12-069, the Commission
authorized PacBell to contract for third-party testing and di-
rected the utility to file an operations support system master
test plan by January I1, 1999.
PacBell refiled its application on July 15, 1999, claim-
ing that it has complied with the checklist requirements and
the local market is currently open to competition. However,
consumer advocacy groups and other competitors contend that
PacBell has not yet fully opened its lines to competition.
Competitors complain of problems of dropped connections
and errant billing while trying to hook up their computer sys-
tems to PacBell lines, and other opponents insist that con-
sumers do not really have a realistic choice when choosing a
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local phone company. [17:1 CRLR 177; 16:2 CRLR 145-46;
16:1 CRLR 162]
On April 2, 2001, 11 CLECs submitted their respective
lists of difficulties, problems, and concerns with PacBell's
current operations. The central argument of the CLECs is that
in some 50 enumerated respects, PacBell continues to stymie
competition in the local California market. These alleged bar-
riers involve technical database and connection impediments
for competitor computer hook-up onto PacBell lines, and the
failure to meet checklist due dates in opening up the local
loop facilities for competitive use. Competitors cite the four
findings that the Commission must make under Public Utili-
ties Code section 709.2(c) prior to PacBell entry, including
(1) fair and non-discriminatory access to exchanges and in-
terchange facilities (consistent with the Commission's Open
Access in Network Architecture proceedings); (2) no
anticompetitive practices by the LEC (PacBell), including
unfair use of subscriber information or customer contacts;
(3) no improper cross-subsidy of intrastate telecommunica-
tions through accounting or cost allocation methods; and (4)
no harm to competitive intrastate markets.
The new entrants contend that these requirements have
not been met. They remain vigorously opposed to PacBell
entry into long distance markets while it allegedly blocks their
attempts to compete with it in the local market where it re-
tains control of the wired loop into homes and businesses.
The Commission is requiring evidence of bona fide compli-
ance with the requirement to facilitate fair local competition
prior to its support of a long distance quid pro quo entry for
PacBell. At this writing, a final decision is expected some-
time in late 2001 or early 2002.
* Open Access Rulemaking. On December 9, 1999, the
FCC released a decision requiring ILECs to provide com-
petitive access to the high-frequency portion of their local
loop. In other words, PacBell, GTE California, and other tele-
phone utilities retaining the home and business wire connec-
tion must permit competitors to use their lines. As described
above, the failure of local phone companies to do so has led
regulators to bar their concomitant entry into long distance.
The high-frequency traffic here at issue involves non-voice
data and information transmission, including high-speed DSL
lines which promise competitive access to the Internet. The
issue takes on critical importance given its market context.
The cable industry has available high-speed Internet connec-
tion capacity in some (but not all) areas. As noted above, two
cable firms (Time Warner and AT&T) control 80% of the
market nationally, and almost all local areas are served by
only one provider. Further, cable firms contend that they can
limit consumers to their chosen Internet service provider, or
at least require its use-even where the local jurisdiction con-
ferring a cable franchise would order open access (see LITI-
GATION). Hence, for most consumers, Internet access is sub-
ject to an anticompetitive "choke point." A typical consumer
may have a cable provider with high-speed access and a des-
ignated Internet service provider. The only competition may
be from a telephone DSL line. Accordingly, in order to pre-
vent a duopoly (or worse), local DSL lines must be open to
more than one carrier.
In 1999, the legislature enacted AB 991 (Papan) (Chap-
ter 714, Statutes of 1999), which required the PUC to imple-
ment the FCC's December 9, 1999 order to open local access
lines to competition by April 10, 2000. [17:1 CRLR 181-82]
Accordingly, on January 31, 2000, the PUC's chief ALJ is-
sued a ruling requiring PacBell and GTE California to file an
offer to amend existing interconnection agreements to pro-
vide "line sharing agreements" for such competition. Hence,
the "line sharing" phase of two longstanding proceedings (R.
93-04-003 and I. 93-04-002) began.
Instead of formal proceedings, the Commission opted for
an arbitration format. Testimony was submitted by the two
major utilities and by a number of prospective CLECs, and
arbitration hearings occurred from April 7-17, 2000. No settle-
ments were reached, so briefs were filed on April 21 and April
26, 2000. A draft arbitrator's report was filed on May 8, 2000,
for final comment, further settlement negotiations, and "du-
eling clause" proposals (where objectors present alternative
terms for interconnection agreements which allow competi-
tors to use PacBell and GTE California local loop lines for
DSL transmission to homes and businesses).
The overall goal of the "line sharing" proceeding was to
ensure the possibility of competition by June 6, 2000-the
deadline set by the FCC. The final arbitrator's report of May
26, 2000 is broken into four parts: network architecture for
line sharing issues, operational issues, pricing, and general
terms and conditions. The vast majority of issues were de-
cided in favor of the ILECs, over the objections of challeng-
ers seeking broader competitive opportunity. The most im-
portant aspects of the decision include the following:
* The ILECs (PacBell and GTE California) are only re-
quired to provide a requesting carrier with access to the high-
frequency portion of the loop if the ILEC is providing analog
voice service on the particular loop for which the requesting
carrier seeks access.
* The ILECs are not required to share their fiber-based
lines until within 30 days of offering those particular lines to
its own customers.
* The ILECs may own the splitter that patches into the
line, even if used by a competitor.
- If an ILEC voice customer terninates that ILEC as its
voice provider, the competing service must purchase the en-
tire loop-including the voice transmission element, in order
to continue to provide data service (Internet access).
* The standard for "trouble response time" by the ILEC
where the shared line is not working is "parity with retail
service"-a rather liberal 24 hours, rather than the two-hour
mean time standard proposed by the competitors. (Note the
competitive difficulty for a challenger where Internet access
is blocked for 24 hours at a time, with correction depending
upon more expeditious response by the challenger's direct
competitor.)
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* As proposed by PacBell, the rate for access to PacBell
lines is $5.85 per month. This represents 50% of the cost of
an entire PacBell loop if purchased by a competitor, includ-
ing both voice and data; as such, it is far above the marginal
cost of providing the space on the line (which is nil). The
access rate for GTE is $3 per month.
On September 21, 2000, the full Commission approved
the final arbitrator's report in D. 00-09-074.
* PUC Suspends Planned Area Code Overlays and
Implements Number Conservation Measures. Over the last
three years, California consumers have endured a prolifera-
tion of PUC-required area code changes-rendering statio-
nery obsolete, interfering with businesses that are telephone
service-sensitive, and inconve-
niencing all involved. Moreover, Over the last three yean
the proliferation has resulted in
toll billing for calls within a city changes-rendering sta
that had long been within the same with businesses that are
area code. The problem stems and ineniencing all
partly from the need to accommo-
date new competitors, and partly
from the demand for new lines for fax machines, cellular
phones, pagers, Internet access, and other new uses. How-
ever, consumer groups discovered in 1999 that the creation
of new area codes due to an alleged lack of numbers has been
artificially stimulated by FCC policies allowing existing utili-
ties to reserve tens of thousands of numbers based on projec-
tions of possible use by potential competitors. [17:1 CRLR
177-78; 16:2 CRLR 147-48]
While waiting for the FCC to revise its rules, the PUC
"split" many area codes into two areas-one that retains the
existing area code and another whose residents must assume
a new area code. From 1991 to 1997, the number of area codes
in California almost doubled to 13, and further increased to
25 by March 2000. Exacerbating the problem was a 1998
PUC decision approving a new concept called an "overlay."
Planned initially for the 310 area code in Los Angeles, it was
intended as an alternative to the unpopular "split" maneuver.
Rather than splitting the 310 area into two area codes (310
and a new 424), the PUC's overlay plan would require all
residents in the 310 area (some of whom would be assigned a
424 area code) to dial eleven digits (I + area code + seven-
digit phone number) on all calls, even if the call is to next
door. The new 310 overlay was scheduled to take effect on
July 17, 1999. The PUC also approved overlays for the 408
area code in the San Jose area (scheduled for October 1, 1999),
the 909 area code in San Bernardino and Riverside counties
(scheduled for February 12,2000), the 415,510, and 650 area
codes in Bay Area counties (scheduled for September 2000),
and the 714 area code in Orange County (scheduled for Oc-
tober 7, 2000). The overlay concept imposes most of the costs
and annoyances of an area code split, and also complicates
automatic dialing and numerous other systems which assume
that local phone numbers involve seven digits rather than
eleven.
In June 1999, Assemblymember Wally Knox and U.S.
Representative Henry Waxman filed a petition with the PUC,
urging it to suspend- and ultimately reverse - its overlay de-
cision regarding the 310 area code in Los Angeles. While the
Commission was deliberating the petition, the legislature
passed AB 406 (Knox) (Chapter 809, Statutes of 1999), which
directs the PUC to allocate phone numbers more efficiently
[17:1 CRLR 181], and the Governor announced his opposi-
tion to the overlay concept.
Anticipating an FCC rule change, the PUC suspended
the 310 overlay in September 1999 and suspended the other
six planned area code overlays on December 16, 1999. One
factor stimulating the suspension decision was an agency
number utilization study of the
310 area code revealing that no
f Cruied cnuers have less than three million telephonef PUC-required area code nmesrmi nsd
nery obsolete, interfering numbers remain unused.
ele e, vice-ntivei On March 17, 2000, the FCC
volved, adopted new rules doing away
with the allocation of blocks of
10,000 numbers at a time for pro-
spective future use by competitors hoping to gain subscrib-
ers. Instead, numbers will be reserved and allocated in blocks
of 1,000. Hence, small competitors with little prospect of ob-
taining more than one or two thousand subscribers will re-
ceive the number matching their projected business need. The
FCC also ordered then-unused numbers to be returned to lo-
cal rate centers so they could be reassigned more precisely in
relation to need.
On March 18, 2000, immediately after the FCC's deci-
sion, the PUC started the process of reallocating numbers in
blocks of 1,000. Further, the Commission ordered allocated
numbers to be "pooled" for use by more than one competitor,
further cutting unused numbers awaiting prospective customer
allocation. In July 2000 in D. 00-07-052, the PUC adopted
several number conservation measures for use in numbering
plan areas statewide; when the FCC subsequently issued su-
perseding orders in December 2000, the PUC conformed its
rules in an April 30, 2001 order.
As of 2000, FCC policy prohibited the use of separate
numbering systems for separate "technologies" or types of
lines. This prohibition adds to the pressure on area codes,
threatening existing "land lines" (voice transmission by hard
wire traditionally dominating phone service) with disruptive
new area codes and/or overlays. Accordingly, in September
2000, the Governor signed SB 1741 (Bowen) (Chapter 907,
Statutes of 2000), which requires the PUC to seek FCC ap-
proval of "technology-specific" or "service-specific" area
codes or overlays for cell phones, pagers, and other strictly
data transmission lines (see 2000 LEGISLATION). If allowed
by the FCC, new area codes or overlays would be applied
only to the new devices which form the basis of much of the
new demand, and would not apply to the land lines of resi-
dential and business customers who rely on continuity of
numbers. The policy change would limit new area code






designations (or overlay systems) to those specified devices
(e.g., cell phones, pagers, data-only services in retail stores
doing credit card checks), allowing land lines to retain their
existing area codes notwithstanding continued overall expan-
sion.
The FCC has not yet abrogated its ban on technology
specific numbering differentiation, but is scheduled to issue
a decision in December 2001 which is expected to allow "case-
by-case" waiver to states and area codes where expansion is
stimulating numbering disruption, particularly New York and
California.
* PacBeU Service Charges: Increases and Decreases.
On November 18, 1999, the PUC announced a new pricing
scheme applicable to "unbundled network elements (UNEs)."
Translated, these are distinct telephone services or functions
provided by PacBell which can be offered by PacBell. Alter-
natively, competing companies are allowed to pay PacBell a
lease charge for those services, and then compete in provid-
ing them to consumers. Examples include call waiting, re-
peat dialing, speed calling, three-way calling, white page list-
ings, operator directory services, inside wiring repairs, and
high-speed data transmission.
Theoretically, these unbundled prices are "cost-driven."
That is, they are to be based on what is termed the "total
element long-run incremental cost" (TELRIC) plus a markup
of 19% to recover "shared and common costs" incurred by
PacBell. Hence, each service designedly pays its own mar-
ginal (or "out-of-pocket") cost, plus an equivalent share of
overhead. Accordingly, effective competition is stimulated and
PacBell, although controlling the necessary conduit, may
experience competitive challenge. The PUC's November 18,
1999 decision also adopted price floors for certain access line
and other local exchange services;
these price floors were set accord-
ing to a different standard called The PUC granted PacBel
"total service long-run incremen- 411 directory assistance 4
tal cost" (TSLRIC), which gener- per call-an 88% increas
ally results in a higher cost floor.
At the same time, the Commission rejected the requests of
PacBell and others to allow varying charges by geographic
location, based on the varying costs of serving different loca-
tions. Cost formulas and pricing
remain tied to statewide averages. On December 22, 1999,
However, the Commission Maribeth Bushey issued a
did grant substantial rate increases PacBell to pay $44 million
for unbundled services in apply- misleading practices in a
ing its adjusted formula and in al-
lowing PacBell more liberal credit
for non-recurring costs. For example, the PUC granted PacBell
authority to raise the fee for 411 directory assistance calls
from 25 cents to 46 cents per call-an 88% increase. The
decision also eliminates free 411 calls for businesses and re-
duces the number of free 411 calls made by residential con-
sumers from five per month to three. Callers are permitted to




the charges are available to customers with certain physical
and visual disabilities.
The decision infuriated customers, consumer groups, and
even some dissenting commissioners. PacBell's request gen-
erated some 42,000 letters and emails, almost all opposing
the price hike. Opponents contended that the fee increase will
especially hurt the elderly, customers on fixed incomes, and
those with limited English skills. There is also a belief that
customers are being forced to use directory assistance more
frequently because of changing area codes (see above) and
phone books with limited coverage and outdated listings.
PacBell, on the other hand, insisted that the previous rate
did not cover its cost of providing the service, and also ar-
gued that the increase is necessary in the face of strong com-
petition from Internet directory assistance services as well as
from other long distance carriers. In addition, PacBell claimed
that even with the price increase, its rates are still lower than
fees charged in 25 other states. A 3-2 majority of the PUC
insisted that the rate increase and reduction in free call allow-
ance will not affect most consumers because the majority of
residential customers make three or fewer directory assistance
calls per month.
In addition to the rate increase for 411 calls, the PUC's
November 1999 order also granted rate increases for PacBell's
busy line verification (BLV) and emergency interrupt (EI)
services. BLV, which is used when callers ask an operator to
verify if someone's phone service is busy or out of order,
increased from 50 cents to $1.20. El service, which is used
when customers ask the operator to interrupt a busy call, in-
creased from $1.00 to $1.25 per request.
Not all of PacBell's requests and the PUC's decisions
were in the direction of increase. The charge for one unbundled
service of particular impor-
tance-high-speed transmission
uthority to raise the fee for use of PacBell's facilities-was
s from 25 cents to 46 cents reduced significantly. The Com-
mission lowered previous
PacBell prices for a DSL high
speed line, or "data loop," from $148.96 to $12.67. One im-
petus for this reduction is PacBell's desire to compete with
high-speed cable services in providing Internet access. The
non-DSL phone connection to the
iministrative Law Judge Internet is markedly slower than
oposed decision requiring DSL. Without DSL, PacBell can-
penalties for deceptive and not serve as a conduit for com-
rtising optional services. petitive Internet access where
cable (high-speed) competition is
available. Although the PUC is-
sued press releases accurately pointing to the beneficial im-
pact of this price reduction on consumer prices and competi-
tion, consumer critics pointed out that it was driven by
"intermodal" competition-that is, by cable competition not
within PUC regulatory ambit.
* PacBell Fined for Deceptive Marketing Practices.
On December 22, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Maribeth






Bushey issued a proposed decision requiring PacBell to pay
$44 million in penalties for deceptive and misleading prac-
tices in advertising optional services. The ALJ's findings were
remarkably similar to a 1987 case in which the PUC fined
PacBell $16.5 million and ordered substantial consumer re-
funds for deceptive marketing practices. [8:2 CRLR 121; 7:2
CRLR 106]
The proposed decision cited PacBell for engaging in de-
liberately misleading sales practices by tricking or pressur-
ing consumers into buying expensive or extra services that
they do not need or understand. PacBell customer service rep-
resentatives testified at evidentiary hearings that they were
instructed to wait until customers repeatedly asked for a price
before giving it to them, and that they were not to take "no"
for an answer until a customer refused at least six times.
PacBell had been marketing a package of optional phone ser-
vices as "The Basics," leading customers to believe it was
the lowest-price plan even though there was a cheaper alter-
native for which many customers would have opted. PacBell
also pushed higher-priced rates on its inside wire repair ser-
vice without telling customers of a cheaper alternative until
they declined the higher price. [17:1 CRLR 178-79]
In addition, the ALJ found that PacBell had persuaded
people to switch from Caller ID "complete blocking" to "se-
lective blocking" without giving them complete information.
A majority of customers sign up for Caller ID blocking so
that their names and phone numbers will not appear on an-
other person's Caller ID box. Although complete blocking
better protects a consumer's privacy rights, it renders Caller
ID-a feature which PacBell markets for $6.50 per month-
less effective and valuable to companies that are trying to
capture personal information from those who call them.
PacBell, therefore, had been trying to push customers to switch
to selective blocking, which means that their names and num-
bers will be displayed unless they dial *67 before making a
call. Some customers were offered a "free upgrade" to selec-
tive blocking by a telemarketer without being informed of
their privacy rights. Because selective blocking offers less
privacy protection than complete blocking, the switch is ac-
tually a downgrade rather than an upgrade.
As noted above, the proposed decision found that the
utility had "failed to sufficiently inform customers regarding
(1) the number blocking options to prevent a caller's number
from being displayed on a Caller ID device, and (2) the two
inside wire maintenance plans it offers," and that "Pacific
Bell's marketing policy of sequentially offering packages of
services in descending order of price fails to sufficiently in-
form customers because they are not told of the lesser-priced
package unless they refuse the more expensive option." In
addition, the ALJ determined that "unlimited potential sales
commissions for service representatives is not consistent with
the incentive compensation guidelines we have previously
stated with regard to Pacific Bell. We hold that Pacific Bell
may not use the Universal Lifeline Telephone Service sub-
sidy program as a link to market other optional services. In
its marketing of 'The Basics,' a package of optional services,
we conclude that the name inaccurately suggests a relation-
ship with basic telephone service."
The proposed decision declared that "wide-ranging ef-
forts by Pacific Bell are required to remedy the violations we
find. Unfortunately, the record does not contain detailed re-
medial proposals, so we direct the parties to prepare such pro-
posals for our further consideration. These proposals should
address customer notification and refunds, including customer
outreach plans to ensure that Pacific Bell reaches as many
customers as possible. We direct Pacific Bell to make all nec-
essary refunds directly to customers and to provide sufficient
funds for the customer outreach effort."
While consumer groups applauded the ALJ's proposed
decision, PacBell denied the findings and claimed the ruling
was "ill-informed and unfair." PacBell contended that the PUC
was aware of its marketing of "The Basics" and even approved
it. It claimed that the PUC received only 15 complaints over
a time period when the company handled 36 million calls
from customers. PacBell officials stated that the ALJ's pro-
posed decision "legally flawed, anticompetitive, and danger-
ous to California businesses." On January 21, 2000, PacBell
filed an appeal of the proposed decision. In addition, PacBell
took out full-page newspaper advertisements and aggressively
lobbied legislators.
Consumer groups counter-lobbied, but complained bit-
terly about the impact of PacBell's campaign contribution
influence and the intervention of Davis administration offi-
cials in PUC deliberations. On the same day that PacBell filed
its appeal, San Diego-based UCAN filed its own appeal of
the ALJ's decision, claiming that the decision did not punish
the company sufficiently. UCAN argued that PacBell should
be penalized about $100 million instead of $44 million.
Following a reopening of the record and further argu-
ment, ALJ Bushey filed a "modified draft decision" on July
13, 2000. The "modified draft decision" included very few
changes to the original proposed decision, and actually in-
creased the proposed fine to $49 million, including a required
consumer education plan funded at $29 million (an increase
of $5 million) and a fine of $20 million to be deposited into
the general fund (with $ 10 million of that fine suspended if
PacBell complies with all of the PUC's orders).
Although the PUC's proceeding produced substantial
evidence of misleading, unfair, and unlawful marketing prac-
tices by the utility, PacBell continued its aggressive lobbying
campaign after July 2000. Some observers believe that the
success of that effort undermines the integrity of the
Commission's regulatory process. Due to the tenacity of
PacBell's resistance to the outcome of these proceedings, fi-
nality has been elusive. In October 2000, Commissioner
Neeper issued an alternate proposed decision finding entirely
for PacBell on all issues of alleged unfair marketing, finding
no fault by the utility as to the complained-of practices, and
contrary to the factual findings of the ALJ. Later in 2000,
Commissioners Bilas, Wood, and Brown all contributed their
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own proposed decisions in this matter; at this writing, a final
PUC decision is not expected until late 2001.
* PUCApproves Bylawsfor Consumer Protection Fund.
On May 4, 2000, the PUC published Resolution T-16388 to
implement bylaws for a "Consumer Protection Fund Oversight
Corporation," a nonprofit organization established to adminis-
ter a compensation fund of $4.8 million created to address al-
leged telephone marketing abuses by GTE California.
The Oversight Corporation is the culmination of proceed-
ings initiated on February 18, 1998 (I. 98-02-025), an inves-
tigation of alleged marketing abuses filed by the PUC's Con-
sumer Services Division. That investigation led to the inter-
vention of the Greenlining Institute and the Latino Issues
Forum, two Bay Area public interest organizations. These in-
tervenors sought to represent limited-English speaking vic-
tims of those alleged abuses. A settlement agreement was
reached among the parties on December 17, 1998 (D. 98-12-
084), and GTE California contributed $4.8 million to resolve
the matter.
The Corporation has the task of selecting and monitor-
ing a Fund Administrator, a third party capable of fulfilling
the assigned tasks consistent with the corporate bylaws. The
settlement decision states that the purpose of the Fund is to
"facilitate and further telecommunications consumer protec-
tion and education in non-English and limited-English speak-
ing communities in the GTE California service area." The
Corporation will issue a request for proposals from nonprofit
organizations wishing to engage in telecommunications edu-
cation projects; the money is to be distributed within three
years, and all grantee programs are to be completed within
one year of the receipt of a grant. The Corporation is to be
dissolved by December 31, 2003 "unless the Commission
directs otherwise." The termination of the funding vehicle is
important to the intervenors, who contend that it should be
used as a continuing vehicle to distribute restitutionary PUC-
or court-ordered cy pres monies involving regulated utilities.
The Commission has created a Board of Directors with no
Commission representation (outside of one person in a non-
voting liaison role). The Commission allocated $48,000 for
the first year as operating expenses, and $32,000 for each of
the two following years.
* Rulemaking to Establish a "Telecommunications
Consumer Bill of Rights." On February 3, 2000, the PUC
instituted a rulemaking proceeding (R. 00-02-004) for the
purpose of finding new methods
of protecting consumer rights in On February 3, 2000, the
today's ultra-competitive telecom- proceeding (R. 00-02-004
munications market. While regu- new methods of protectin
lations have been changing in or- ultra-competitive telecom
der to promote competition within
the market, the changes have
paved the way for marketing abuses (as reflected above). The
Commission hopes to first establish a "telecommunications
consumer bill of rights" and then set up consumer protection





the PUC's Telecommunications Division released its report
and recommendations entitled Consumer Protections for a
Competitive Telecommunications Industry. The report recom-
mends that the Commission officially recognize and protect
the following consumer rights:
- Disclosure-consumers have a right to receive clear
and complete terms and conditions for service agreements
and disclosure of prices for goods and services, and to affir-
matively accept all terms and conditions before being charged
for services.
- Choice-consumers have a right to select their service
vendors, and to have that choice respected by industry.
- Privacy-consumers have a right to personal privacy,
and to have protection from unauthorized use of their records
and personal information and to reject intrusive communica-
tions and technology.
* Public participation-consumers have a right to par-
ticipate in public proceedings and shall be informed of means
to participate.
- Oversight and enforcement-consumers have a right
to be informed of their rights and what agency enforces those
rights. Consumers have a right to address how well state and
federal regulators monitor and implement consumer protec-
tions on their behalf.
• Accurate bills and redress -Consumers have a right to
understandable and accurate bills for services they authorize
and the opportunity for redress for problems they encounter.
Vendors of telecommunications services shall provide clear
information explaining how and where consumers can com-
plain. Consumers shall have their complaints addressed with-
out harassment.
Telecommunications Division staff argued that the bill of
rights should be applicable to services provided by all tele-
phone companies (including wireless carriers), noting that con-
sumer protections for customers of wireless services were or-
dered by the PUC in D. 96-12-071 but have yet to be estab-
lished. Staff also recommended the replacement of the "fully
competitive" service tariffs filed with the PUC by telecommu-
nications companies with consumer protection rules. Note that
the background for these proceedings involves deregulation to
competitive forces. Normally, the competitive sector is subject
to a phalanx of general consumer protection statutes and rem-
edies. However, these may be limited as to a newly deregu-
lated industry, because legislators have long relied on state regu-
lators and have not enacted pro-
IC instituted a rulemaking tective statutes in the relevant sub-
'or the purpose of finding ject area.And even court remedies
:onsumer rights in today's for general and serious abuses may
unications market. be limited by continued respect for
the regulatory authority of the
now-absent regulator, with defer-
ral to an absent watchdog often continuing through "exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies" requirements, application of
the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine, or other bars to redress
normally available against market abusers.
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Finally, Telecommunications Division staff suggested that
the Commission reexamine its longstanding limitation of li-
ability protections in filed tariffs. While some liability limi-
tations may be appropriate where a utility is closely regu-
lated and must clear much of what it does in advance, the
advantage to consumers is less clear when the limitation is
applied to competitive services for which the Commission
no longer sets rates based on cost of service.
The Commission asked stakeholders to provide input on
the development of the new rules. Written comments were
requested by April 3, 2000, and reply comments by May 3,
2000. Extensive public participation hearings were scheduled
throughout the state, running from June 15 in the San Fernando
Valley to August 15,2000 in Fullerton (and including ten other
locations, with both afternoon and evening sessions in most
locations).
In January 2001, Assigned Commissioner Carl Wood
expressed support for many of the proposed rules. He also
sought stakeholder comments on two new sets of rules - stan-
dards governing the inclusion of unauthorized, misleading,
or deceptive charges for products or services on the
subscriber's telephone bills ("cramming"), and rules address-
ing the switching of customers' service without their permis-
sion ("slamming"). Both of these problems were the subject
of extensive testimony during the public participation hear-
ings. Accordingly, the rulemaking was essentially expanded
into three sets of rules, with PUC staff drafting proposals for
the latter two. Commissioner Wood's January 2001 order an-
ticipates a new "telecommunications consumer protection
general order" which will consolidate all three sets of rules.
In addition, the Commissioner anticipates that growing out
of the "rights" general order should be a "consumer telecom-
munications education program" to stimulate consumer
knowledge of and industry adherence to the final standards.
At this writing, Commissioner Wood is expected to release
interim rules governing cramming in July 200 1; a final PUC
decision on all three subject areas is scheduled for early 2002.
* Lifeline Program: Rulemaking and Report. On Oc-
tober 11, 2000 in D. 00-10-028, the PUC adopted revisions
to the Universal Lifeline Telephone Service (ULTS) program
and General Order (GO) 153. The ULTS program was cre-
ated in 1984 in response to the enactment of the Moore Uni-
versal Telephone Service Act, Public Utilities Code section
87 1. Local phone utilities are required to provide basic tele-
phone service to low-income households at substantially re-
duced rates. Utilities then recover these subsidies from the
ULTS Fund (based on the difference between each utility's
normal tariffed rates for basic service and the discounted rates
charged to ULTS customers). The fund is fed by a surcharge
assessed all end users of intrastate services. 117:1 CRLR 179;
16:2 CRLR 145-46]
As of 1999, 3.2 million California households partici-
pated in the ULTS program. The ULTS program budget for
2000 was approximately $276 million; of this amount, $268.6
was expended on subsidies paid to utilities to provide ULTS;
$6.6 million funded marketing and outreach efforts; and the
remainder was spend on ULTS program administrative costs.
The rule changes adopted in October 2000 are intended
to update the ULTS program based on the changes extant since
the PUC's adoption of GO 153 in 1984. According to the
PUC, the revisions also conform to specific aspects of the
federal Lifeline and Link Up programs; expand ULTS pro-
gram benefits to provide more low-income households with
access to affordable basic telephone service; and revise ULTS
program administrative procedures to make the program more
effective and efficient. The specific revisions to GO 153 and
the ULTS program adopted by this decision include the fol-
lowing:
* ULTS program benefits are expanded to allow ULTS
customers to pay a discounted service-connection charge each
time they reestablish ULTS at the same residence, move to a
new address, or switch from one ULTS provider to another.
* ULTS program benefits are expanded to provide two
ULTS lines to low-income households that have (a) a dis-
abled member who needs "two-line voice carryover" to ac-
cess basic telephone service, or (b) at least two members, one
of whom is disabled and uses a text-telephone device.
* Utilities and the PUC's Deaf and Disabled Telecom-
munications Program (DDTP) are required to develop and
deploy a system by July 1, 2001, to provide utilities with real-
time access to the DDTP's database of customers who satisfy
the disability and equipment-related eligibility criteria for two
ULTS lines.
* Utilities are prohibited from requiring customers who
have an unpaid toll bill to post a service deposit in order to
initiate ULTS if such customers elect to subscribe to toll block-
ing.
. The amount of lost revenues that utilities may recover
from the ULTS Fund is limited to the amount that the incum-
bent local exchange carrier may recover from the ULTS Fund.
- Utilities that are qualified to become federal "eligible
telecommunications carriers" (ETCs), but which are not cur-
rently ETCs, are not required to seek designation as an ETC
in order to draw from the ULTS Fund.
- Utilities that sell ULTS to customers in a language other
than English are required to provide these customers with (a)
Commission-mandated ULTS notices, certification forms, and
recertification forms that are in the same language in which
ULTS was originally sold; and (b) Commission-mandated
ULTS notices that include the toll-free number of customer
service representatives who are fluent in the same language
in which ULTS was originally sold.
- Utilities are required to (a) inform potential ULTS cus-
tomers during the screening process about ULTS eligibility
criteria, and (b) ask potential ULTS customers if they meet
the ULTS eligibility criteria without having to disclose spe-
cific household income levels.
- Carriers that are late in remitting ULTS surcharge rev-
enues are required to pay interest equal to a 10% annual rate
beginning on the date that the remittances are due.
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* The scope of Commission audits of ULTS surcharge re-
mittances and ULTS claims is limited to five calendar years
following the year in which the surcharge revenues are remit-
ted or the claims submitted, except in cases where there ap-
pears to be malfeasance. Where there is an indication of mal-
feasance, the scope of an audit shall depend on the circum-
stances at the time the malfeasance is suspected or discovered.
9 The charter of the ULTS Administrative Committee
(ULTSAC) is revised to replace the members of the Commit-
tee who represent carriers and utilities with the directors of
the PUC's Consumer Services Division, Legal Division, and
the Office of Ratepayer Advocates, or their designees.
Meanwhile, on December 1, 1999, the Commission sub-
mitted a report to the legislature pursuant to SB 207 (Polanco)
(Chapter 750, Statutes of 1996). The report discussed the
PUC's five public purpose programs created to stimulate so-
ciety-wide access to telecommunications, including: (1) the
ULTS program, which discounts rates to low-income con-
sumers (see above); (2) the California High Cost Fund-A,
which cross-subsidizes 17 small LECs to reduce any dispar-
ity in the rates charged by these companies; (3) the Califor-
nia High Cost Fund-B, which similarly subsidizes LECs serv-
ing high-cost (e.g., rural) areas of the state; (4) the California
Teleconnect Fund, which provides discounted services to
qualifying schools, libraries, publicly-owned health clinics
and hospitals, and certain community organizations making
telecommunications services (including Internet access) avail-
able to those otherwise lacking access; and (5) the Deaf and
Disabled Telecommunications Program (see below).
The report documents improvement in universal service
achievement for basic telephone service, with 95.2% of the
state's households subscribing as of 1998-1% above the
national average. Further, the trend toward universality is up,
given somewhat lower levels in the 1980s (92.5% in 1984).
The number of low-income subscribers receiving assistance
has increased steadily from 3.1
million in 1996 to an estimated 3.6 The rulemaking was spa
million in 2000. Effective Novem- the public and some go
ber 1, 1999, PacBell's new ULTS Commission's relaxed r
installation rate was $9.50, the flat entry into the local exci
rate was $5.34 per month, and the compliance with CEQA.
measured rate was $2.85; these
numbers average a 5% decrease
from pre-1999 levels.
The report also discussed the Public Policy Payphone
Program, created in D. 98-11-029 (Nov. 5, 1998), whose pur-
pose is to provide payphones to the general public at no charge
where they would otherwise not exist. The private market
requires substantial volume of use to support a payphone in-
vestment. However, the public benefit of having telephone
access for emergency or other critical use may not be reflected
in that market, and the PUC provides such facilities at loca-
tions it designates as "emergency gathering places."
* Rulemaking on Telecommunications Services for the
Deaf and Disabled. Since 1979, the PUC's Deaf and Dis-
abled Telecommunications Program (DDTP) has assisted the
deaf, hard-of-hearing, and disabled communities to gain ac-
cess to the public switched telephone network. Currently, the
DDTP consists of three components: (1) the distribution of
telecommunications devices (TDDs) at no cost to certified
deaf and hearing-impaired telephone subscribers, to schools
and organizations representing the deaf or hearing-impaired,
and to state agencies with significant public contact; (2) the
California Relay Service, which improves the communica-
tion potential for the deaf and hearing-impaired by providing
them direct access to California's public switched telephone
network; and (3) the provision of other specialized telecom-
munications equipment to consumers with hearing, vision,
mobility, speech, and cognitive disabilities.
In 1999, the legislature enacted SB 669 (Polanco) (Chap-
ter 677, Statutes of 1999), which codified the Deaf and Dis-
abled Telecommunications Administrative Committee
(DDTPAC) which the Commission has long had in place
through its own administrative action. The statute requires
telephone corporations to collect and fund the three programs
described above. [17:1 CRLR 182] One of the motivations
for this enactment was concern by some that the PUC lacked
constitutional or statutory authority to maintain the program
on its own regulatory authority alone.
On April 20, 2000, the Commission adopted Resolution
T-16379 setting the DDTP's budget at $57.3 million for cal-
endar year 2000. The amount is $4 million above the 1999
level, but $9.7 million below the recommendation of the
DDTPAC.
On May 4,2000, the Commission instituted a rulemaking
proceeding (R. 00-05-001) to implement the changes called
for in SB 669. As noted above, most of this statute simply
replicates in statutory form the longstanding practice of the
PUC in administering the three existing programs. The pre-
liminary scoping memorandum indicates that most of the
rulemaking proceeding will per-
ed by concerns raised by tain to internal housekeeping mat-
nment agencies that the ters, such as how the DDTPAClatory barriers for e and PUC should communicate
mein with each other and the timing of
the PUC's adoption of the DDTP
budget. The most important issue
to be decided appears to be
whether the utility representatives and/or Commission repre-
sentatives on the DDTPAC should continue their member-
ship. At this writing, a final decision is expected in July 2001.
* Rulemaking to Assess the Impact of New Communi-
cations Facilities on the Environment. On February 3, 2000,
the PUC initiated a rulemaking proceeding (R. 00-02-003) to
address the Commission's enforcement of the California En-
vironmental Quality Act (CEQA) as it applies to telecommu-
nications companies in California. The rulemaking was
spawned by concerns raised by the public and some govern-
ment agencies that the Commission's relaxed regulatory bar-
riers for easing entry into the local exchange market may not






be in compliance with CEQA. The PUC eased entry require-
ments in order to facilitate competition, promote technologi-
cal change, and reduce prices to customers. However, due to
environmental concerns, the PUC has expressed concern that
CLECs may need to be subject to more stringent requirements.
For example, in the months prior to the rulemaking or-
der, PUC staff ordered several carriers to stop construction of
telecommunications facilities following communications from
other government agencies and members of the public who
expressed concerns about the carriers' compliance with
CEQA. In December 1999, the Commission issued two deci-
sions modifying its previous practice of issuing authority to
provide local exchange service to new CLECs. Rather than
giving it out in "batches," the Commission will review each
application, placing more emphasis on the potential environ-
mental impacts that construction may cause. The problem with
this system, however, is that only new CLECs are subject to
stringent review, while existing LECs such as PacBell and
AT&T are not, thereby creating an unequal system. Commis-
sioners are concerned that carriers will not have an equal op-
portunity to compete. As part of the rulemaking, the PUC
will consider these factors and try to assess the best way to
keep the market competitive and fair while complying with
CEQA. On April 7, 2000, the PUC conducted a roundtable
discussion on this issue as part of its ongoing study. At this
writing, the proceeding is still pending.
Auditor Criticizes PUC Contract
Management Practices
On March 16, 2000, the Bureau of State Audits (BSA)
released California Public Utilities Commission: Weaknesses
in Its Contracting Process Have Resulted in Questionable
Payments (No. 99117.2), a 25-page report critical of the PUC's
contract management practices. BSA examined a sample of
25 Commission contracts entered into during fiscal year 1998-
99. Problems cited include failures to seek competitive bids,
clearly define scope of work, and/or prepare reasonably de-
tailed budgets and progress schedules. As a result, the report
concluded that "the Commission has made hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars in questionable payments to its consultants."
The report identified $662,000 in facially questionable pay-
ment in its audit of $11 million in expert consulting contracts
entered into during the audited year. The audit found that the
work itself was monitored adequately, but faulted Commis-
sion staff for failing to require competitive bidding, proper
documentation, and specificity. Interestingly, the audit re-
vealed that the Commission had conducted its own internal
audit which made similar findings (see agency report on BSA
for related discussion of this audit).
2000 LEGISLATION
Power Utilities Legislation
AB 265 (Davis), AB 1156 (Ducheny and Battin), and
AB 970 (Ducheny) comprise a three-bill package intended
to ease the effects of the state's energy crisis on San Diegans,
whose utility bills unexpectedly doubled and-in some
cases-tripled during 2000 (see MAJOR PROJECTS), and
to move the state toward constrution f new power generat-
ing facilities:
* AB 265 (Davis), as amended August 29, 2000, requires
the PUC-retroactive to June 1,2000-to establish a ceiling
of 6.5 cents/kwh on the energy component of electric bills
for residential, small commercial, and street lighting custom-
ers of SDG&E through December 31,2002; if the PUC finds
it in the public interest, this ceiling may be extended through
December 2003. The bill also requires the PUC to establish
an accounting procedure to track and recover reasonable and
prudent costs of providing electric energy to retail customers
unrecovered through retail bills due to the application of that
ceiling, and to -review that procedure periodically; "the ac-
counting procedure and review shall provide a reasonable op-
portunity for San Diego Gas and Electric Company to re-
cover its reasonable and prudent costs of service over a rea-
sonable period of time." The bill also requires the PUC to
establish a voluntary program for large commercial, agricul-
tural, and industrial customers who buy energy from SDG&E
to set the energy component of their bills at 6.5 cents/kwh
with a true-up after a year; and to institute a proceeding to
examine SDG&E's prudence and reasonableness in procur-
ing wholesale energy on behalf of its customers, and to issue
orders it determines to be appropriate affecting the retail rates
of SDG&E customers if it finds that SDG&E acted unrea-
sonably or imprudently. This bill was signed by the Gover-
nor on September 6, 2000 (Chapter 328, Statutes of 2000).
* AB 1156 (Ducheny and Battin), as amended August
30, 2000, would have set aside $150 million in general fund
money to be used by the PUC to assist SDG&E and San Di-
ego ratepayers in the event that the difference between rates
as capped by AB 265 (and as documented through the ac-
counting procedure required by AB 265) and the price paid
for power by SDG&E becomes unmanageable. After con-
sumer advocates called the bill a public bailout of SDG&E
and the out-of-state energy generators, Governor Davis ve-
toed the bill on September 29, 2000, stating: "This legisla-
tion is premature, sets a troubling precedent, and encourages
merchant generators and energy traders to continue to act ir-
responsibly." The Governor noted that he had signed AB 970
(see below) to encourage new energy production in Califor-
nia, called upon FERC to halve its $250/mwh cap on whole-
sale electricity prices, and urged FERC to meaningfully regu-
late "the merchant generators and energy traders who are
unconscionably profiteering in the deregulated marketplace."
* AB 970 (Ducheny), as amended August 31,2000, en-
acts the California Energy Security and Reliability Act
(CESRA) of 2000. The bill establishes the Governor's "Clean
Energy Green Team" (Green Team), consisting of a chair and
not more than 15 members appointed by the Governor, con-
sisting of various federal, state, and local agency representa-
tives with jurisdiction over powerplant siting activities in the
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state; and requires the Green Team to undertake various ac-
tivities designed to expedite construction of new, clean en-
ergy. The bill establishes expedited processes for California
Energy Commission (CEC) siting of both temporary "peak-
ing" and permanent thermal powerplants, and expands en-
ergy conservation and demand-side management programs
administered by the CEC and PUC. This bill was signed by
the Governor on September 6, 2000 (Chapter 329, Statutes
of 2000).
AJR 77 (Keeley), as amended August 31,2000, calls on
the PUC and the EOB to petition FERC to modify rates of
the ISO to ensure they are just and reasonable. Whenever
those entities find that prices are not just and reasonable, they
shall recommend to the FERC that remedial actions ("includ-
ing the retroactive recalculation of the market-clearing price
to just and reasonable levels as may be necessary to achieve
fair and reasonable wholesale prices") be taken.
The resolution also calls upon the PUC, in consultation
with the EOB, to investigate "the most effective mechanisms
to protect consumers from price volatility, energy exports,
and unreasonably high prices caused by an uncompetitive
market." The resolution requires the EOB to direct the ISO to
demonstrate why the price for wholesale energy in the ancil-
lary services and real-time energy markets should not be
capped at $100, and report back to the legislature by Decem-
ber 1, 2000. This resolution also calls on the PUC to com-
mence an investigation by September 21, 2000 into the im-
pact of high wholesale electric prices on consumers and elec-
trical corporations under the rate freeze. AJR 77 was adopted
in the Assembly on August 31, and in the Senate on Septem-
ber 1, 2000 (Chapter 153, Resolutions of 2000).
SB 1388 (Peace), as amended June 20, 2000, requires
the PUC to conduct a pilot study of certain customers of each
electrical corporation to determine the relative value to
ratepayers of information, rate design, and metering innova-
tions using specified approaches; the bill requires the PUC to
report initial results of the study to the legislature on or be-
fore March 31,2002. SB 1388 also requires the PUC and the
EOB to facilitate efforts to obtain federal authorization to
recover certain expenses of electrical corporations related to
reconfiguration, replacement, or expansion of transmission
facilities. The bill authorizes the PUC to periodically review
and adjust depreciation schedules and rates authorized for an
electric plant that is under the jurisdiction of the Commission
and owned by electrical corporations and to periodically re-
view and adjust depreciation schedules and rates authorized
for a gas plant that is under the jurisdiction of the PUC and
owned by gas corporations. This bill was signed by the Gov-
ernor on September 30, 2000 (Chapter 1040, Statutes of 2000).
AB 2866 (Midgen), as amended June 15, 2000, autho-
rizes the PUC to investigate issues relating to multiple quali-
fied exchanges. The bill requires the PUC to prepare and sub-
mit findings and recommendations to the legislature if it de-
termines that allowing electrical corporations to purchase from
multiple qualified exchanges is in the public interest. This
bill was signed by the Governor on July 8 (Chapter 127, Stat-
utes of 2000).
SB 1709 (Kelley), as amended May 16, 2000, excludes
corporations or persons employing digester gas technology
for the generation of electricity for certain purposes from the
definition of an electrical corporation subject to regulation
by the PUC. Digester gas is the methane (natural gas) that
comes from the treatment or decomposition of organic mate-
rials (including cow manure and human waste). This bill was
signed by the Governor on July 21,2000 (Chapter 174, Stat-
utes of 2000).
AB 1002 (R. Wright), as amended August 25, 2000,
requires the PUC to establish a surcharge on all natural gas
consumed in California to fund certain low-income assistance
programs, cost-effective energy efficiency and conservation
activities, and public interest research and development. AB
1002 requires public utility gas corporations to collect the
surcharge from natural gas consumers; the money from the
surcharge will be deposited in the Gas Consumption Surcharge
Fund created by this bill, and continuously appropriated to
specific entities. Governor Davis signed this bill on Septem-
ber 29, 2000 (Chapter 932, Statutes of 2000).
SB 1194 (Sher), as amended August 21, 2000, restates
the policy of the state that each electrical corporation operate
its electric distribution grid in a safe, reliable, efficient, and
cost-effective manner and that electric corporations continue
to make prudent investments in their distribution grids; and
reaffirms California's doctrine, as reflected in regulatory and
judicial decisions, regarding the reasonable opportunity of
investor-owned utilities to recover costs and investments as-
sociated with their electric distribution grid and the reason-
able opportunity to attract capital for investment on reason-
able terms.
SB 1194 also extends the collection by investor-owned
utilities of a nonbypassable system benefit charge to fund
energy efficiency and conservation activities; public interest
research, development and demonstration; and in-state op-
eration and development of existing, new, and emerging re-
newable energy resources. The bill requires the CEC to de-
velop investment plans for renewable energy and public in-
terest research, development, and demonstration; and requires
the PUC and CEC to continue to administer energy efficiency
programs following prescribed guidelines. SB 1194 requires
the Governor, on or before January 1, 2004, to appoint an
independent review panel that, on or before January 1, 2005,
is required to report to the legislature and the CEC on, among
other things, the benefits secured for residential customers.
The bill requires the CEC to report to the legislature on re-
newable energy and research and development, develop and
submit to the legislature certain investment plans, and rec-
ommend allocations among specified projects.
SB 1194 requires the PUC to require investor-owned utili-
ties to inform all customers who request residential service
connections via telephone of the availability of the Califor-
nia Alternative Rates for Energy (CARE) program and how
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they may qualify for and obtain these services (see MAJOR
PROJECTS), and permits such utilities to recover the rea-
sonable costs of implementing these provisions. Additionally,
the bill requires investor-owned utilities to accept applica-
tions for the CARE program according to procedures speci-
fied by the PUC, and authorizes the PUC to include misrep-
resentations of a material fact by an applicant obtaining a
registration as an electric service provider as a reason to sus-
pend or revoke their registration. SB 1194 was signed by
Governor Davis on September 30, 2000 (Chapter 1050, Stat-
utes of 2000).
AB 995 (R. Wright), as amended August 18, 2000, reaf-
firms state policy that each investor-owned utility shall con-
tinue to operate its electric distribution grid in its service terri-
tory and have a reasonable opportunity to recover its costs. AB
995 also extends, until January 1, 2012, the current surcharge
on electricity to fund specified public purpose programs, in-
cluding energy efficiency and conservation activities; public
interest research, development, and demonstration (RD&D)
programs; and in-state operation and development of existing,
new, and emerging renewable energy resources. AB 995 re-
quires the CEC to develop investment plans for renewable en-
ergy and RD&D programs, and requires the PUC to continue
administering specified energy efficiency programs. The bill
also requires the Governor to appoint an independent review
panel to prepare and submit a report evaluating the public pur-
pose programs funded by this bill. Governor Davis signed AB
995 on September 30, 2000 (Chapter 1051, Statutes of 2000).
Telecommunications Legislation
AB 1263 (Thomson). Existing law requires all 911 emer-
gency telephone calls made from cellular telephones to be
routed to the California Highway Patrol (CHP) for emergency
response, and charges the Department of General Services
(DGS) with the responsibility for administering the 911 sys-
tem. As amended August 25, 2000, this bill-which applies
to all wireless communications services, including cellular
telephone service and personal communications service-
provides that 911 calls made from wireless telephones may
be routed to a public safety agency other than the CHP if (1)
the call originates from a location other than from a highway
or county road under CHP jurisdiction; (2) it is economically
and technically feasible; (3) it will benefit public safety; and
(4) if the CHP, DGS, and the public safety agency, in consul-
tation with the wireless industry, producers of 911 selective
routing service, and local law enforcement officials believe
it will provide more efficient 911 service. This bill also bars
any charges for wireless telephone calls to 911 and requires
wireless 911 calls from non-customers to be completed. This
bill was signed by the Governor on September 29, 2000 (Chap-
ter 981, Statutes of 2000).
SB 1712 (Polanco). The Moore Universal Telephone
Service Act requires the PUC to establish a class of "lifeline"
service necessary to meet minimum residential communica-
tions needs and establish rates and charges for that service
(see MAJOR PROJECTS). As amended June 12, 2000, this
bill adds findings and declarations stating the intent of the
legislature that the PUC redefine universal telephone service
by incorporating two-way voice, video, and data service as
components of basic service; and requires the PUC, on or
before February 1,2001, to initiate an investigation to exam-
ine the current and future definitions of universal service,
seeking input from a wide cross-section of providers, users,
state agencies, and convergent industries and reporting find-
ings and recommendations, consistent with specified prin-
ciples, to the legislature. This bill was signed by the Gover-
nor on September 29, 2000 (Chapter 943, Statutes of 2000).
AB 994 (R. Wright), as amended June 19,2000, requires
the PUC-on or before January 1,2002-to prepare and sub-
mit to the Governor and the legislature a report on the feasi-
bility of establishing rural telephone cooperatives or other
alternative service configurations to promote rural telephone
service, including voice and data transmission service.
Existing law, until January 1, 2001, requires the PUC to
develop, implement, and maintain a program to establish a
fair and equitable local rate structure designed to reduce any
disparity in rates charged by small independent telephone
corporations serving rural and small metropolitan areas, and
a program to provide for transfer payments to telephone cor-
porations serving areas where the cost of providing services
exceeds rates charged by providers, as determined by the PUC.
AB 994 extends the operative date of those provisions until
January 1,2005.
Until January 1, 2001, existing law restricts the type of
charges that can be included in a telephone bill to communi-
cations-related goods and services. This bill extends that sun-
set date until July 1, 2001 to allow the PUC time to complete
its ongoing rulemaking procedure to adopt consumer protec-
tion rules (see MAJOR PROJECTS). This bill was signed by
the Governor on September 29, 2000 (Chapter 931, Statutes
of 2000).
AB 2757 (Committee on Utilities and Commerce).
Existing law requires the PUC to establish a rate recovery
mechanism through surcharges on intrastate telephone ser-
vice, until January 1,2001, to recover the costs of providing
telecommunications devices capable of serving the needs of
the deaf, hearing impaired, and disabled (see MAJOR
PROJECTS). As amended June 21,2000, this bill would have
extended the requirement for those telephone surcharges un-
til January 1, 2005, and required the PUC to design and imple-
ment, on or before July 1, 2002, a program to provide free
access to telephonic reading systems for individuals with print
disabilities. The bill would have authorized specified entities
to apply to the PUC for funding to establish a new telephonic
reading system, and for the operation of this system, and re-
quired the PUC to reimburse any authorized operational ex-
penses paid or incurred by a telephonic reading system on or
after January 1, 2001.
On September 29, 2000, the Governor vetoed this bill,
citing his concern that implementation of this program could
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negatively affect funding for other important activities within
the Deaf and Disabled Telecommunications Program (DDTP).
In addition, the Governor opined that spending caps within
the DDTP could be impacted by the implementation of a tele-
phonic reading system, particularly when there are no com-
plete estimates of the level of use anticipated for these sys-
tems, and indicated that it would be premature to enact this
measure without the data sufficient to estimate the impact of
the program.
AB 1825 (Strom-Martin), as amended August 8, 2000,
would have expanded the California High-Cost Fund Pro-
gram to fund a grant program within the PUC for rural tele-
communications infrastructure, and would have provided
grants to community-based organizations to construct tele-
communications infrastructure in rural areas. Governor Davis
vetoed AB 1825 on September 29, 2000, saying that it would
divert up to $10 million per year from the California High-
Cost Funds, and could result in increased rates for other rural
ratepayers.
AB 1082 (Calderon and Maddox). Existing law requires
PUC approval before a telephone company may issue stock or
long-term debt with a maturity date of more than twelve months.
As amended June 20, 2000, AB 1082 would have permitted
telephone companies that are regulated under a "price cap"
regulatory structure to issue stock or debt unless the PUC can
prove that such an issuance would not be in the public interest.
Governor Davis vetoed this bill on September 30, 2000. Ac-
cording to the Governor's veto message, "AB 1082 duplicates
existing PUC procedures that allow the PUC to exempt tele-
phone companies on a case-by-case basis from regulatory re-
view of their financing proposals. It also places ratepayers at
risk if local telephone companies make bad financial decisions
and must seek additional forms of revenue to offset the losses.
It is important that local telephone companies obtain state re-
view before issuing stock or debt so the public can be pro-
tected from imprudent corporate finance decisions."
SB 1741 (Bowen), as amended July 3, 2000, requires
the PUC to request authority from the FCC to require tele-
phone corporations to establish technology-specific area codes
based on wireless and data communications and to allow
seven-digit dialing within that technology-specific area code
and the underlying preexisting area code(s) (see MAJOR
PROJECTS). SB 1741 requires the PUC to use any authority
so granted unless it makes specific findings. The bill prohib-
its the PUC from approving new area code splits or overlays
unless a telephone utilization survey has been performed and
reasonable telephone number conservation has been imple-
mented, a technology-specific area code has been established
(if authorized), and further area code relief is warranted. Gov-
ernor Davis signed SB 1741 on September 29, 2000 (Chapter
907, Statutes of 2000).
Other PUC Legislation
AB 1398 (Papan). In 1998, SB 779 (Calderon) (Chapter
886, Statutes of 1998) made substantial changes in the judi-
cial review process of PUC decisions. In relevant part, SB
779 provided for judicial review of major PUC decisions by
both the California Supreme Court and courts of appeal, and
changed the courts' standard of review from abuse of discre-
tion to substantial evidence review. [16:1 CRLR 170-71] This
provision was operative for all PUC-regulated entities on Janu-
ary 1, 1999, except for decisions affecting water corporations,
for whom the expanded judicial review was set to begin Janu-
ary 1,2001. As amended June 15,2000, AB 1398 indefinitely
extends the deferential judicial review standards of PUC de-
cisions affecting water corporations. According to the bill's
sponsor, the California Water Association, the conversion of
the energy, telecommunication, and transportation utilities to
competitive markets not fully regulated by the PUC requires
expanded access to the court system at all levels. However,
water corporations remain fully subject to "traditional, rigor-
ous PUC regulation ....The PUC's broader regulatory author-
ity over water corporations makes greater judicial involve-
ment unnecessary; statewide continuity and consistency is
obtained through Commission regulation." Governor Davis
signed AB 1398 on September 29, 2000 (Chapter 953, Stat-
utes of 2000).
SB 1491 (Leslie), as amended May 24, 2000, authorizes,
on an application-by-application basis, the Commission to
supervise the operation of pilot projects for the purpose of
evaluating proposed railroad crossing warning devices or new
technology at designated crossings, with the consent of the
local jurisdiction, the affected railroad, and other interested
parties. The Governor signed SB 1491 on August 29, 2000
(Chapter 263, Statutes of 2000).
AB 2762 (Committee on Utilities and Commerce).
Existing law establishes a PUC program to ensure the safe
operation of passenger carriers (e.g., shuttles, limousines,
charter buses); this program is paid for by fees on the carri-
ers, and those fees are based on a uniform percentage of their
individual gross revenues. As amended August 7, 2000, this
bill permits the PUC to move away from a revenue-based
assessment system and to instead use a system based on a
per-vehicle assessment. Governor Davis signed AB 2762 on
September 6, 2000 (Chapter 341, Statutes of 2000).
The following bills reported in Volume 17, No. 1 (Win-
ter 2000) died in committee or otherwise failed to be enacted
during 2000: AB 365 (R. Wright), which would have required
the PUC to develop and post on the Internet information about
local and long distance telephone services offered by provid-
ers and other consumer information; AB 651 (R. Wright),
which would have required telecommunications providers to
pay the actual costs associated with installation and mainte-
nance of the equipment needed to provide services; AB 1003
(R. Wright), related to the restructuring of the electrical ser-
vices industry; AB 1352 (Longville), which would have cre-
ated the California Trucking Advisory Board; SB 310 (Peace),
which would have prohibited the PUC from enacting or imple-
menting any decision, order, or rule that interferes with the
rights and obligations of the directors of a corporation to ef-
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ficiently and effectively discharge their fiduciary duties to
shareholders; SB 427 (Peace), which would have required
electrical corporations to mitigate for the removal of trees
under utility lines by planting an unspecified amount of trees;
SB 640 (Perata), relating to settlements in certain proceed-
ings before the PUC; SB 932 (Bowen), which would have
enacted the "Telephone Consumers Bill of Rights"; and SB
1217 (Polanco), which would have enacted the Internet En-
hancement Act of 1999.
2001 SPECIAL SESSION
_EGISLATION
As the energy crisis unfolded, Governor Davis called the
legislature into special session commencing January 3, 2001
(concurrent with its regular session) to deal with urgent is-
sues (see MAJOR PROJECTS). During a special session, tra-
ditional legislative rules and deadlines are suspended, per-
mitting the legislature to act on an expedited basis. Some of
these measures are also discussed in the chronology of events
above.
ABX1 5 (Keeley), as amended January 16,2001, replaces
the 26-member ISO governing board with a five-member in-
dependent governing board of directors appointed by the
Governor. The bill prohibits any member of the independent
governing board appointed by the Governor from being af-
filiated with any actual or potential participant in any market
administered by the ISO. The bill also prohibits the ISO from
entering into a multistate entity or a regional organization
unless that entry is approved by the board; requires the board
to require the ISO's articles of incorporation and bylaws to
be revised and filed with FERC as the board determines to be
necessary; and requires the ISO to make publicly available a
list of all powerplants located in the state that are not opera-
tional due to a planned or unplanned outage on the Internet,
updated daily. This bill was signed by the Governor on Janu-
ary 18, 2001 (Chapter 1, Statutes of 2001-02, First Extraor-
dinary Session).
ABX1 6 (Dutra), as amended January 16, 2001, prohib-
its California utilities from selling power generation assets
prior to January 1, 2006; requires those facilities to continue
to be subject to PUC regulation until the Commission has
authorized the disposition of those facilities; and requires the
Commission to ensure that public utility assets remain dedi-
cated to service for the benefit of the public. This bill was
signed by the Governor on January 18,2001 (Chapter 2, Stat-
utes of 2001-02, First Extraordinary Session).
SBX1 7 (Burton), as amended January 18, 2001, autho-
rizes-for a period not to exceed twelve days from its effec-
tive date-the Department of Water Resources to purchase
electric power from any party and to make that electric power
available to the ISO, any public utility, or retail end-use cus-
tomer at the cost of its purchase (plus any specified adminis-
trative costs, transmission and scheduling costs, and other
related costs incurred by DWR). The bill transfers $400 mil-
lion from the general fund to DWR to purchase electric power
during this period, and requires the PUC to adopt and imple-
ment emergency regulations to provide for delivery and pay-
ment mechanisms relating to the sale of electric power pur-
chased by DWR for sale directly or indirectly to the ISO,
public utilities, or retail end-use customers. This bill was
signed by the Governor on January 19,2001 (Chapter 3, Stat-
utes of 2001-02, First Extraordinary Session).
ABX1 1 (Keeley), as amended January 31,2001, autho-
rizes DWR-until January 1,2003-to enter into long-term
contracts for the purchase of electric power and to sell that
power to retail end-use customers and to local publicly owned
electric utilities at not more than DWR's acquisition costs;
the bill appropriates $500 million from the general fund to
DWR to purchase power. The bill also authorizes DWR to
issue revenue bonds, with the authorization of the Depart-
ment of Finance and the State Treasurer, to finance electric-
ity purchases, and limits the amount that they may be issued
to four times the amount of annual revenues generated from
wholesale power.
ABX1 I also establishes in the State Treasury a new
Department of Water Resources "Electric Power Fund," and
requires all revenues payable to DWR under the bill to be
deposited in the fund. The bill requires the Bureau of State
Audits to conduct a financial and performance audit of DWR's
implementation of the bill. This bill was signed by the Gov-
ernor on February 1, 2001 (Chapter 4, Statutes of 2001-02,
First Extraordinary Session).
SBX1 43 (Alpert), as amended April 4, 2001, reduces
rates for large industrial customers of SDG&E. Specifically,
SBX1 43 requires the PUC to establish an initial frozen rate
of 6.5 cents/kwh for all SDG&E customers not subject to
Public Utilities Code section 332.1 (b). The bill also requires
the Commission to consider the comparable energy compo-
nents of rates for comparable customer classes served by
PG&E and SCE and, if it determines it to be in the public
interest, to increase SDG&E's rates to a statewide average
level if it deems necessary; any such rate increase would be
retroactive to the date rate increases ordered in the PUC's
March 27, 2001 decision become effective (see MAJOR
PROJECTS). Finally, the bill prohibits any retroactive recov-
ery of undercollections by any investor-owned utilities. This
bill was signed by the Governor on April 6, 2001 (Chapter 5,
Statutes of 2001-02, First Extraordinary Session).
ABX1 43 (Correa), as amended April 5, 2001, is the
Assembly counterpart of SBXI 43 (Alpert) (see above), and
was signed by the Governor on April 11, 2001 (Chapter 6,
Statutes of 2001-02, First Extraordinary Session).
SBX1 5 (Sher), as amended April 5, 2001 and as it re-
lates to the PUC, appropriates $708.9 million to various state
agencies to implement energy efficiency programs and supple-
ment existing energy efficiency programs. Of that amount,
$246 million is allocated to the PUC to be expended in the
following amounts: $50 million to encourage the purchase of
energy efficient equipment, with priority given for purchases
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of efficient appliances or retirement of inefficient equipment
in low- and moderate-income households, and for the replace-
ment of oldest and least efficient equipment; $100 million to
provide immediate assistance to electric or gas customers
enrolled in or eligible for the CARE program (see MAJOR
PROJECTS); $20 million to augment funding for low-income
weatherization services; $16.3 million for high-efficiency and
ultra-low-polluting pump and motor retrofits for oil or gas
producers and pipelines; and $60 million to provide incen-
tives to encourage replacement of low-efficiency lighting with
high-efficiency lighting systems. Governor Davis signed the
bill on April 11, 2001, but exercised his line-item veto au-
thority to reduce several of the appropriations, including-
with respect to the funds allocated to PUC-reducing the
amount provided for pump and motor retrofits for oil and gas
producers and pipelines from $16.3 million to $12 million
(Chapter 7, Statutes of 2001-02, First Extraordinary Session).
ABX1 29 (Kehoe). Under existing law, the PUC requires
every electrical and gas corporation to file a schedule of rates
and charges providing baseline rates. In establishing these
rates, the PUC must avoid excessive rate increases for resi-
dential customers, and establish an appropriate gradual dif-
ferential between the rates for the respective blocks of usage.
Additionally, in establishing residential electric and gas rates,
including baseline rates, existing law requires the PUC to
assure that the rates are sufficient to enable the electrical cor-
poration or gas corporation to recover a just and reasonable
amount of revenue from residential customers as a class, while
observing the principle that electricity and gas services are
necessities, for which a low affordable rate is desirable. As
amended April 5, 2001, this bill-among other things-re-
quires the PUC, at least until December 31,2003, to require
that all charges for residential electric customers are volu-
metric, and to prohibit any electrical corporation from im-
posing any charges on residential consumption that are inde-
pendent of consumption unless the charges are in place prior
to the effective date of the bill.
ABX 1 29 also appropriates $408.65 million for a variety
of new programs relating to energy conservation, efficiency
and distributed generation, including $20 million for the
PUC's Low-Income Energy Efficiency (LIEE) program. The
bill requires the PUC to designate a baseline quantity of gas
and electricity and to require every gas and electric corpora-
tion to file a schedule of rates and charges providing baseline
rates. The bill also requires the PUC, until December 31,2002,
to ensure that errors in estimates of demand elasticity of sales
do not result in material over- or undercollections of the elec-
trical corporations. Although the Governor deleted about $154
million of the appropriated funds, he signed the bill on April
11, 2001 (Chapter 8, Statutes of 2001-02, First Extraordi-
nary Session).
SBX1 6 (Burton), as amended April 26, 2001, would
create the California Consumer Power and Conservation Fi-
nancing Authority (CPCFA), which would be authorized to
issue up to $5 billion in revenue bonds io finance electricity
generation projects, natural gas transmission and storage
projects, and energy efficiency programs. Specifically, SBX 1
6 would create the CPCFA, to be governed by a five-member
board of directors consisting of four gubernatorial appoin-
tees (confirmed by the Senate and serving staggered terms)
and the State Treasurer. The bill would establish that the pur-
poses of the Authority are to finance, purchase, lease, own,
operate, acquire, or construct generating facilities to supple-
ment private and public sector power sources currently in
operation or under development. The CPCFA could finance
projects on its own or through joint ventures with public or
private entities. The CPCFA would be authorized to finance
energy efficiency programs administered by the PUC, the
CEC, and other qualifying entities; finance retrofits and/or
expansions of existing powerplants for energy efficiency and
environmental improvements; and finance natural gas trans-
portation or storage projects as recommended by the PUC
and pursuant to a needs analysis to be prepared by the PUC
within 90 days of the effective date of the bill.
SBXI 6 would require all generation projects financed
by the CPCFA to provide electricity to California consumers
at the costs of generating that power, including the cost of
financing the project. (The power can be sold outside the state
at just and reasonable rates if it is not needed or if it is finan-
cially advantageous to the state's consumers to do so.) The
bill would also authorize the CPCFA to issue up to $5 billion
in revenue bonds for the stated purposes, but would limit the
amount available for energy efficiency programs to $1 bil-
lion; the bill would also establish a special fund for expendi-
ture of bond proceeds and collection of revenues by the
CPCFA. All monies in the fund are continuously appropri-
ated, except for the CPCFA's annual operating budget, which
is subject to appropriation in the Budget Act. At this writing,
SBX 1 6 has passed both the Senate and the Assembly, but
has been returned to the Senate for that house's concurrence
in Assembly amendments. [S. Floor]
ABX1 3 (Wright), as amended April 26, 2001, would
permit any existing gas customer who enrolls in the CARE
program before October 1, 2001 to be deemed to have en-
rolled in the program as of the effective date of this bill; as a
consequence, the customer would receive a discount equal to
the prorated average monthly CARE discount for that gas
corporation from October 2000 to March 2001. This bill would
also require the PUC to adjust CARE program income re-
quirements annually to account for inflation; require utilities
to offer payment arrangements to customers having trouble
paying their bills, with payments spread over not more than
twelve months; prohibit utilities from disconnecting CARE
customers if the customer is in compliance with the payment
arrangements or if the utility has been provided with notifi-
cation that an energy assistance provider is forwarding pay-
ment sufficient to prevent disconnection; provide for expanded
notification of the availability of the CARE program; and
require the PUC to conduct targeted outreach to low-income
and senior households. [S. EU&C]




SB 1055 (Morrow). Existing law requires the PUC to
establish priorities among the types or categories of custom-
ers of every electrical corporation and every gas corporation,
and to include specified considerations when establishing
these priorities. As introduced February 23, 2001, this bill
would require the PUC to include as a consideration when
establishing these priorities a determination that certain health
facilities shall have access to uninterruptible supplies of elec-
tricity. IS. EU&C]
SB 47 (Bowen), as amended April 18,2001, would delete
the Electricity Oversight Board's exclusive right to decline to
confirm the appointments of members of the ISO's governing
board. SB 47 would instead require the appointment of these
members to be confirmed by the Senate, and change the terms
of the members from one to three years. SB 47 would also
specify that a member of the PX governing board is not con-
sidered to be affiliated with a market participant solely because
of service on the governing board of the PX. [S. Appr]
AB 1233 (Pescetti), as amended April 26, 2001, would
prohibit assessment of local transmission rates on natural gas
if (a) it is delivered to an end-use customer, (b) it is delivered
through a transmission system owned by a gas corporation
that is not interconnected with a local utility transmission
system , and (c) it is blended with gas supplies produced from
an in-state source for the purposes of achieving a usable ther-
mal rate. The bill would require the Commission to adminis-
ter this provision in a manner that prohibits any cost shift to
core customers resulting from the rate exemption required
under the bill. [A. Appr]
AB 1 (Aanestad). Under AB 995 (R. Wright) (Chapter
1051, Statutes of 2000), the PUC- until January 1,2012-
requires electrical corporations to identify a separate rate com-
ponent to collect a system benefits charge to fund energy ef-
ficiency, renewable energy, and research, development, and
demonstration programs (see 2000 LEGISLATION). As
amended April 16, 2001, AB 1 would require the Commis-
sion to establish a single universal rebate rate for all energy
efficiency technologies used for large nonresidential standard
performance contract programs allocated funds under those
provisions. [A. Appr]
AB 69 (Wright), as introduced December 13, 2000,
would require the Governor's Clean Energy Green Team-
which was created in AB 970 (Ducheny) (Chapter 329, Stat-
utes of 2000) (see 2000 LEGISLATION) to provide assis-
tance to persons proposing to construct powerplants-to make
the repowering of existing powerplants a top priority, and
would require it to ensure that any expedited repowering is
subject to conditions that ensure a reduction in the environ-
mental impact of the facility. The bill would also require the
Green Team to encourage regulatory agencies to promote and
accelerate the repowering of existing powerplants within their
existing authority. [A. NatRes]
AB 621 (Corbett), as amended April 5, 2001, would re-
quire the ISO to notify local air pollution control districts or
air quality management districts of all electrical customers
with whom it has, or enters into, interruptible service con-
tracts or similar arrangements. The bill would also require
electrical corporations to notify local air pollution control dis-
tricts or air quality management districts of all electrical cus-
tomers with whom it has, or enters into, interruptible service
contracts or similar arrangements. [A. Appr]
AB 1031 (Canciamilla), as introduced February 23,2001,
would make legislative findings and declarations with respect
to natural gas price increases and the intent of the legislature to
address the long-term risks of high natural gas prices by reduc-
ing California's dependence in winter months on out-of-state
supplies and passing comprehensive legislation to increase in-
state pipeline capacity, increase in-state storage, and increase
in-state production of natural gas. [A. U&C]
Telecommunications Legislation
AB 219 (Committee on Utilities & Commerce). Exist-
ing law requires the PUC-until January 1, 2001 -to estab-
lish a rate recovery mechanism through surcharges on intra-
state telephone service to recover the costs of providing tele-
communications devices capable of serving the needs of the
deaf and hearing-impaired and telecommunications equipment
for the disabled. As introduced February 9, 2001, this bill
would extend the requirement for those telephone surcharges
until January 1, 2006, and delete an obsolete provision. [S.
Apprl
AB 870 (Wesson). Existing law authorizes the PUC to
control and regulate the use of automatic dialing-announcing
devices and specifies the hours during which the devices may
not be operated. As amended April 19, 2001, this bill would
prohibit the use of automatic calling devices (ACDs) which
are capable of sequentially or randomly calling telephone
numbers with no person or prerecorded message available
for the person called on or after July 1, 2002; and authorize
the PUC to establish an acceptable error rate for such devices
on or after July 1, 2002. IA. Appr]
AB 140 (Strom-Martin), as amended April 26, 2001,
would require the PUC to establish a grant program to fund
telecommunications infrastructure projects in areas currently
without such service. The bill would limit the grant funding
to $10 million per year from California High-Cost Fund-A or
the California High-Cost Fund-B, or both, and sunset the pro-
gram after four years. AB 140 would also require the PUC to
establish a government-industry work group to develop tech-
nical criteria for evaluating grant proposals which would be
submitted by community-based groups. [A. Appr]
SB 896 (Poochigian), as introduced February 23, 2001,
would amend existing laws that impose taxes, surcharges, and
fees on mobile telecommunications charges, including emer-
gency telephone surcharges, to reflect changes made by the
federal Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-252. [S. Appr]
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Other PUC Legislation
SB 201 (Speier). Under existing law, the PUC's Office of
Ratepayer Advocates (ORA) represents the interests of public
utility customers and subscribers in Commission proceedings.
The ORA director is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of
the Governor, subject to Senate confirmation. On January 1,
2002, these statutes are scheduled to be repealed and replaced
with new provisions requiring the PUC to create an organiza-
tion or division within the PUC to represent the interests of
public utility customers and subscribers in PUC proceedings.
As introduced February 8, 2001, this bill would delete the re-
peal of the provisions that provide for ORA, ORA's director,
and its funding source; and would repeal the provisions that
were to become operative January 1, 2002. The bill would re-
quire that the ORA Director be paid a salary equal to 90% of
the salary received by PUC commissioners. [S. Appr]
AB 1325 (Negrete McLeod). The Political Reform Act
(PRA) of 1974 regulates the lobbying of the Governor, the
legislature, and regulatory agencies; the Fair Political Prac-
tices Commission (FPPC) is the agency that administers and
implements the PRA. A"lobbyist" is defined as an individual
who receives $2,000 or more in a calendar month or whose
principal duties are to communicate directly or through agents
with an elective state official, agency official, or legislative
official for the purpose of influencing legislative or adminis-
trative action. Most individuals who engage in substantial
"lobbying" activities (as that term is defined in the PRA and
FPPC regulations) are required to register as a lobbyist with
the FPPC, comply with ethical rules, and submit quarterly
reports on expenses incurred in lobbying and contributions
made to covered officials. According to Assemblymember
Negrete McLeod, current FPPC interpretations of the PRA
exempt from lobbyist qualification, and significantly reduce
the reporting of spending on, attempts to influence specified
types of proceedings before the PUC -while similar proceed-
ings at other regulatory agencies are subject to the full appli-
cation of the PRA and the FPPC's regulations. As amended
April 5, 2001, AB 1325 would ensure that individuals and
entities that lobby the PUC comply with the same lobbying
and lobbyist reporting rules that apply to individuals and en-
tities that lobby other state agencies.
AB 1325 would define the term "administrative action"
to include PUC ratemaking proceedings and quasi-legislative
proceedings -thus subjecting those who attempt to influence
PUC administrative action to the PRA's lobbyist registration,
reporting, and ethical requirements. However, communica-
tions made at a PUC public hearing, public workshop, or other
public forum, and communications that are included in the
official record of a PUC proceeding, would not be consid-
ered "lobbying." This bill would also define a payment made
for the purpose of influencing a PUC ratemaking or quasi-
legislative proceeding as a "payment to influence legislative
or administrative action" under the PRA, thus requiring its
reporting to the FPPC. [A. Appr]
LITIGATION
Energy
As the energy crisis hit San Diego and then the rest of
California in late 2000, a number of challenges to utility and
generator practices were filed at the state and federal trial
court level. At this writing, none of these cases has reached
the appellate level or resulted in a published decision, but
they are significant to future evolving caselaw. PG&E's April
4, 2001 bankruptcy proceeding is discussed above (see MA-
JOR PROJECTS). Also mentioned in the chronology above
are other major filings which are now pending at the trial
level and warrant monitoring, including the following:
* Hendricks v. Dynegy Power Marketing Inc., No.
GIC758565, was filed in San Diego County Superior Court,
removed to federal court, and then remanded back to state
court. This case was filed on November 29, 2000 on behalf
of a single ratepayer against 16 power generators. Similar
suits were filed by three San Diego County water districts.
These suits allege violation of federal antitrust law prohibit-
ing unreasonable restraints of trade (Sherman Act section 1).
* SCE v. Lynch, No. CV-00-12056-RSWL (C.D. Cal.),
and PG&E v. Lynch, No. CVO1-1083 (N.D. Cal.), filed by
SCE and PG&E in late 2000, seek a court order compelling
the PUC to order rate increases to pay for the higher energy
costs allegedly imposed by power generators. On February
12, 2001, Judge Ron Lew denied the utilities' motions for
injunctive relief requiring the Commission to raise their rates.
At the time, the court recognized that the PUC had scheduled
emergency ratesetting hearing on the utilities' rate increase
requests; the PUC subsequently approved 50% rate increases
for ratepayers of SCE and PG&E (see MAJOR PROJECTS).
* Berg v. Southern California Gas Co., No. BC 241991,
and City of Los Angeles v. Southern California Gas Co.,
No. BC 247125, are class actions filed in Los Angeles County
Superior Court on December 18, 2000 against Southern Cali-
fornia Gas Co., SDG&E, Sempra Energy (parent of SoCal
Gas and SDG&E), El Paso Natural Gas Co., and other com-
panies related to El Paso. The suits allege a conspiracy to
limit the supply of natural gas resulting in restraint of trade,
unfair competition, and unlawful business practices. Specifi-
cally, the suits allege that the companies agreed not to com-
pete against each other in the southern California and Baja
California markets, and to work together to prevent the con-
struction of other natural gas pipelines that would compete
against them and lower natural gas prices in these markets.
* People v. Dynegy Power Marketing Inc., No.
SCV318189, was filed on January 18, 2001 in San Francisco
Superior Court by the City of San Francisco against the 13
major power producers, contending that they had unlawfully
colluded to manipulate the wholesale market.
* Bustamante v. Dynegy, No. BC 249705, was filed by
California Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante on May 2,
2001 in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The suit names
the major five power producers and alleges that they (and 14
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named executives) violated federal and state antitrust laws in
conspiring to fix prices and supplies of power for California
sale.
On December 30, 1999 in Wise, et al. v. Pacific Gas &
,lectric Co., 77 Cal. App. 4th 287 (1999), the First District
-ourt of Appeal held that the primary jurisdiction doctrine
temporarily precludes court jurisdiction over alleged over-
.harges by PG&E.
The case arose after PG&E initiated a gas regulator re-
placement program (GRRP) to replace approximately
2,000,000 old regulators; during a ratemaking proceeding, the
PUC increased PG&E's rates to enable the utility to pay for
the program. Later, PG&E unilaterally ceased the GRRP pro-
,ram and failed to inform the PUC that it had curtailed the
program and was not incurring the costs of the program it had
previously represented. Plaintiffs brought an action against
'G&E for fraud and unfair business practices in violation of
Business and Professions Code section 17200 and 17500 and
1lublic Utilities Code section 2106; plaintiffs alleged that PG&E
charged its ratepayers over $42 million for services it failed to
provide. PG&E demurred on grounds the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction because exclusive jurisdiction resides with
the PUC. The trial court granted the utility's demurrer without
leave to amend and plaintiffs appealed.
This case turns on the interplay between two sections of
law: Public Utilities Code section 1759, which bars court in-
terference with matters under PUC jurisdiction if the court
action would hamper, hinder, frustrate, or otherwise impede
the PUC's exercise of authority; and Public Utilities Code
section 2106, which grants explicit
private suit where a utility com-
mits fraud or violates the law or a
3UC order. Applying Waters v.
Dacific Telephone Company, 12
.al. 3d 1 (1974), and SDG&E v.
Superior Court (Covalt), 13 Cal.
4th 893 (1996), the court held that
section 1759 bars the suit until the
3UC has had an opportunity to
address the issue. In so ruling, the
court relied substantially on the
and broad authority for
This case turns on the inter
of law: Public Utilities Code
court interference with matte
if the court action would ha
otherwise impede the PUC's
Public Utilities Code section
and broad authority for pr
commits fraud or violates th
,1acement of PUC authority in the constitution itself, which
distinguishes the holding from primary jurisdiction coverage
which might apply vis-a-vis other agencies of statutory ori-
gin. In addition, the GRRP issue had been brought before the
PUC in an administrative proceeding, and the agency was
considering its own investigation into the allegations against
PG&E. Thus, the appellate court reversed the trial court's
decision and remanded it with instructions to retain the mat-
ter on its docket pending further PUC proceedings.
Of particular interest in the decision is the court's strong
dicta on PUC authority. One of the plaintiff's contentions was
that the primary jurisdiction doctrine could not apply because
the PUC lacks legal authority to grant restitutionary relief.
Specifically, the ban on "retroactive ratemaking" prohibits
the Commission from altering rates already set -for any rea-
son. The sole remedy would be a prospective rate adjustment,
which might not accrue to the same victims and may be prob-
lematic. Accordingly, plaintiffs argued that the courts offer
the only practical remedy and that primary jurisdiction should
not bar a civil suit. Indeed, plaintiffs' contentions here mirror
the commonly-interposed defense of utilities to any
restitutionary order based on allegedly excessive prior rates.
In a passage which could make this decision a Pyrrhic vic-
tory for all utilities, the court wrote: "It is inconceivable that
the Legislature intended the PUC would be powerless to award
reparations when a public utility obtained a tariff rate by
fraudulent means." Of course, that is what utilities have con-
tended, with general success, for the last thirty years. The
court expressed confidence that the PUC "in the exercise of
its equitable jurisdiction would be able to fashion a remedy
in the event of fraud committed by a public utility during the
ratemaking process. The exercise of such equitable power will
provide a remedy for the wrong committed and hopefully
serve to deter such fraudulent conduct in the future."
Telecommunications
On January 8, 2001 in Eckert v. Bay Area Cellular Tele-
phone Company, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1369 (2001), depublished
May 16, 2001, the First District Court of Appeal held that an
action under California's Unfair Competition Act, Business
and Professions Code section 17200, against a cellular com-
pany for failing to disclose discounted wireless (cellular)
phone rates for the hearing-impaired is preempted by PUC
jurisdiction. As in Wise v. PG&E described above, the court
was required to reconcile Public
)lay between two sections Utilities Code section 1759
section 1759, which bars (which forbids courts from issu-
ers under PUC jurisdiction ing orders that interfere with or
mper, hinder, frustrate, or hinder Commission policy-mak-
exercise of authority; and ing in matters delegated to it un-
2106, which grants explicit der the Constitution) with Public
ivate suit where a utility Utilities Code section 2106
e law or a PUC order. (which is the sole private remedy
against any regulated utility that
violates the law or a PUC order).
Whereas the appellate court in Wise reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the case, the First District in Eckert affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the case.
Plaintiffs-a hearing-impaired individual and a seller of
hearing aids-complained that defendant cellular telecom-
munications firm failed to notify customers of a reduced rate
for hearing-impaired persons; plaintiffs also alleged that de-
fendant imposed requirements for participation in the reduced-
rate program that exceed the terms of its tariffs filed with the
Commission. In finding that judicial action would hinder on-
going administrative proceedings, the court pointed to a 1996
PUC decision following substantial federal deregulation of
cellular rates, in which the PUC announced that it would
"shortly" issue for public comment a set of consumer protec-
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tion rules applicable to cellular providers. The court also found
that the Commission initiated a proceeding on February 3,
2000 to establish a "telecommunications consumer protec-
tion bill of rights" (see above). Rejecting plaintiffs' conten-
tions that none of these steps involve PUC enforcement ac-
tions or imminent standards, nor do they address plaintiffs'
specific complaints regarding misleading advertising regard-
ing services and charges for the deaf, the court held: "The
commission is, in short, 'still actively pursuing the broad
policy inquiry into [consumer protection in wireless services]
that it initiated in 1996.' Given that administrative posture,
we agree with the trial court's conclusion that it lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' action."
Critics of this holding note
that its logic may be applied to al- The federal courts have
most any activity by a utility given decisions in cases bi
the number and breadth of general Telecommunications Ac
inquiries and studies of the PUC.
Most of them do not result in the tocfostercpeon inkte
exercise of Commission regula-
tion, nor are they intended to im-
ply exemption from the fair competition statutes which apply
generally to all California businesses. As noted above, the
California Supreme Court has depublished the First District's
decision, thus voiding its stare decisis impact.
On June 8, 2000 in Ball v. GTE Mobilnet of California,
et al., 81 Cal. App. 4th 529 (2000), review denied Sept. 27,
2000, the Third District Court of Appeal reinstated a con-
sumer action alleging that California's major cellular phone
companies routinely overcharge customers for "non-commu-
nication" time-including calls its own technology drops post-
connection, and the widespread practice of "rounding up" time
(charging in full-minute billing increments for any part of a
minute used). Plaintiffs alleged the cellular companies' ac-
tion violates California's Unfair Competition Act, Business
and Professions Code section 17200. The trial court sustained
defendant's demurrer, holding that the claim is preempted by
the Federal Communications Act. The Third District reversed.
Relying on a 1996 federal ruling, In Re Comcast Cellular
Telecommunications Litigation, 949 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa.),
the appellate court found that section 332(c)(3)(A) of the
Federal Communications Act, effective August 8, 1995, pre-
empts state law challenges to cellular ratesetting. However,
the court held that plaintiff could invoke section 17200 to
challenge charges that occurred prior to August 8, 1995.
The court also reinstated other section 17200 claims re-
lated to misleading advertising of rates or failure to disclose
charges, rather than the rate charges themselves directly.
Hence, the complaint may contend that the defendants en-
gaged in unfair competition by misleading consumers about
their rates as charged, gaining an advantage over competitors
who might advertise accurately.
On March 23, 2000, the First District Court of Appeal
denied PacBell's petition for a writ of review in Pacific Bell
v. Public Utilities Commission, 79 Cal. App. 4th 269 (2000).
In this case, Pacific Bell filed an "advice letter" with the PUC
attempting to amend a tariff to remove references to "yellow
pages" which are not within PUC jurisdiction. In response,
the PUC asked Pacific Bell to file a formal application to
amend the tariff. Instead, Pacific Bell petitioned the court of
appeal under Public Utilities Code section 1756, which-ef-
fective January 1, 1998-allows a court of appeal as well as
the California Supreme Court to review PUC decisions. [16:1
CRLR 171] The First District denied Pacific Bell's petition,
finding that the PUC was within its discretion when it denied
the changes proposed in Pacific Bell's advice letter.
The federal courts have recently issued a number of deci-
sions in cases brought under the federal Telecommunications
Act of 1996 ("the Act"), Pub. L.
No. 104-104, which is designed to:ently issued a number of
ght under the federal foster competition in telecommu-
1996, which is designed nications, including local tele-
ommunications, including phone markets. In AT&T, et al. v.
Iowa Utilities Board, et al., 525
U.S. 366 (1999), the U.S. Supreme
Court succinctly described the rea-
son for and impact of the statute-including its impact on state
public utilities commissions:
"Until the 1990s, local phone service was thought to be
a natural monopoly. States typically granted an exclusive fran-
chise in each local service area to a local exchange carrier
(LEC), which owned, among other things, the local loop.
(wires connecting telephones to switches), the switche.
(equipment directing calls to their destinations), and the trans-
port trunks (wires carrying calls between switches) that con-
stitute a local exchange network. Technological advances,
however, have made competition among multiple providers
of local service seem possible, and Congress recently ended
the longstanding regime of state-sanctioned monopolies.
The.. .Act fundamentally restructures local telephone mar-
kets. States may no longer enforce laws that impede competi-
tion, and incumbent LECs are subject to a host of duties in-
tended to facilitate market entry. Foremost among these dutie,
is the LEC's obligation under 47 U.S.C. section 251 (c) to share
its network with competitors. Under this provision, a request-
ing carrier can obtain access to an incumbent's network in three
ways: It can purchase local telephone services at wholesale
rates for resale to end users; it can lease elements of the incum-
bents network 'on an unbundled basis'; and it can interconnect
its own facilities with the incumbent's network. When an en-
trant seeks access through any of these routes, the incumbent
can negotiate an agreement without regard to the duties it would
otherwise have under section 251 (b) or 251 (c)... .But if private
negotiation fails, either party can petition the state commis-
sion that regulates local phone service to arbitrate open issues
which arbitration is subject to section 251 and the FCC regula-
tions promulgated thereunder."
* On September 13, 2000 in US West Communications
et al. v. Hamilton, et al., 224 F.3d 1049 (2000), the U.S. Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision in three consoli-






dated cases dealing with the rules pertaining to interconnec-
tion agreements between the established utility (the "incum-
bent local exchange carrier" or "ILEC") and newly compet-
ing carriers ("competitive local exchange carriers" or
"CLECs"). As described above, the Act requires the incum-
bent utility to give access to its conduits and rights of way to
competitors in local call traffic at a fair charge, and that charge
is subject to state PUC arbitration. US West is the ILEC in
Oregon, and sought Oregon PUC (OPUC) approval of recip-
rocal access to the facilities of three CLECs-also at a fair
charge. The OPUC arbitrated and ratified the terms of inter-
connection agreements between US West and the three
CLECs. US West challenged the agreements in federal dis-
trict court, which consolidated all of the cases and upheld
some provisions of the agreements while invalidating others.
US West appealed.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's
decision. Underlying much of its ruling is an FCC policy that
precludes reciprocal use of CLEC facilities by an ILEC. Al-
though critical of this FCC policy and suggesting that it is
contrary to congressional intent, the Ninth Circuit noted that
the Eighth Circuit is currently presiding over multidistrict liti-
gation challenging the FCC's policy, has the exclusive juris-
diction to overturn the relevant FCC order, and has not yet
dispositively ruled (see below). Any final ruling on this sub-
ject will be momentous in California, where the same ques-
tion will then confront the PUC, similarly in charge of ILEC-
CLEC interconnection agreements.
* On July 18, 2000 in Iowa Utilities Board, et al. v.
FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (2000), the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals again tackled the complex issues raised in a number
of consolidated cases brought by numerous parties and state
PUCs challenging the FCC's First Report and Order imple-
menting the local competition provisions of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996.
In 1997, the Eighth Circuit vacated many of the FCC's
regulations implementing the Act, finding that the FCC had
exceeded its jurisdiction (120 F.3d 753); in 1999, the U.S.
Supreme Court largely reversed the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion-finding that the FCC is authorized to adopt numerous
kinds of rules implementing the Act-and remanded the cases
for further proceedings (525 U.S. 366).
On remand, the Eighth Circuit looked not at the FCC's
jurisdiction but at the merits of the rules it adopted. One of
the most contested rules pertains to the prices that ILECs may
charge their new competitors for interconnection, unbundled
access, and resale, as well as rules regarding the prices for
the transport and termination of local telecommunications
traffic. In other words, how much should existing utilities
charge entering companies for access to their networks? The
FCC decided that these rates should be based on the future
cost of operating the existing company's network, using the
most efficient, modern technology. This rate is called the "to-
tal element long-run incremental cost" (TELRIC). The exist-
ing utilities (ILECs) disagreed with the pricing rule, contend-
ing that rates should be based on historical costs, including
past investment decisions-even if those decisions would not
now be replicated in hindsight. The Eighth Circuit agreed with
the ILECs, rejecting the FCC's pricing methodology and hold-
ing that rates should be based on the actual costs of the in-
cumbent carrier's network rather than on hypothetical future
costs.
The new entrants (including WorldCom and AT&T) and
the FCC sought U.S. Supreme Court review by writ of cer-
tiorari, arguing that the rejection of the FCC's simpler "for-
ward-looking" pricing rules will result in a time-consuming
and costly review process for new rates. AT&T argued that
the compensation sought by Verizon (an ILEC) will be gratu-
itously excessive if it is allowed to include historical original
costs for capital structure no longer "used or useful."
On January 23, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari and agreed to review the Eighth Circuit's decision,
limiting its scrutiny to the following three issues: (1) whether
the Eighth Circuit erred in striking down the FCC's pricing
rules that new entrants into the local telephone market must
pay existing local phone service providers; (2) whether the
appeals court erred in holding that the FCC need not include
in its pricing rules the historical costs incumbent phone com-
panies have incurred in constructing their phone networks;
and (3) whether the Act prohibits regulators from requiring
that ILECs combine uncombined network elements when an
entrant agrees to compensate the incumbent company for
doing so.
Although the California PUC and other state commis-
sions initially did not agree with the FCC's pricing rules (or
its assumption of jurisdiction over such rates), they are now
aligned with the FCC, defending its flexible, "forward-look-
ing" format. A decision in these cases is expected in mid-
2002.
* On February 14, 2000 in AT&T Communications Sys-
tem v. Pacific Bell, 203 F.3d 1183 (2000), the U.S. Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies is not a prerequisite to federal court review of a
PUC decision under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
In this case, AT&T sought entry as a competitor into
PacBell's local exchange market. Pursuant to the Act, the two
carriers attempted but failed to negotiate an interconnection
agreement; they petitioned the PUC to arbitrate the unresolved
issues. The PUC arbitrator issued a final agreement, and the
parties submitted it to the Commission for approval. The PUC
approved the agreement with some modifications. AT&T then
sought judicial review of the approval in federal court, and
PacBell contended that administrative remedies had to be
exhausted before seeking review.
The district court held that the Act permits federal courts
to review "final" state agency decisions. It stated that although
the Act had been technically violated because AT&T did not
petition to the PUC for a rehearing (thereby failing to ex-
haust all remedies), "AT&T was entitled to be excused from
the rehearing requirement because 'requiring complete ad-
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ministrative exhaustion in these cases would completely and
unfairly bar the parties from obtaining any review of the in-
terconnection agreements at issue."'
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's judg-
ment to permit judicial review, but disagreed with its opinion
that a "final" order is a prerequisite to receiving that review.
The court held that Congress' intent in the enacting the stat-
ute was not to require exhaustion of state administrative rem-
edies. The court first looked at the wording of the Act and
found that since there is no provision requiring a "final" or-
der (as does the Administrative Procedure Act), Congress must
not have intended that a final determination be made before
seeking review in federal court. The court also determined
that, in the Act, Congress has called for a timely review of
judgments, and that "any state law allowance for
rehearing...cannot stand in the way of this federal provision."
Finally, "the statute provides exclusively for federal court
review and expressly forecloses state court review." All of
these findings, the court held, are contrary to the notion of
exhaustion of state remedies.
* On December 27, 1999 in Pacific Bell v. Cook Telecom
Inc. and PUC, 197 F.3d 1236 (1999), a case of first impres-
sion in the federal appellate courts, the U.S. Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Telecommunications Act of
1996 allows paging companies to
enter into reciprocal compensa- On December 27,1999 in
tion arrangements for the transport Inc. and PUC, a case of fi
and termination of telecommuni- appellate courts, the U.S.
cations. held that the Telecommu
"Reciprocal compensation paging companies tc
arrangements" are provided for in compensation arrangem
section 25 1(b) of the Act, 47 termination of telecommu
U.S.C. section 153(26), as part of
Congress' effort to increase com-
petition local telecommunications markets. The arrangement
requires the networks of all carriers to be interconnected to
each other, and requires the carriers to compensate each other
for the cost of switching calls to their networks. When a
PacBell customer dials a number assigned to a Cook paging
unit, the call is transferred over to a Cook pager by the in-
terconnection mechanisms. Because Cook does not provide
two-way paging service, it does not deliver any calls to
PacBell's network. PacBell argued that because it sends calls
to Cook's network but Cook sends no calls to PacBell's net-
work, the requirements for a reciprocal compensation agree-
ment were not met and Cook was not entitled to compensa-
tion from PacBell. The PUC disagreed, and disapproved an
arbitrated agreement that failed to provide Cook for com-
pensation for costs it incurred in terminating calls to its pag-
ing customers. PacBell sued Cook and the PUC in federal
court. The district court upheld the PUC's decision, finding
that the statute is ambiguous, the PUC's interpretation is
consistent with the FCC's interpretation, and the agencies'
interpretations are entitled to deference. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit's ruling is an important one because it
could cost local phone companies such as PacBell millions
of dollars. Usually the networks mutually exchange calls, so
payments are made from both sides. With one-way paging,
however, all of the payments come from the local exchange
carrier (in this case, PacBell), but no compensation comes
from the other side. This ruling is part of a larger battle over
reciprocal compensation agreements being fought before the
FCC. A heated issue is over whether local exchange carriers
must compensate for calls transferred over to Internet service
providers. Such a ruling could mean far larger amounts of
money to be paid out by PacBell than in this situation.
* On November 4, 1999 in Communications Telesystems
International, et al. v. California Public Utilities Commis-
sion, 196 F.3d 1011 (1999), the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that the federal Telecommunications Act of
1996 does not preempt a state's authority to impose sanc-
tions against a service provider that switched customers' ser-
vices without their consent-a practice known as "slamming."
Communications Telesystems International (CTS) is a
California-based corporation that provides intrastate long dis-
tance telecommunications services under authority granted
by the PUC. In the mid- 1990s, the PUC received 56,000 com-
plaints from consumers alleging slamming by CTS. On May
21, 1997, after more than a year
cificBellv. Cook Telecom of investigation and administra-
impression in the federal tive proceedings before a PUC
th Circuit Court of Appeals AL, the PUC found CTS guilty
ations Act of 1996 allows of slamming, and imposed mon-
enter into reciprocal etary sanctions on the company,.
ts for the transport and as well as a three-year prohibition
ations. on the provision of intrastate long
distance services. CTS challenged
the PUC's prohibition in both
state and federal court, contending that it is preempted by
section 253(a) of the Act, which provides that a state may not
prohibit an entity from providing interstate or intrastate tele-
communications service. Section 253(b), however, provides
that a state is not precluded from imposing requirements nec-
essary to protect the public health and safety, and to safe-
guard the rights of consumers. CTS argued that the
Commission's actions were not necessary to safeguard the
rights of consumers since it had already eliminated CTS's
ability to engage in slamming.
While addressing numerous procedural and jurisdictional
complexities, the Ninth Circuit also addressed the merits of
CTS' preemption claim in its November 1999 decision. The
court found that although section 253(a) contains an explicit
preemption provision, section 253(b) expressly charges states
with imposing requirements necessary to protect competition
in the telecommunications industry and protect consumers
from unfair business practices. The Ninth Circuit noted that
"federal preemption of state regulation in the area of tele-
communications must be clear and occurs only in limited cir-
cumstances," and that state actions may be preempted only








for conduct that is "flagrantly and patently" violative of the
Constitution. The court held that the PUC's actions in fining
and temporarily suspending CTS from providing long dis-
tance service serve the very purpose specified in section
253(b): "The sanctions advanced important state interests and
thus were not 'flagrantly and patently' violative of the Con-
stitution."
On June 22, 2000 in AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d
871 (2000), the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a
decision critical to future competition in the cable industry-
with particular importance to Internet access competition. Two
cable firms (AT&T and Time Warner) currently control over
75% of the residential cable market in the nation. Over 95% of
their respective cable business locally is without effective com-
petition. Cable in Portland and elsewhere increasingly offers
high-speed access to the Internet. The major alternative means
of access to the Internet is through phone lines. Although high-
speed digital subscriber lines (DSL) are growing, they are lim-
ited geographically and by number of subscribers in many ar-
eas. [17:1 CRLR 176; 16:2 CRLR 144-45]
The City of Portland had granted a franchise to Telecom-
munications, Inc. (TCI) to provide cable services to its resi-
dents. TCI had no competition. After AT&T and TCI merged,
the merged company had to seek the approval of local fran-
chising authorities where so required by local franchising
agreements; TCI's franchise with Portland permitted the city
to "condition the Transfer upon such conditions, related to
the technical, legal, and financial qualifications of the pro-
spective party to perform according to the terms of the Fran-
chise, as it deems appropriate." In December 1998, Portland
voted to approve the transfer subject to an "open access con-
dition"- in other words, Portland asked that AT&T not limit
its subscribers to the single Internet service provider (ISP)
associated with AT&T, but to allow competing ISPs to serve
its consumers. That requirement is intended to stimulate com-
petitive opportunity. AT&T refused to accept the condition,
contending that Portland could not prevent it from confining
consumer choice to its own or its selected ISP. Portland de-
clined to approve the transfer agreement; AT&T filed suit in
federal district court, which rejected all of AT&T's claims
and awarded summary judgment to the City of Portland.
In a decision which surprised advocates from all sides,
the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court essentially held that cable
broadband facilities (including Internet access) are subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC. Although the court ad-
mitted that "the FCC has not subjected cable broadband to
any regulation, including common carrier telecommunications
regulation," it opined that the agency has discretion to for-
bear from such regulation within its domain. "Congress has
reposed the details of telecommunications policy in the FCC,
and we will not impinge on its authority over these matters."
The sum total of these conclusions is the deferral of regu-
lation to the private discretion of the cable firms. Consumer
advocates decried the implications of such a posture over what
they contend has become the nation's largest and most politi-
cally powerful unregulated monopoly. They contend that the
two dominant firms exercise effective monopoly power in
the cable entertainment market within their respective mar-
kets (with only the often hidden or unmarketed "basic tier"
of services subject to maximum rate regulation). They argue
that the extension of that power into control of high-speed
access to the Internet raises both economic and long-range
first amendment implications. Some amicus contributors-
including the Center for Public Interest Law-pointed to the
importance of the Internet as a market for commerce and ideas
and warned of creating "choke points" of control by limiting
ISP options for consumers and precluding alternatives. That
concern is heightened by a continuing trend of mergers and
climbing worldwide concentration in media ownership, in-
cluding satellite transmission, entertainment production, com-
puter elements, and Internet access.
On October 2,2000, the FCC announced that it will con-
sider regulating the issue of Internet access, a subject it had
assumed prior to Portland was not within its regulatory do-
main. The FCC's interest was partly spawned by the merger
of Time Warner (the nation's largest cable firm) with America
Online, the nation's largest ISP. The FCC approved an initial
document outlining the questions it must address, including
the assurance of Internet access competitive choice; at this
writing, the matter is still pending.
In a related case, Time Warner Entertainment v. FCC,
240 F.3d 1126 (Mar. 2, 2001), the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit invalidated the FCC's mod-
est limitation on cable/Internet marketshares, imposed to as-
sure a measure of competition. The FCC limited a cable op-
erator to no more than 30% of the cable market in an area,
and a 40% financial interest in the ISPs used by their custom-
ers. In a baffling decision, the court ruled that the precise
percentage limitations imposed by the agency impinged the
first amendment rights of cable operators without substantial
justification. It appears that such limitations, including tighter
restrictions stimulating greater competition, diversity, and
opportunity, might withstand the opinion's analysis where
based on empirical data indicating the consequences of me-
dia concentration. Those consequences seem self-evident to
consumer advocates, who cite cases and lessons from the
record of the initial AT&T breakup, Microsoft's alleged tie-
in restrictions and offenses, and the larger record of consumer
abuse where concentration levels are high and market or regu-
latory checks are absent. The decision was viewed as facili-
tating the massive Time Warner/America Online merger. Had
the FCC rules been upheld, the merger would have required
some divestiture of assets to other firms to maintain concen-
tration levels below the stated maximums. Consumer critics
decried the decision as a major blow to competitive choice
and first amendment access and diversity.
Other Litigation
In January 2001, the Foundation for Taxpayer and Con-
sumer Rights (FTCR) filed People ex rel. FTCR v. Henry
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Duque, No. 318164 (San Francisco Superior Court), a quo prohibited interest is immaterial and did not operate to re-
warranto action against Commissioner Duque under Code store him to the vacant office." The AG concluded that
of Civil Procedure section 803, alleging that Duque must be whether Commissioner Duque forfeited his office when he
disnualified frnm his office be- nurchased the stock "nresents a
cause he owned stock in a tele-
communications corporation
regulated by the Commission.
This matter started in August
2000, when San Francisco
Chronicle journalist Todd Wallack
reviewed Commissioner Duque's
1999 and 2000 statements of eco-
nomic interests and found that the
Commissioner had bought 700 shares of stock in Nextel Com-
munications, Inc., the nation's fifth largest wireless commu-
nications firm, on May 12, 1999. The stock rose 48% to a
value of $14,400 by August 2000. Wallack questioned Duque
about the purchase, asserting that Nextel is a PUC-regulated
company whose stock Duque is not permitted to own under
the California Constitution and the Public Utilities Code.
Duque sold his remaining Nextel stock on August 18, 2000;
Wallack reported the purchase and sale in the August 21, 2000
issue of the Chronicle.
In the furor that followed, Duque contended that his pur-
chase of the stock was an oversight by his investment ad-
viser; he stated that he believed wireless carriers such as
Nextel are regulated by the FCC. In fact, while states are pre-
cluded from regulating the rates charged by wireless carriers,
other aspects of Nextel's business are regulated by the PUC,
and Duque participated in several PUC decisions involving
Nextel subsequent to his purchase of the stock.
On October 4, 2000, FTCR filed an application with the
Attorney General's Office for leave to sue Commissioner
Duque in quo warranto under Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 803, which authorizes the filing of a quo warranto ac-
tion "against any person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlaw-
fully holds or exercises any public office." FTCR contended
that Duque's purchase of the Nextel stock while a member of
the Commission violates Article XII, section 7 of the Califor-
nia Constitution ("a Public Utilities Commissioner may not
hold an official relation to nor have a financial interest in a
person or corporation subject to regulation by the commis-
sion") and Public Utilities Code section 303(a) ("a public utili-
ties commissioner may not hold an official relation to nor
have a financial interest in a person or corporation subject to
regulation by the commission. If any commissioner acquires
a financial interest in a corporation or person subject to regu-
lation by the commission other than voluntarily, his or her
office shall become vacant unless within a reasonable time
he or she divests himself or herself of the interest").
On November 29, 2000, the Attorney General issued a
ruling on FTCR's petition, finding that "it would appear that
defendant's office became vacant immediately upon his ac-
quisition of the 700 shares of stock in Nextel on May 12,
1999. The fact that defendant subsequently disposed of the
substantial issue of law that war-
rants judicial resolution," and
granted FTCR's petition. Be-
cause Duque refused to resign,
FTCR filed its quo warranto ac-
tion in January 2001. At this writ-
ing, the case is pending in San
Francisco Superior Court.
In Pacific Gas & Electric
Company v. PUC, 85 Cal. App.4th 86 (Nov. 30, 2000), the
First District Court of Appeal held that Public Utilities Code
section 453(d), which prohibits public utilities from includ-
ing political advocacy in any bill for services, "unconstitu-
tionally infringes upon public utilities' First Amendment
right to freedom of speech."
PG&E includes a newsletter in its monthly billings to
ratepayers. The newsletter includes energy savings tips, sto-
ries about wildlife conservation, billing information, and even
recipes. The newsletters sent in June, July, and August of 1987
included information regarding federal regulations that PG&E
was seeking to have changed, advancing a lobbying position
on behalf of the utility. An independent energy producers'
association and others filed a complaint with the PUC alleg-
ing that PG&E had violated section 453(d). The parties stipu-
lated that the newsletters were printed at utility expense, used
otherwise unused space available in billing envelopes at no
additional cost to ratepayers, and the conservation advice in
the newsletters provided some economic benefit to ratepayers.
The utility conceded that some of the subject matter in the
newsletter violated section 453(d), but contended that the
prohibition violates its free speech rights. The PUC ruled for
complainants, finding that PG&E violated section 453(d) by
including "with bills for services to its customers literature
designed or intended to promote or defeat any change in fed-
eral legislation or regulations." The PUC ordered PG&E to
refund to its customers $920,000 (representing 40% of the
cost of postage for the billings in the three months at issue).
PG&E appealed.
The First District held the statute is unconstitutional on
its face, as it can only be interpreted as prohibiting the inclu-
sion of political advocacy in billing envelopes. Further, the
court held that the prohibition is not a reasonable time, place,
or manner restriction on protected speech, a permissible sub-
ject-matter regulation, or a narrowly-tailored means of serv-
ing a compelling state interest. The court also rejected com-
plainants' argument that the PUC's decision is necessary tr
prevent forced ratepayer subsidization of PG&E's political
speech as "misleading and meritless," because the PUC did
not find that the inclusion of the newsletter in customers' bills
resulted in ratepayers' contribution to the support of PG&E's
political advocacy; because the PUC found a clear violation
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of section 453(d), it did not reach the subsidization issue. The
First District refused to "accept counsel's post hoc rational-
izations for agency action."
On December 15, 1999, the California Supreme Court
agreed to review the First District Court of Appeal's decision
in Hartwell Corporation v. Superior Court (Santamaria, et
al., Real Parties in Interest), 74 Cal. App. 4th 837 (Sept. 1,
1999; as modified Sept. 29, 1999). In this matter, three sepa-
rate plaintiff groups of residents filed 1997 tort actions in
two superior courts against various PUC-regulated southern
California water companies (including Southern California
Water Company, Suburban Water Systems, and Southwest
Water Company), other non-PUC-regulated water companies,
and general industrial companies for money damages arising
from the contamination of well water in the San Gabriel Val-
ley. The trial courts' various and conflicting decisions on de-
murrers were all appealed to the Second District Court of
Appeal, which eventually recused itself and transferred all of
the matters to the First District. The First District held that
PUC's jurisdiction over water quality standards and regulated
water utilities preempts the filing of tort actions for damages
in court against those regulated utilities. However, the court
refused to extend preemption to claims against utilities not
regulated by the Commission even though issues of the same
or similar subject matter are involved. Plaintiffs and the non-
utility defendants all petitioned for review. [17:1 CRLR 185-
86] At this writing, oral argument is scheduled for November
2001 and the Supreme Court's decision is expected in early
2002.
FUTURE MEETINGS
The full Commission usually meets every other Thurs-
day in San Francisco.
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the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency ized committees
pursuant to Business and Professions Code section gage lending, su
10000 et seq.; DRE's regulations appear in Chapter 6, Title age. Various sul
10 of the California Code of Regulations (CCR). DRE's pri- DRE prima
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the handling of real estate transactions and the offering of Pursuant to Bus
subdivided lands and real property securities by DRE licens- seq., DRE also li
ees. To this end, DRE has established a standard of knowl- supply prospecti
edge-measured by a written examination-for licensing real erties available
estate agents, and a minimum criterion of affirmative disclo- prospective tena
sure for qualifying subdivided lands offerings. DRE also the list. Certifie
works to increase consumer awareness and collaterally as- DRE, but by the
sists the real estate industry in expanding its standards and the Business,Tr
increasing its level of professional ethics and responsibility. A person m
The Real Estate Commissioner, who serves as the chief gage in the real
executive of the Department, is appointed by the Governor, advertise, or ass
subject to Senate confirmation. The Commissioner's princi- son in Californi
pal duties include determining administrative policy and en- censure must ful
forcing the Real Estate Law in a manner that achieves maxi- and pass a real
mum protection for purchasers of real property and those cense. In most c
persons dealing with real estate licensees. The Commissioner pleting the educ
is authorized to issue licenses; promulgate regulations that real estate expe
have the force of law; and revoke or suspend licenses for and salesperson
violations of those regulations, the Real Estate Law, or other general, both ty
applicable laws. The Commissioner is assisted by the Real ting the approp
Estate Advisory Commission, which is comprised of six bro- completion of 4
kers and four public members who serve at the tion courses. At
Commissioner's pleasure. The Real Estate Advisory Com- ensees in Calif
mission must conduct at least four public meetings per year. bering brokers (
.1 -
ner receives additional advice from special-
s in the areas of education and research, mort-
bdivisions, and commercial business broker-
)committees also provide advisory input.
ily regulates two aspects of the real estate in-
(salespersons and brokers) and subdivisions.
iness and Professions Code section 10167 et
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nts are required to pay a fee in order to obtain
d real estate appraisers are not regulated by
separate Office of Real Estate Appraisers within
ansportation and Housing Agency.
ust obtain a real estate license in order to en-
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ume to act as a real estate broker or salesper-
a. An applicant for real estate salesperson li-
fill certain real estate education requirements
estate examination before obtaining the li-
ases, a broker applicant, in addition to com-
ational prerequisites, must have two years of
rience before applying for the exam. Broker
licenses are issued for a four-year period. In
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'riate application and fee, and evidence of
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this writing, there are 311,845 real estate lic-
)rnia, with salespersons (204,250) outnum-
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